Monografico_6_EN_Doxa_31_The_Digital_Ecosystem

This rather rigid schema was, according to Coseriu (1962), reworked by Hjelmslev and Lotz at what the Rumanian linguist called the ‘Semantic Conference’ held in 1951, where they introduced the system/norm/speech triad. In the words of Coseriu (1962: 11),

[…] at the conference, Professors Hjelmslev, from Copenhagen, and Lotz, from New York (‘intrinsic’ semanticists and representatives of the ‘integral management of general grammar’) summarised their position in a table illustrating the distinction between three aspects of language –schema, established norm and parole (speech)– instead of the two traditional ones in post-Saussurian linguistics (in which the doctrine of the Genevan expert still is not accepted): langue and parole, lengua and habla (Sprache-Rede, language-speech).1

In short, for them the point of intersection between language and speech derived from the verbal act.

Having said that, over time these conceptions relating to parole were the object of many heated controversies, for which reason in more recent times –albeit bridging the gap– prominent philosophers of language like Austin (1961: 220-240) have preferred to talk about ‘performative utterances’, Searle (1969) about ‘speech acts’ and, lastly, Acero et al. (1989) about preferencias (utterances) in general to allude to ‘[…] any verbal act consisting in the emission (either through our speech apparatus or by some or other mechanical means) or inscription of a sign or set of signs’ (Acero et al., 1989: 33).

Either way, what is truly important is that the rules governing speakers should not be rigid or constrict communication, but favour it and allow for modifications that do not alter the essence of the comprehension of the message, as stated by Coseriu (1962: 107):

Indeed, we have seen that what is imposed on the speaker is not the system (which ‘is offered to him’), but the rules. However, the speaker is aware of the system, uses it and, on the other hand, knows or does not know the rules, obeys or disobeys them, even maintaining himself within the possibilities of the system. […] Thus, the individual speaker appears as a baseline also of change in the system, which begins with unfamiliarity with, or non-acceptance of, the rules.

The speaker’s and, therefore, language’s creative capacity for adapting to different environments and favouring this form of communication is unlimited.

In other words, since communication is only possible in terms of comprehension, it is necessary to delve into its interpretation as a result of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’, which for authors like Gadamer (1995), Palmer (1969) and Lledó (2015) is a fundamental key for interpreting written words from a hermeneutic perspective. Certainly, these authors are interested in written discourse and not the oral kind, because

Hermeneutics is the art of understanding, and the object of this understanding is written discourse. Versus oral discourse that exhausts temporality in its flow, in its successive and ephemeral simultaneity, the written kind loses, in a way, immediacy, that which analytical philosophy has called the illocutionary act, to become inserted into an ambiguous system of perlocutionary acts (Lledó, 2015: 49).

At any rate, so as to understand a phenomenon or specific fact, it is important that this is linked to the meaning and not, in contrast, to the utterance, with which it may even coincide: ‘Human communication is, to start with, a continual

1 All translations are ours, unless otherwise indicated.