This study aims to address algorithmic collusion within the framework of competition law. It focuses on analyzing potential new measures to prevent practices by firms that restrict competition, and to take advantage of its many efficiency-enhancing and pro-competitive effects. The paper thoroughly explores the concepts of algorithms and collusion, followed by an examination of these concepts in the context of EU competition law. An assessment of the different existing types of algorithms allows for a personalized approach by authorities in each case. Furthermore, four scenarios where algorithms facilitate explicit or tacit collusion are presented: the Messenger, the Hub-and- Spoke, the Predictable Agent, and the Digital Eye. An expansion of the interpretation of the concept of agreement or concerted practice under EU law to forbid harmful pricing algorithms is envisaged, as well as a general prohibition of tacit collusion. The paper equally emphasizes current lacunae in the understanding of algorithms’ working schemes and in the impossibility of the subsequent application of European competition law precepts in certain occasions which endanger a fair competition especially in online markets. With all, the present work illustrates the possibilities that competition authorities could adopt, whilst highlighting the various challenges that authorities may face when doing so.