doxa.comunicación | 27, pp. 99-120 | 103

julio-diciembre de 2018

Juan Carlos Córdoba Laguna

ISSN: 1696-019X / e-ISSN: 2386-3978

visible figures in the region, mainly cattle ranchers, landowners, and politicians7. In response, these actors supported the formation of paramilitary armies whose purpose was to annihilate or drive the guerrillas out, such as the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (known as AUC in Spanish)8. Their actions included committing a massacre every two days between 1999 and 2000 or according to the UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) the seizure of 6,000,000 hectares of land, and mass displacement of around one million people in 15 years.

Like drug trafficking, paramilitarism was supported by a part of Colombian society who saw it as their saviour, media support for it was also decisive. This support influenced the population’s reaction, as they assumed that the problem was not so serious. The infiltration of paramiltarism in politics is called “para-politics,” the president at the time Álvaro Uribe Vélez has been accused of belonging to it alongside other politicians, several of them are in prison or are being tried in legal proceedings, but often do not receive any real sanction. Some of these allegations have been made by world-renowned media:

“The cables published this Friday by The New York Times, put Former president Uribe in a compromising position, just hours away from presidential elections this Sunday. The events mentioned in the cables would have taken place between 1992 and 1995 when Uribe Vélez still belonged to the Liberal Party. The former president has reiterated that he has never had anything to do with drug trafficking” (El Espectador, May 25, 2018, Judicial Section).

The end of Uribe’s government marked the beginning of a decline in the fight against guerillas who remained during its mandate, although they had been weakened by financial problems and the loss of their leaders 9 they began talks in 2013. This polarised the country who took opposing sides on any issue between left and right wing, like in the 2016 Plebiscite. President Santos’ government sought to endorse the Peace agreements signed with the FARC in Havana, but to the publics’ general surprise “No” won in the 2016 Plebiscite, empowering the right wing that would go on to win the 2018 presidential elections.

The triumph of “No” was another chapter in media spectacularisation, the “No” campaign leader implemented a strategy of disinformation about the peace agreements. This was used to win votes, by distorting victims’ and indigenous groups’ marches calling for an end to the conflict, and by discrediting the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to President Santos. This phase was full of information, unexpected events, opinions with little historical reference, apologist, extremist or conciliatory approaches, as well as views that interfered with the way individuals constructed their view of the conflict.

In the 2016 referendum, private TV channels in Colombia engaged in a struggle to win viewers over and generate profits from the event. They resorted to the spectacular to achieve this goal; while at the same time showed an optimistic country

7 The most famous kidnapping by the FARCwas of a French-Colombian citizen and presidential candidate, Íngrid Betancourt, which lasted six years [2002-2008]. Her release was obtained through a military operation to deceive the guerrillas, dubbed “Operation Checkmate”.

8 Together with the massacres and displacement, the paramilitaries assassinated Jaime Garzón in 1999, one of the most renowned journalists and comedians in the country.

9 Raúl Reyes was assasinated in 2008, in a Colombian Army military operation in Ecuador. In 2009, the FARC announced that its founder Manuel Marulanda “Tirofijo”, the world’s oldest guerilla had died.