2. Universidad Cardenal Herrera-CEU

This paper explores the external financing–cash flow relationship in capital structure theory by comparing unlisted (financially constrained) and listed (financially unconstrained) companies. We postulate that investment is determined endogenously in the case of unlisted firms, as they are strongly dependent on internally generated funds (cash flow). Consequently, unlisted firms invest their cash flow in profitable projects, using any residual cash flow to increase their holdings of safe assets. In turn, listed companies determine their investment exogenously and may reduce leverage if they raise an excess of cash flow. As a result, listed companies would react more negatively to shocks in cash flow. Our findings reveal that both unlisted and listed companies show a negative external financing–cash flow relationship, that of the latter being clearly more intense.

We analyze the relevance of adjustment costs in keeping Spanish public firms away from their target leverage. We argue that firm's cash flow outcomes determine the importance of the adjustment costs on capital structure changes. Then, we estimate capital structure adjustment speeds across three different cash flow realizations. We report that during years in which either over-levered or under-levered Spanish public firms make changes in their financing decisions, as a result of their high cash flow realizations, they close significantly more of the gap between current and target capital structure than those firms with intermediate and low cash flow observations. Moreover, independently of the cash flow level, we find that leverage adjusts more quickly for over-levered than for under-levered firms.

This article explores the cash–cash flow relationship by comparing financially constrained and financially unconstrained companies. Unlike previous research, we test the sensitivity of cash to cash flow by considering unlisted firms as constrained and listed firms as unconstrained. Our empirical evidence is based on findings from Spanish firms and is consistent with the core rationale that unlisted firms face more difficulties than their listed counterparts when looking for funding from external markets. As a result, unlisted firms tend to hoard significant amounts of cash out of the generated cash flow, while listed firms do not. Our findings are robust to a number of additional empirical tests.