Álvarez Rubio, Juan José2021-04-222021-04-222018-12-01http://hdl.handle.net/10637/12469En: Arbitraje: revista de arbitraje comercial y de inversiones. eISSN. 2603-9281. vol. 11, n. 3, 2018, pp 703-734El caso RFC Seraing v. FIFA gira en torno a la prohibición del Third Party Ownership (TPO), impuesta por la FIFA en el art. 18ter de su Reglamento sobre el Estatuto y la Transferencia de Jugadores (RETJ). La sentencia de 20 febrero 2018 del Tribunal Federal Suizo (TFS) reabre el debate acerca de la especificidad del Derecho del deporte y la proyección sobre el mismo de los principios y normas del Derecho europeo; en su decisión, el TFS desestima el recurso de anulación presentado por un club de fútbol de tercera división belga contra el laudo dictado por el Tribunal Arbitral de Deportes (TAS) el 9 marzo 2017. La decisión del TFS considera, por un lado, que el TAS es un verdadero tribunal arbitral y confirma a su vez la validez de la prohibición impuesta por la FIFA a los TPO. El litigio abre de nuevo el debate centrado, por un lado, en el análisis de la compatibilidad de la normativa FIFA con la legislación europea que ampara la libre circulación de personas y capitales así como la protección de la libre competencia y por otro en la interacción entre las decisiones arbitrales del TAS y las de los respectivos tribunales estatales, junto al papel decisorio final que previsiblemente habrá de jugar el TJUE en esta materia sobre la que todavía no ha tenido ocasión de pronunciarse. En paralelo, el RFC Seraing y Doyen Sports Ltd. iniciaron un procedimiento judicial en Bélgica contra la FIFA, la UEFA y la Federación Belga de Fútbol). Procesalmente, el tribunal belga tenía que determinar si podía declararse competente o si la excepción de arbitraje alegada por la FIFA (es decir, que la disputa tenía que dirimirse por arbitraje ante el TAS), era válida. El 29 agosto 2018, la Corte de Apelación de Bruselas dictó una decisión declarándose competente al considerar que la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en los Estatutos de la FIFA no era válida al ser demasiado genérica. En su argumentación, y haciendo referencia al art. 1681 del Code judiciaire belga y al art. II del Convenio de Nueva York sobre el Reconocimiento y la Ejecución de Sentencias Arbitrales Extranjeras de 1958 (CNY), la Corte de Apelación de Bruselas consideró que la cláusula de arbitraje TAS contenida en los Estatutos de FIFA no cumplía con el requisito de referirse a una relación jurídica determinada (“rapport de droit déterminé”).The case Rfc Seraing v. FIFA revolves around the ban of the Third Party Ownership (TPO), imposed by FIFA in art. 18 ter of its Regulations on the Statute and Transfer of Players (RETJ).The judgment of February 20, 2018 of the Swiss Federal Court (SFC) reopens the debate about the specificity/particularity of sports law and the projection on it of the principles and rules of European Law; in the decision, the SFC dismisses the appeal of annulment filed by a Belgian third division football club against the arbitral award issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on March 9, 2017. The decisions of the SFC considers, on the one hand, that the CAS it is a true arbitral tribunal and confirms in turn the validity of the prohibition imposed by FIFA on the TPO. The litigation opens again the debate centered, on the one hand, on the analysis of the compatibility of the FIFA regulations with European legislation that protects the free movement of people and capital as well as the protection of free competition and on the other hand in the interaction between the arbitral decisions of the CAS and those of the respective state courts, together with the final decision–making role that the CJEU will foreseeable have to play in this matter on which it has not yet had the opportunity to rule. Meanwhile, RFC Seraing and Doyen Sports Ltd. initiated legal proceedings in Belgium against FIFA, UEFA and the Belgian Football Federation. Procedurally, the Belgian court had to determine whether it could declare itself competent or whether the arbitration exception alleged by FIFA (that is, the dispute had to be settled by arbitration before the CAS) was valid. On August 29, 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal issued a decision declaring itself competent when considering that the arbitration clause contained in the FIFA Statutes was not valid because it was too generic. In his argument, and making reference to art. 1681 of the Code judiciaire Belgian and to art. II of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (CNY), the Brussels Court of Appeal found that the TAS arbitration clause contained in the FIFA Statutes did not meet the requirement to refer to a specific legal relationship (“rapport de droit determine”).The case Rfc Seraing v. FIFA revolves around the ban of the Third Party Ownership (TPO), imposed by FIFA in art. 18 ter of its Regulations on the Statute and Transfer of Players (RETJ).The judgment of February 20, 2018 of the Swiss Federal Court (SFC) reopens the debate about the specificity/particularity of sports law and the projection on it of the principles and rules of European Law; in the decision, the SFC dismisses the appeal of annulment filed by a Belgian third division football club against the arbitral award issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on March 9, 2017. The decisions of the SFC considers, on the one hand, that the CAS it is a true arbitral tribunal and confirms in turn the validity of the prohibition imposed by FIFA on the TPO. The litigation opens again the debate centered, on the one hand, on the analysis of the compatibility of the FIFA regulations with European legislation that protects the free movement of people and capital as well as the protection of free competition and on the other hand in the interaction between the arbitral decisions of the CAS and those of the respective state courts, together with the final decision–making role that the CJEU will foreseeable have to play in this matter on which it has not yet had the opportunity to rule. Meanwhile, RFC Seraing and Doyen Sports Ltd. initiated legal proceedings in Belgium against FIFA, UEFA and the Belgian Football Federation. Procedurally, the Belgian court had to determine whether it could declare itself competent or whether the arbitration exception alleged by FIFA (that is, the dispute had to be settled by arbitration before the CAS) was valid. On August 29, 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal issued a decision declaring itself competent when considering that the arbitration clause contained in the FIFA Statutes was not valid because it was too generic. In his argument, and making reference to art. 1681 of the Code judiciaire Belgian and to art. II of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (CNY), the Brussels Court of Appeal found that the TAS arbitration clause contained in the FIFA Statutes did not meet the requirement to refer to a specific legal relationship (“rapport de droit determine”).application/pdfspArbitraje deportivoOrden público y derecho europeoEspecificidad del Derecho del DeporteNormativa FIFASports arbitrationPublic order and european lawSepecificity of Sports LawRegulation of FIFAArtículo10.19194arbitrajeraci.11.03.02https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es