Albiach Serrano, Anna

Our capacity to attribute mental states to others, or theory of mind (ToM), affects the way in which we manage social interactions. Likewise, the social scenario in which we find ourselves probably influences our use of ToM. In this study, 6-year-old children and adult women participated in pairs in a task where participants needed to infer their partner’s behavior considering the partner’s visual perception (Experiment 1), knowledge (Experiment 2), and false belief (Experiment 3) regarding the placement of rewards under cups. The results were analyzed according to the temporal direction of the inference (past or future behavior of the partner), the social context (competition or cooperation), and—in the case of women—the type of social relationship with their partner (another adult or their own child). Children solved only the visual perception task, and adults solved the three tasks but performed better in the visual perception task than in the false belief task, suggesting that not only developmental issues but also differences in the intrinsic difficulty of the tasks underlie children’s results. The temporal direction of the inference, in contrast, did not influence their results. Whereas children performed better in the competition context, adults performed better in the cooperation context in one experiment. Moreover, women avoided competing against their own child, and even cooperated with her or him when this was against their own interest, suggesting that cooperation between mothers and children might have been a key driving force in the evolution of ToM in our species.

Nut-cracking with hammer tools (henceforth: nut-cracking) has been argued to be one of the most complex tool-use behaviors observed in nonhuman animals. So far, only chimpanzees, capuchins, and macaques have been observed using tools to crack nuts in the wild (Boesch and Boesch, 1990; Gumert et al., 2009; Mannu and Ottoni, 2009). However, the learning mechanisms behind this behavior, and the extent of nut-cracking in other primate species are still unknown. The aim of this study was two-fold. First, we investigated whether another great ape species would develop nut-cracking when provided with all the tools and appropriate conditions to do so. Second, we examined the mechanisms behind the emergence of nut-cracking by testing a naïve sample. Orangutans (Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus) have the second most extensive tool-use repertoire among the great apes (after chimpanzees) and show flexible problem-solving capacities. Orangutans have not been observed cracking nuts in the wild, however, perhaps because their arboreal habits provide limited opportunities for nut-cracking. Therefore, orangutans are a valid candidate species for the investigation of the development of this behavior. Four nut-cracking-naïve orangutans at Leipzig zoo (P. abelii; Mage = 16; age range = 10–19; 4F; at the time of testing) were provided with nuts and hammers but were not demonstrated the nut-cracking behavioral form. Additionally, we report data from a previously unpublished study by one of the authors (Martina Funk) with eight orangutans housed at Zürich zoo (six P. abelii and two P. pygmaeus; Mage = 14; age range = 2–30; 5F; at the time of testing) that followed a similar testing paradigm. Out of the twelve orangutans tested, at least four individuals, one from Leipzig (P. abelii) and three from Zürich (P. abelii and P. pygmaeus), spontaneously expressed nut-cracking using wooden hammers. These results demonstrate that nut-cracking can emerge in orangutans through individual learning and certain types of non-copying social learning.

When presented with the broken cloth problem, both human children and nonhuman great apes prefer to pull a continuous cloth over a discontinuous cloth in order to obtain a desired object resting on top. This has been interpreted as evidence that they preferentially attend to the functionally relevant cues of the task (e.g., presence or absence of a gap along the cloth). However, there is controversy regarding whether great apes’ behavior is underpinned by causal knowledge, involving abstract concepts (e.g., support, connection), or by perceptual knowledge, based on percepts (e.g., contact, continuity). We presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children with two versions of the broken cloth problem. The Real condition, made with paper strips, could be solved based on either perceptual cues or causal knowledge. The Painted condition, which looked very similar, could be solved only by attending to perceptual cues. All groups mastered the Real condition, in line with previous results. Older children (3- and 4-year-olds) performed significantly better in this condition than all other groups, but the performance of apes and children did not differ sharply, with 2-year-olds and apes obtaining similar results. In contrast, only 4-year-olds solved the Painted condition. We propose causal knowledge to explain the general good performance of apes and humans in the Real condition compared with the Painted condition. In addition, we suggest that symbolic knowledge might account for 4-year-olds’ performance in the Painted condition. Our findings add to the growing literature supporting the idea that learning from arbitrary cues is not a good explanation for the performance of apes and humans on some kinds of physical task.

Chimpanzees help conspecifics achieve their goals in instrumental situations, but neither their immediate motivation nor the evolutionary basis of their motivation is clear. In the current study, we gave chimpanzees the opportunity to instrumentally help a conspecific to obtain food. Following recent studies with human children, we measured their pupil diameter at various points in the process. Like young children, chimpanzees’ pupil diameter decreased soon after they had helped. However, unlike children, chimpanzees’ pupils remained more dilated upon watching a third party provide the needed help instead of them. Our interpretation is that chimpanzees are motivated to help others, and the evolutionary basis is direct or indirect reciprocity, as providing help oneself sets the conditions for a payback. This is in contrast to young children whose goal is to see others being helped—by whomever—presumably because their helping is not based on reciprocity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved)

Observational studies have suggested that some nonhuman primates’ cooperative behavior may rely on their capacity to share goals and understand the role of their partners. Experimental studies have tried to find evidence for this under controlled conditions, investigating aspects like the degree of organization in different primate species and the individuals’ capacity to recognize and choose good partners, switch roles with them, and care about their outcomes. Often, the results have been mixed. Partly, this is because of the methodological difficulties inherent to empirical research. In this paper, I offer a critical, methodological review of the experimental studies done in the last years on nonhuman primates’ cooperation, I discuss their findings, and suggest possible solutions to some of the procedural problems. Hopefully, this will contribute to improve the design of future studies and therefore our knowledge about the evolutionary history of cooperation.

Gaze sensitivity allows us to interpret the visual perspective of others, inferring their intentions and attentional states. In order to clarify the evolutionary history of this ability, we assessed the response of free-ranging Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) to human gaze in three contexts: threat (Experiment 1), cooperation (Experiment 2), and competition (Experiment 3). Subjects interpreted the direct gaze of an approaching human as a sign of threat, showing a greater flight initiation distance and more threats towards the human in this condition than when the human gazed in another direction. Subjects also adapted their behavior to the attentional cues of a human who gave them food, by for example moving into his visual field. However, the macaques did not seem to take the visual perspective of a human competing with them over food, as they failed to first retrieve the food that was not visible to the human (i.e., located behind an opaque barrier). Our results support the idea that Japanese macaques can respond to a human’s gaze flexibly depending on the context. Moreover, they highlight the importance of studying animal behavior across different species and contexts to better understand the selective pressures that might have led to its evolution.