L'anima in Tommaso D'Aquino, morte cerebrale e problemi in bioetica.

Abstract

Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine about the soul, and particularly, his quote in S.Th. I, q. 75-83, is the central argument to explain that the human soul is all over the human body and that, therefore, human death does not mean death of a single organ but loss of unity for the whole organism. Is it possible to harmonize Aquinas’ theory with our current perspective to determine individual death based on the criteria of brain death? This paper analyzes the problem of brain death and states that human death is produced by the loss of “integrative somatic unity” for the whole organism. Brain death is just the material sign of it. Aquinas defines death as the separation of the soul and the body or as absence of life. The first definition is metaphysical and the second one phenomenological. The second definition can be determined with scientific criteria. In fact, brain death is a clear sign showing absence of organic unity, total lack of life. On the other hand, it is not possible to have empirical certainty of the first definition, we will not be able to see the soul and body separating from each other. Therefore, we also need scientific criteria to determine if this has happened or not: brain death is the more reliable criteria to settle this question. In brief we will try to summarize the bioethical implications of this definition: organ donor conditions, anencephalic children, persistent vegetative state patients, etc. Finally, some criticism of functionalism criteria will help to settle the question.