



CEU

*Instituto Universitario
de Estudios Europeos*

Universidad San Pablo

Documento de Trabajo

Serie Unión Europea y Relaciones Internacionales

Número 83 / 2017

Peace and Reconciliation Processes: The Northern Irish case and its lessons

Carlos Johnston Sánchez



CEU | *Ediciones*

Documento de Trabajo
Serie Unión Europea y Relaciones
Internacionales
Número 83 / 2017

**Peace and Reconciliation Processes:
The Northern Irish Case and its lessons**

Carlos Johnston Sánchez

El Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos de la Universidad CEU San Pablo, Centro Europeo de Excelencia Jean Monnet, es un centro de investigación especializado en la integración europea y otros aspectos de las relaciones internacionales.

Los Documentos de Trabajo dan a conocer los proyectos de investigación originales realizados por los investigadores asociados y colaboradores del Instituto Universitario en los ámbitos histórico-cultural, jurídico-político y socioeconómico de la Unión Europea.

Las opiniones y juicios de los autores no son necesariamente compartidos por el Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos.

Los Documentos de Trabajo están también disponibles en: www.ideo.ceu.es

Serie *Unión Europea y Relaciones Internacionales* de Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos

Peace and reconciliation Processes: The Northern Irish Case and its lessons

Cualquier forma de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública o transformación de esta obra solo puede ser realizada con la autorización de sus titulares, salvo excepción prevista por la ley. Diríjase a CEDRO (Centro Español de Derechos Reprográficos, www.cedro.org) si necesita fotocopiar o escanear algún fragmento de esta obra.

© 2017, Carlos Johnston Sánchez

© 2017, Fundación Universitaria San Pablo CEU

CEU Ediciones

Julián Romea 18, 28003 Madrid

www.ceuediciones.es

Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos

Avda. del Valle 21, 28003 Madrid

www.ideo.ceu.es

ISBN: 978-84-16477-81-4

Depósito legal: M-33805-2017

Maquetación: Servicios Gráficos Kenaf s.l.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| INTRODUCTION | 3 |
| 1. THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT: COLONIALISM, RELIGION AND ETHNICITY..... | 6 |
| 1.2. A brief history: Ireland before and during the Middle Ages | 7 |
| 1.3. A brief history: Plantation and the arrival of Protestantism in Ireland..... | 8 |
| 1.4. A brief history: From Wolf Tone to the Easter Rising | 10 |
| 1.5. A brief history: The Irish War of Independence, the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Irish Civil War .. | 17 |
| 2. NORTHERN IRELAND: THE NEW ULSTER AND ITS FAULT LINES | 21 |
| 2.1. The early years: 1923-1968..... | 21 |
| 2.2. Northern Ireland: The Troubles 1968-1979..... | 27 |
| 2.3. Northern Ireland: The Troubles during the Premiership of Margaret Thatcher 1979-1990 | 30 |
| 2.4. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 | 32 |
| 2.5. The loss of hope | 36 |
| 3. THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND | 39 |
| 3.2. The peace process: The Downing Street Declaration and the first IRA ceasefire..... | 40 |
| 3.3. The peace process: Stormont talks begin in 1997..... | 43 |
| 3.4. The peace process: The Good Friday Agreement in a new Northern Ireland(1998) | 48 |
| 3.5. Internal pressures during the peace process | 54 |
| 3.6. External Pressures | 56 |
| 4. NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BASQUE COUNTRY. NATIONALISM AND THE DECOMMISSIONING PROCESS..... | 63 |
| 4.1. The Basque problem and its relation with Northern Ireland. | 63 |
| 4.2. The decommissioning process of the IRA and ETA | 70 |
| CONCLUSIONS | 76 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 80 |

Introduction

For nearly thirty years, Northern Ireland's highly polarised society descended into open conflict between two ideologically religious factions. The Troubles –a term used for the Irish War of Independence in the 1920's, but in relation to the focus of this dissertation for the violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the end of last century– effectively marked the last modern conflict to be fought in Western Europe.

The Troubles threatened to destabilise the European Union, casting a shadow over the process of European enlargement and integration, with a core Member State, the United Kingdom (which had joined in 1973) having to deal with violence and instability on home soil. Consequently, European media coverage of the Troubles was wide, although the reality –or rather complexity– of the ongoing situation still tended to elude the great majority of European citizens, including the British themselves. Of course, the situation in Ulster, the most northerly of the Irish provinces, was multi-layered and complex, its roots deep within a history of division that was, by turns, colonial, post-colonial, ethnic, religious, ideological and, of course, military. The result was an inflammatory cocktail of failed diplomacy, tribalism, bigotry and sectarianism that, in the most recent phase of the Troubles, began with the rise of the Civil Rights and People's Democracy movements in 1968 and came to a stuttering, although incomplete, halt with the signing of the Good Friday –or Belfast Agreement– in April 1998. The long road to peace had led to the death of approximately 3500 people. To put this in terms of comparative population size (as a guide to impact on the population), it would be the equivalent of over 90,000 deaths in Spain during the same period.

This dissertation asks why. It begins by interrogating how the history of Ireland before and after partition has shaped the present and how the Troubles are deeply rooted in the past. A central research question emerges from this: how has the past been interpreted and used as a narrative and, linked to this, how might the different narratives that emerge from the past not only help us to understand confrontation between two communities, but more recently, during the peace process, how do they explain how the shared experience of a divided history served as a basis for reconciliation? Accordingly, Chapter One provides a necessary but brief account of Irish history, not in any attempt to be comprehensive or judgemental of the truth, but to set out the story of the past that each community tells itself. To begin to understand the conflict, and what we can learn from it, we need to focus on the roots of a historical divide that was, in general terms, to reshape modern diplomacy and, in particular, provide an international model for peace negotiation.

History could be described as a way of telling a story that helps us make sense of the world and our place in it. We cannot interiorise the events of the past through personal experience, so we are taught about it by historians. But history is conditioned by who writes it. No matter how scholarly and detailed historiographical writing is, people will choose to interpret it. In that way, no one has access to the ultimate truth. As the eminent English philosopher of history R G Collingwood implied, when he wrote that “the historian's picture of the past is ... in every detail an imaginary picture”. the past seems to become more real when it is interpreted rather than when it is objectively recorded. This is especially true in the history of conflicts, where two opposing sides believe they are in the right about the truth of history. This is why chapters Two and Three examine the fault-lines that two conflicting

¹ Explanatory Note: Ulster is a term often used by Unionists in reference to Northern Ireland, but it is also part of one of the four provinces of the island of Ireland, which is composed by: Connacht, Munster, Leinster and Ulster. Many Republicans may also use this word, but it is more common to hear them talk about the “North of Ireland” or simply “the North” rather than Ulster of Northern Ireland.

² CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “Malcom Sutton: An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status.html>] Accessed on the 1st of June, 2017. The population at the last census had risen to just over 1.8 million, 2017 - which is an important indicator of inward economic migration as a key stabilising element within the new Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency “Census Population Tables (2011)” 2011 [Online] [Available at <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/2011-census-results-population-estimates-summary-tables-25-september-2014.pdf>] Accessed on the 1st of June, 2017.

interpretations of history generated in Northern Ireland, and the resulting failure of hope from those who felt that the possibility of change would never arrive due to the weight of history on Northern Irish society. Corroborating this part of the dissertation is the question: how and why do we allow ourselves to become prisoners of the past?

The discussion then goes on to consider the peace process itself, its success highlighted by the way it seems to have broken the mould of the past. The questions to which the remaining chapters in the dissertation respond are, therefore, more outward looking: how did civic society in Northern Ireland distance itself from history in order to begin to find peace? To what extent did the international context play a role in breaking the mould of the past? And finally, what are the lessons to be learnt from the Northern Irish peace process? Can they only be understood and applied within this particular conflict, given the specificities of its historical context, or can other countries where there is internal conflict, like Spain or Colombia, benefit from an analysis of the Northern Irish experience? In terms of this final question, given the constraints of space in this dissertation, the discussion will be limited to the Basque question, but it is the view of the writer that certain similarities can be found in both cases.

1. The Roots of the conflict: Colonialism, Religion and Ethnicity

In contrast to its geographical size, a mere 5,459 square miles. Northern Ireland has occupied a great amount of space in the global press. In itself this is an indication both of the complex international implications of the issues that underlay the conflict, and of the deep roots of a history of colonialism and divided ethnicity that reflected the experience of many other countries. It is a history of colonial division that translates itself not only into external perceptions of the conflict as a fundamentalist divide reminiscent of Reformation Europe where Catholics are set against Protestants, but that also reflects the lived experience of many within Northern Ireland's two major communities. Nevertheless, the issue has its roots less in theology and more in colonial policy. Put simply, while Protestants, in their vast majority, see themselves as British citizens within the United Kingdom (UK), the majority of Catholics have a deep emotional, cultural and political attachment to the aspiration of a united Ireland. For that reason, Protestants tend to group under labels such as "loyalist" (in the case of working –class Protestants) or "unionist" (reflecting the two main pro-British parties, the larger Democratic Unionist Party [DUP] and the less– influential Ulster Unionist Party [UUP]) while Catholics associate themselves with labels such as "republican" or "nationalist" (reflecting an aspiration towards emancipation from the British Crown and re-unification with the Republic of Ireland).

In that sense, Northern Ireland continues to embody today a division inherited from a colonial past, the conflictive relationship between Ireland and its powerful island neighbour to the east. At the heart of this division stand two different narratives of history, two different ways of imagining the politics of a common land. The DUP, as we have mentioned Northern Ireland's main Protestant/Loyalist political group, refer only to Northern Ireland and its relationship with the rest of the UK on their website. On the other hand, Sinn Féin, the main republican party, operating in both the North and the Republic of Ireland, mentions Northern Ireland on very limited occasions on their website but does mention Ireland, an island that Sinn Féin casts in historical terms as "as a single national unit" before the English economic and military presence made itself felt there. These two different narratives seem to appeal to realities that are historically questionable (the republican

³ Collingwood, R.G, *The Idea of history* [1946] Revised edition with lectures 1926- 1928. (Jan van Der Dussen, Ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. Accessed on the 2nd of June, 2017.

sense of a pre-colonial and united nation and the unionist depiction of an ethnically –defined Protestant Ulster)– have, and still do, created fierce loyalties that all too often appear to be more embedded in tribal instinct than political analysis.

1.2. A brief history: Ireland before and during the Middle Ages

Before the Norman invasion of Ireland, which took place in various stages throughout the late twelfth century, clear political and social structures were in place on the island, in part confirming Sinn Féin’s account, although it is also true that these structures were spread across a number of smaller kingdoms, or fiefdoms, that grouped themselves into the four provinces that survive today as Ulster, Munster, Leinster and Connaught. These four provinces fought continual territorial wars so that, apart from periods of unity against external enemies, for example, during the Viking invasion from the 9th to the 11th centuries. internal conflict was a constant of the island’s history.

The arrival of the Normans, however, drew England into Irish geopolitics. And it was precisely one of the kings of the province of Leinster, Dermot McMorraugh, who lured them into Ireland in the year 1170 so that they could help him settle his territorial disputes. While this occurred, King Henry II, fearful of the possible rise of a rival Norman kingdom in Ireland, decided to claim what he considered his territorial right as Lord of Ireland. His resulting invasion in 1171 was authorised by Pope Adrian (the only ever English-born Pontiff), in response to stories of abuse and forbidden practices (such as simony) within the Irish Church, which had forced him to issue the papal letter known as “Laudabiliter” sixteen years earlier. It was this bull, granting rights in Ireland to the English crown, which convinced Henry of the legitimacy of his action. Effectively, also, it ushered in the colonial phase of Irish history, as lands were possessed and re-distributed to loyal Norman barons and those Irish kings who swore allegiance. At the heart of this process of colonisation was a distinct procedure of acculturation through political and marital alliances, whose effects were to change the cultural face of Ireland, a change whose impact has been significant throughout the whole of Irish history.

While the Normans adopted Irish culture, it was also the Irish who fell under English influence, in terms of law, language, customs, dress and administration. Ulster, however, the most northerly province and therefore the most geographically distant from London, remained resistant and resolutely Gaelic in its identity. Even with the creation of an Irish Parliament, in 1297, Ulster remained a thorn in the English side. This essentially ecclesiastical and culturally Norman Parliament condemned any type of integration with the Irish, including intermarriage, the wearing of Irish costume or the raising of children in Irish ways or language. Leading historians today, such as Richard Finnegan and Edward McCarron, describe this maintenance of difference in terms of “signalling the somewhat insecure status of the Anglo-Norman elite in Ireland”. But with the ongoing separation of Ulster, there was no unified movement to expel the Norman-English, so that increasingly the north of Ireland became identified in the mind of the colonisers as a source of resistance and potential rebellion.

⁴ Barrow, Mandy “Facts and figures about Northern Ireland” Project Britain [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://projectbritain.com/northern_ireland.html] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

⁵ Explanatory Note: Sin Féinn is a Nationalist/Republican party that represents all 32 counties of Ireland-26 in the South and 6 in the North. The party was formed in 1905, and the name means “Ourselves alone” in Irish.

⁶ Sinn Féin “History of the conflict” Sinn Féin [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.sinnFéin.ie/history>] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

1.3. A brief history: Plantation and the arrival of Protestantism in Ireland

The English Reformation of 1534 led to religious schism as Henry VIII dispossessed the Catholic Church and turned to Protestantism. Ireland, of course, remained resolutely Catholic, with the result that the Tudor monarchs feared that Ireland would attract new allies, such as the Catholic kingdoms of France and Spain, so a new sense of urgency about imposing English law and practice throughout what was left of Gaelic Ireland began to make itself felt. In 1541, Henry was named King of Ireland by the Irish Parliament, issuing a series of bribes designed to win over Irish chieftains and leaders. The process was a long one and, of course, not without its own series of bloody conflict. But after a rising of Irish Earls was defeated at the battle of Kinsale (1603), all of Ireland finally fell under English control, and Gaelic-Irish traditions and laws were replaced. But the problem remained: how might the most rebellious of Irish provinces, Ulster, be pacified? A reworking of the traditional colonial strategy of dispossession and re-assignment of lands was implemented by James I. This so-called 'Plantation' granted lands confiscated by the Crown from their native Irish owners to protestant landlords made up of English and mainly Scottish settlers, so that not only was control of Ulster decisively guaranteed in the short term, but in the longer one the divided make-up of the province was permanently ensured. Even though there were still Gaelic-Irish tenants, all Catholic, by 1641 six-sevenths of the population in the North were Protestants, who owned all the land. After its success in Ulster, plantation continued to take place all over the island.

Colonial dispossession, of course, feeds resentment. In 1641, during the English Civil War, the native Irish rose against the English invaders. The reality of sectarianism, a term widely used across Northern Ireland today and an effective result of the consequence of a colonial strategy to divide and conquer, began to impose itself. Bloody massacres of protestant populations took place, many of them in Ulster where, in one such incident, more than a hundred Protestants were drowned in the River Bann at Portadown. Events like these (along with many others), even though they seem distant in history, remain alive in the historical memory of both sides of the divide, and have shaped the Ulster Protestant's vision of Catholic violence towards their own culture in Northern Ireland.

Rebellion and retaliation, insurrection and brutal response, formed the violent history of an island that refused to be fully colonised. By 1685, Catholicism had re-asserted itself in England after James II was crowned king, but by then the whole nation was deeply distrustful of Catholicism and the London Parliament replaced him with the Protestant William of Orange. Enraged, James fled to Ireland to rally Catholic support. Finally, his troops were defeated at the River Boyne by William of Orange, now known as William III. This victory was of strategic importance, but it also symbolised the final victory of the Protestant religion over the Catholic one; for King William's loyal subjects, its moral rightness in the eyes of God was assured. Once again, history provides a potent storehouse of collective memory. To this day, the Loyalist community in Northern Ireland celebrates this victory every 12th of July, and from it the Orange Order, a supremacist Protestant organisation, was born. By the end of the 17th century, Protestants accounted for approximately 25% of the population. but they made up the entirety of the Irish Parliament. Through this "orangeism", as it became known, a series of repressive laws, the Penal Laws, were created to enshrine the Protestant hegemony and to control the Catholic population, embedding the perceived moral and cultural superiority of Protestantism in law.

⁷ Explanatory Note: It is said that Brian Boru, a well-known Irish warrior with legendary status, fought the Vikings (or Ostmen, as they called themselves) and even managed to accomplish what few kings had tried in the past: the coming together of Ireland as a single monarchical authority. This endeavour went to the lengths of Boru being proclaimed "Emperor of the Irish". However, his death on Good Friday in the year 1014 at the battle of Clontarf marked the return of conflict amongst the Irish provinces and kings. Also, more and more Hiberno-Norse settlers were starting to intermarry with Irish population and integrating themselves among the Irish society.

Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. Ireland, *Historical Echoes, Contemporary Politics*. United States of America (2000). WestView Press, p. 5. Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

⁸ Explanatory Note: Simony: "The practice, now usually regarded as a sin, of buying or selling spiritual or Church benefits such as pardons, relics, etc., or preferments". Farlex, *The Free Dictionary [S.D.]* [Online] [Available at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/simony>] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

1.4. A brief history: From Wolfe Tone to the Easter Rising

As the largest Protestant region in Ireland as a result of the Plantation, repression was most strictly enforced in Ulster. It is an interesting paradox of history that the Presbyterians, who were associated with egalitarian politics, also rejected the stern enforcement of the Methodist and Church of Ireland denial. They too were banned from public offices and the military, which led many to emigrate to America, where they chose to fight against British rule in the American War of Independence (1775-1783). The ideals that inspired the French and American Revolutions resonated powerfully in Ireland, especially in Ulster, where a group of disaffected Presbyterians and dispossessed –mainly associated with middle class citizenry– came together under the symbolic name of the Society of United Irishmen. In Belfast, Ulster’s biggest city, today the capital of Northern Ireland, they plotted a rebellion modelled on republicanism and the concept of a new democracy, like the ones that had just been implemented in the US and France. In a moment of revolutionary fervour, they searched for a union of all Irishmen, regardless of religion. It can therefore be argued that this Society was indeed the first attempt at achieving some kind of reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics, although some experts argue that a number of Protestants felt unease at the reality of Catholic emancipation. But it is no less true that both communities came together through the shared experience of oppression, Ulster Presbyterians at the hands the Anglicans, and Catholics under the yoke of the Protestant landowners. In this way, identification of common cause, not through a shared enemy but as a result of shared suffering, becomes a viable model for qualitative change.

Led by key figures such as Theobald Wolfe Tone –who would later be regarded as a martyr in the struggle for independence– Thomas Russell, Henry Joy McCracken (who was finally hanged in Belfast’s Corn Market and is the subject of Stewart Parker’s 1989 play “Northern Star”) and William Drennan, they persuaded the French (then at war with Britain) to reinforce the United Irishmen with a force of 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers. But like the Spanish Armada before it, French ships were unable to land due to bad weather, and without them the rebellion of 1798 could not prosper. The Protestant majority Irish Parliament quickly created an armed corps and crushed the United Irishmen with extraordinary brutality. Wolfe Tone was captured shortly after and took his own life before he was to be hanged. Thus ended a chapter in Irish history, ultimately aimed at reconfiguring the relationship between two religious and cultural rivalries. But on an island where history is constantly commemorated and mythologised, where it has been and remains a living element in the fabric of everyday life, on both sides of the divide, a key notion was born from this: the image of revolutionary republicanism that would no longer define itself in terms of Catholicism, but as a response to the slavery of the colonial condition. Historian Kevin Whelan notes in this regard that “there was a window of opportunity (...) which beckoned to the still unattained prospect of a non-sectarian, democratic and inclusive politics adequately representing the Irish people in all of their inherited complexities”. A window of opportunity that was to remain closed for nearly two hundred more years, but a vision of change nonetheless that was reflected by the Civil Rights and People’s Democracy movements (radical Protestants and Catholics together who began to militate against the oppressive legislation of the Unionist –dominated Northern Irish state in 1968, and inspired as had been the United Irishmen before them by revolution in France– this time the student revolution of May 1968 in Paris).

⁹ Explanatory Note: Gaelic “a Celtic language that includes the speech of ancient Ireland and the dialects that have developed from it, especially those usually known as Irish, Manx, and Scottish Gaelic. Gaelic constitutes the Goidelic sub-branch of Celtic”. Dictionary.com “Gaelic” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/gaelic>] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

¹⁰ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid*, (7). *Op.Cit.*, pp. 4-8.

¹¹ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid*, (7). *Op.Cit.*, p. 8.

¹² The defeated fled Ireland, and what happened would be known as the “flight of the Earls”.

The rebellion of '98, as it became known, served to bring to an end the Irish Parliament, and led to Ireland being fully integrated into the political institutions of the new United Kingdom, primarily of course to prevent future rebellion. It was Prime Minister William Pitt, in particular, who argued for the merging of Irish and British Parliaments in what would be known as the Act of Union, which finally came into law in the year 1800 and through which the United Kingdom was created. While 100 out of 658 MP's represented Ireland. Ulster Protestants were opposed to the Act, as it would in all likelihood mean the end of their privileges, while Catholics hoped that their basic human rights would be respected in a more tolerant London-based administration from Britain that would put an end to their discrimination. Between these growing populist movements, a small number of Catholic and Protestant alike, inheritors in some way of the radical vision of the French-inspired United Irishmen, worked and agitated towards the independence of Ireland, but their priorities rapidly diverged and their energies were diffused: one side aimed to regain control of the island through a mainly Protestant-Irish Parliament, while the other wished to secure their civil liberties before fighting for national liberation.

Today, authors like Joshua Levine talk about the radical change that has made itself felt in these two broad perspectives, particularly within Northern Ireland, where after the Easter Rising in Dublin, 1916, large number of Protestants have fought to remain in the Union and keep their ascendancy, while Catholics seek to shatter the Union as the only way of guaranteeing their rights. But throughout much of the nineteenth century, many Irish Catholics saw the nationalist dream as precisely that, an emotional commitment that hard-headed pragmatism would rapidly demolish— a complex attitude that explains their initial disdain for the Easter Rising, before committing to it wholeheartedly.

But the middle of the nineteenth century brought with it a catastrophe of extraordinary proportions. The potato crop, which was effectively the sole source of food and nutrition for most of the population, failed spectacularly between 1845 and 1848 due to plague. Over a million people died of starvation (the population would not recuperate its old levels again until the 1960's), while more than twice that number emigrated to England and the United States in search of a new life. The wave of emigration to the US was the first Irish diaspora, and the fact that so many were uprooted from their homes and others starved to death while the landowners continued to export livestock and crops to Britain meant that immigrants arrived in North America carrying with them a deep anti British sentiment. This was evident—once again in an example of the long reach of Irish historical memory and also throughout the Troubles— in the activities of groups like NORAI, which functioned as a highly influential fund-raising arm of the IRA. Moreover, the powerful Irish-American political lobby and the growth of powerful Irish-American political families, such as the Kennedys meant that Ireland has always figured high on the political agenda of Republican and Democratic administrations alike, and indeed the Clinton administration was instrumental in the creation of the Good Friday Agreement through the involvement of its special envoy George Mitchell. At the time of writing, former President Clinton's last appearance in public was to deliver the eulogy at the funeral in 2017 of Martin McGuinness, former IRA Chief of Staff who became Northern Ireland's Deputy First Minister—a figure to whom we shall return.

A number of historians, like John Kelly and Tim Pat Coogan, have suggested that The Great Famine, as it became known, must be interpreted as an act of genocide perpetrated on behalf of English interests, concerned more about economic and societal reform in Ireland rather than the hunger of its' people, and they argue that allowing them to starve was the ultimate reflection of a Victorian ethos and policy. The Famine,

¹³ Explanatory Note: Also known as “planters”.

¹⁴ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid.*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, pp. 11-13.

of course, looms large in the Irish collective memory, and allegations such as these served to intensify Nationalist and Republican animosity in Northern Ireland towards the United Kingdom. The effects of the Famine, of course, ranged right across the island in a number of different ways— such as the decline of the Irish language, which was spoken by approximately 4 million before the diaspora. Many of the people who died or suffered during the Famine were the most impoverished, and came from Irish-speaking areas, while others saw English as a language that brought more social and commercial advantages for their children. In the new Northern Ireland, Irish is once again on the rise, and is spoken in many areas of the Province as the process of recouping what has been lost in the past continues. But it also remains a divisive issue and, once again at the time of writing, Sinn Féin's demands for a protective Irish Language Act are being resisted by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), their partners in the power-sharing Executive. Indeed, the issue has become a major source of contention that threatens, once again, to destabilise the hard-won political institutions of the North.

But the Famine also fuelled division in other more direct ways. Belfast at the time of the Famine was a thriving and still radical city, about to build its first university (later to become Queen's University), a model of the industrial revolution in many ways that was popularly referred to as 'Linenopolis', in recognition of one its principal exports, linen. Huge populations of starving Catholics poured into the west of the city in search of employment, rapidly destabilising the workplace and eroding the economic benefits previously enjoyed by Protestant workers. The seeds of conflict, this time resulting from economic migrancy, were sown, and the areas of west Belfast in which the migrants settled were eventually to become the flashpoints of the Troubles, so that area such as the Falls Road, Ballymurphy and Andersonstown are now bywords for violence and anti-British resistance. Yet again, at the time of writing, in the wake of the June 2017 British general elections, while the rest of Belfast returned DUP members to Westminster, the constituency of Belfast West elected a Sinn Féin member of parliament.

Allied to this division carved into the map of Belfast, the Famine also convinced the Catholic population of the need to organise both politically and militarily, and one such military group was the Fenian Brotherhood, which became the predecessor of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The result, in political terms, was a constant push in the British Parliament for a Home Rule Bill, and although there was no clear consensus among Tories and Liberals in Westminster, by the beginning of the twentieth-century the argument for some measure of autonomy for Ireland seemed won in everything but name. It is at this point that the most recent phase of the Troubles begins to take direct shape, with its deepest roots in the colonial history of cultural and economic appropriation begun by Henry II, but its determining fears and resentments fired by the competition for jobs that had come in the wake of the enforced migration of the Famine. In the largely Protestant North, and particularly in Belfast with its heavy industry, there was widespread fear that Home Rule would eventually leave them isolated and at the mercy of the Catholic majority on the island. Their slogans shifted from the anti-religious sentiment of "Home Rule is Rome Rule" to the more threatening "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right". Around 470,000 Ulster Protestants vowed to defend their own interest and

¹⁵ Explanatory Note: "Irish Presbyterianism is largely the result of a movement of population from Scotland to Ireland in the 17th century (...) In 1642 presbytery was constituted in Ulster by the chaplains of a Scottish army which had arrived to crush the Irish rising of 1641. During the Cromwellian regime congregations multiplied and new presbyteries were formed. (...) The Partition of the island in 1921 left them the largest Protestant denomination in Northern Ireland, with some 390,000 members in 1926, numbers in independent Ireland, where Presbyterians had never put down strong roots, fell from 32,000 in 1926 to only 16,000 in 1971. While some Presbyterians have been prominent in recent movements for reconciliation in Ireland, Irish Presbyterianism has become increasingly exclusivist." Oxford, *The Oxford companion to Irish history*. New York (2002) Oxford University Press. p. 484.

¹⁶ Bartlett, Thomas "The 1798 Irish Rebellion" BBC History, 2011 [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/irish_reb_01.shtml] Accessed on the 25th of February, 2017.

¹⁷ Oxford, *Ibid.*, (14) *Op.Cit.*, p. 598.

¹⁸ Explanatory Note: "Anglicanism, one of the major branches of the 16th-century Protestant Reformation and a form of Christianity that includes features of both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism." Sachs L. William; Stanley Dean, Ralph "Anglicanism" *Encyclopedia Britannica* 7th of February, 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anglicanism>] Accessed on the 25th of February, 2017.

not recognise the Home Rule Parliament in the Ulster Covenant of 1912, and two million people in Britain signed a pledge that showed support for the Protestant cause. A provisional Government was established in Ulster to 'defend the interests of loyalists in other parts of Ireland'. but effectively the possibility of partition had been broached.

Historian A.T.Q. Stewart notes that Orangemen from the province of County Tyrone in the north had been practising military drills on their own initiative, and soon other Orange Lodges followed this example. In January 1913 the annual meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council decided that the volunteers should be united into a single unit or body, bringing into being the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The UVF, in its origins utterly respectable, became the first contingent of Irish-Unionist soldiers that fought alongside the British in World War I, but it was later to degenerate into the major Loyalist paramilitary force in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, responsible for an estimated 569 deaths in the recent conflict. The UVF imported weapons from abroad in order to defend the Protestant hegemony; Civil War threatened, but was averted by the outbreak of The Great War (1914-1918). Which prompted British politicians to assume that the question of Irish independence and indeed Home Rule would be effectively set aside while the Empire defended itself against its enemies in Europe. But many Irish political leaders, who had dedicated more than thirty years to Home Rule, started to feel a sense of betrayal. The military wing of Irish nationalism began to impose itself on the political agenda. There was an impassioned return to Gaelic culture and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a nationalist revolutionary body created by James Stephens in 1858, was re-established. The IRB, along with the founder and leader of the Labour Party of Ireland, James Connolly (1868-1916) created in turn the Irish Citizen Army. Sinn Féin was also part of this rise of of Irish identity– being founded in 1905, by Arthur Griffith (1871-1922), who was leader of Cumann na nGaedheal (Party of the Irish). The stage was set, and so it was that in 1914, as Britain was confronting the Triple Alliance of Germany Austria-Hungary and Italy, Clan na Gael. together with the IRB, the Citizen Army and the poet Patrick Pearse decided that Ireland could wait no longer.

On the morning of Easter Sunday, 1916, the rebellion that was two years in the planning began. Approximately 1,600 members of the Volunteers and Citizen Army took up positions in various key areas of Dublin. Outside the General Post Office, Pearse read aloud the Proclamation of an Irish Republic. which included a rejection of sectarianism in recognition of the problems of the North. But, as noted earlier, the insurgents were considered by most of the population to be romantic idealists, and in less than a week they had surrendered unconditionally to British troops. One hundred and sixty prisoners were taken, of which ninety-seven were executed, including seven of the leaders, such as Connolly and Pearse, who had signed the Proclamation. For the British, the insurrection was an act of high treason in times of war, but from the perspective of the Irish population, for whom the war was more distant in every sense, it was precisely the perceived brutality of these executions that turned military failure into a turning point in the rise of Irish nationalism. The seeds of an independent republic were sewn and seventy years later the figures that led the Easter Rising and the martyrdom they stood for continued to radicalise young Catholics during the Troubles.

¹⁹ Cruickshank, Dan "Napoleon, Nelson and the French Threat" *BBC History*, 17th of February, 2011 [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/french_threat_01.shtml] Accessed on the 25th of February, 2017.

²⁰ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid.*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, p. 18.

²¹ *Ibid.*,

1.5. A brief history: The Irish War of Independence, the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Irish Civil War

The extraordinary way in which the Rising was, after the event, re-imagined as a moral and national success created huge pressure within British and Irish politics. Increasing instability and violence in Ireland led to the 1918 Irish general election. Out of 105 members of Parliament, Ulster unionists managed to achieve 26 seats, dominating in the North, which was now viewed as an armed Protestant fortress, while an ever more powerful Sinn Féin, under the leadership of Michael Collins, gained 46.9% of the vote. Out of this result Dáil Éireann (the Assembly of Ireland) was created and a declaration of independence, echoing the Proclamation of the Easter Rising, was published. The Dáil was quickly outlawed by the British government, but its moral authority across Ireland, with the exception of the nine counties of Ulster, was now evident.

As a result, tensions between Irish Nationalists and British soldiers intensified into a guerrilla campaign, with Michael Collins commanding squads that aimed at disrupting a peace which now hung by a thread. The campaign proved too much both for the British army and its public, wearied by the Great War and its aftermath, and by 1920, crown forces were losing control of Ireland as a result of a tactic of constant skirmishes organised by the IRA, which had been formally established as the army of the Republic after the foundation of Dáil Éireann in 1919.

Prime Minister Lloyd George had tried to retain Ireland as a colony through a range of peacekeeping and constitutional policies. One such proposal was the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, amongst whose 86 pages we find the first mention of Northern Ireland as a separate political entity from the South. While this was as much a recognition of Ulster's strategic importance to post-war Britain in terms of its industrial strengths –in particular its shipbuilding industry– as of the wishes of the Protestant community, that community was also assured majority status in the new Northern Ireland state by reducing it from nine to six counties: while Armagh, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Londonderry, Antrim and Down became part of the new Ulster, the counties of Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal, because of their Catholic majorities, became part of the South. This is not to say that the intentions of the Act were entirely short-termist, and the possibility of future unification is articulated in the Act's establishment of an all-island Council of Ireland "with a view to the eventual establishment of a Parliament for the whole of Ireland (...)". The statement was clearly written to appease Irish nationalists, who continued to fight for an all-island solution. As the war brought more casualties, Lloyd George decided to finally call a truce in July 1921 and began talks with Sinn Féin. Eamon De Valera, the first president of the Dáil, sent a number of delegates, among whom was Michael Collins, to negotiate the basis of a new Anglo-Irish Treaty in London. Westminster offered the new Ireland dominion status as a Commonwealth country on condition that a series of terms was agreed. The most controversial of these terms was that "The powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as respects Northern Ireland (...)". Although the document provided two options, one being the inclusion of the six counties of Northern Ireland as part of the Irish Free State -which became known as The Republic of Ireland on its final departure from the Commonwealth in 1949. The other option (Article 12 of the Treaty) explained that should Northern Ireland wish to remain independent from the Free State, it would have to notify Westminster before a certain date, leading to the Northern Irish borders established in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 being revised by a special commission. In effect, both options implied the abandoning of

²² Alonso, Rogelio Irlanda del Norte: Una historia de guerra y la búsqueda de la paz. Madrid (2001) Editorial Complutense, p. 85. Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

²³ Levine, Joshua Beauty and Atrocity: People, Politics, and Ireland's fight for Peace. London (2010), HarperCollins Publishers, London p. 51, Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

²⁴ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, p. 31 Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

one of the two communities that formed Ulster, and Britain's self-interest and identification with Protestantism tipped the balance. The historical die was cast.

Other matters, such as security and defence issues, were presented as unconditional terms of acceptance in the Treaty. The alternative would be all-out war. Once again, Ireland was divided, this time in terms of one view, led by Michael Collins, who argued that the IRA lacked the power to defeat the British army, while the other, headed by De Valera, pursued the more emotional line that the treaty only granted partial freedom to Ireland and insulted the memory of those who had sacrificed their lives in the name of Irish nationalism and independence. The Treaty was finally ratified by the Dáil by a margin of only seven votes, and a Civil War as inevitable. The Irish Civil War, of 1922-1923, was sparked by the Anti-Treaty IRA members (known as the Diehards) who killed an English Field Marshall in London on 22 June, 1922. The British Government pressed the Dáil to take immediate action against the rebels, threatening to nullify the Treaty otherwise. The National Army and the Pro-Treaty IRA (known as the Free-staters), rearmed thanks to the British Army, fought a series of skirmishes and small-scale battles with Republican insurgents until, finally, a ceasefire was declared by the Anti-Treaty forces in May, 1923. Collins himself did not live to see the new peace. Viewed by many Republicans as a traitor for defending the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the first place, he himself had told Lloyd George that he had "signed his own death warrant" for putting his name on the Treaty, and, as he foresaw, was assassinated in August 1922.

Once again, the emotional response to history was to prove stronger than any political or legislative framework, for in practice the diehards never gave up their arms, nor did they recognise the North as separate from the rest of Ireland. Inevitably, armed resistance passed into Ulster, where the local Catholic population in Ulster felt abandoned by the Dáil: a mixture of Republicans, Nationalists and IRA militants murdered British troops and pro-British citizens alike, in what was effectively a mini-rehearsal for the violence that was to erupt in 1968. Catholics were expelled from their jobs, especially from the shipyards, which at the time was one of the biggest in the world. The Dáil responded in return by boycotting all products from Northern Ireland, and the IRA, now seeing itself as a guardian of the Catholic communities, North and South, 'avenged' the deaths of Catholics in Ulster by killing innocent Protestants in the Irish Free State.

Eventually the Dáil and the new Ulster administration, which was named Stormont after the area in which the Parliament Buildings were located, settled their differences and a sort of uncomfortable silence descended on official North-South relations. But the truth is that this did not stop the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland. Periodic violence coincided with moments of recession and the IRA ran one or two short-lived border campaigns in order to protest against the continuing oppression of Catholics in the North, who were denied democratic rights by the stipulation that only property owners could vote at a time when very few Catholics owned the properties in which they lived. When the Troubles finally started in 1968, they came in direct response to this unfair system. But, as this chapter has been concerned to show, they also were an echo of unrest in Paris and had their roots deep in a history of economic division, cultural segregation, and colonial appropriation. Any history of divided communities will give rise to competing narratives, radically divergent

²⁵ Gray, Peter. *The Irish Famine* (1995) H.N Abrams, Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

²⁶ Explanatory Note: Interestingly, the Queen's University Belfast Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies carries the name Senator George Mitchell in recognition of his contribution to the peace process.

²⁷ Explanatory Note: In the Northern Irish power-sharing system, as we shall see in greater detail later, both Deputy First Minister and First Minister carry the same authority, a system designed to give equal weight to both sides of the community.

²⁸ Explanatory Note: Kelly and Coogan blame "the free market economics that Britain tried, and failed, to apply to Ireland's problem (...)" They also describe, in painful detail, the indignity and hardship suffered by the peasant population who were stigmatised by anti-Catholic prejudice and the belief that poverty was self-inflicted. Their most compelling argument for British negligence is in the final chapter, in which they recall "the xenophobic images and words commonly used to caricature the Irish in Victorian England" Y.F. *The Irish Famine: Opening old wounds*. *The Economist*, 12th of December, 2012 [Online] [Available at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2012/12/irish-famine>] Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

ways of re-imagining and commemorating the events and figures of the past. Even though Loyalists/Unionists and Nationalists/Republicans both believe that their legitimacy can be attributed to numerous facts in history (be it Plantation, Scottish ascendance or just oppression from an occupant) the truth is that since its creation in 1921, Northern Ireland was a social and ideological battlefield, marking the last remnants and consequences of British colonialism in the Western world.

2. Northern Ireland: The New Ulster and its Fault Lines

2.1. The early years: 1923-1968

After the Irish Civil War, the new Northern Ireland –referred to dismissively by Republicans as the ‘Orange statelet’– established a form of uneasy stability that was based on a clearly defined Protestant hegemony. The Irish Free State, however, never surrendered sovereignty, and the Irish Free State Constitution does not refer to Northern Ireland explicitly; indeed, Article Three asserts that “Every person, without distinction of sex, domiciled in the area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) at the time of the coming into operation of this Constitution, who was born in Ireland or either of whose parents was born in Ireland or who has been ordinarily resident in the area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) for not less than seven years, is a citizen of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann)”. This right is still valid today.

For nearly fifty years after partition there was a growing sense of uneasy truce between the two parts of Ireland as politicians in the South began to start thinking about the wellbeing of the people within their own borders. And even though violence was still present in Northern Ireland, the Province enjoyed relative stability. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was the main Protestant political representation and, inevitably, formed the Government of Northern Ireland, from the creation of the state in 1921 up until 1972. During the early years of the Unionist government, consolidating their control was paramount. Although they made up the majority of Northern Ireland, Protestants still thought of themselves as being a surrounded nation, a “lonely tribe on a headland”, as poet Derek Mahon puts it vividly. so that their policies grew ever more protectionist. In 1922, Northern Irish Prime Minister James Craig had already decided to put an end to the proportional representation voting system that was in use in both the South and North. Instead, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system was introduced, which is based on electing a member of parliament through most individual votes cast. This is the voting system then and currently in place in the United Kingdom, but would not work in a society as divided as Northern Ireland, especially as a process of gerrymandering was imposed. Through this, constituencies were re-drawn to create inbuilt Protestant majorities. As a result, Catholic Nationalists lost thirteen of the twenty-four councils they controlled. This re-drawing of political boundaries, combined with the FPTP system was used for the 1929 elections to the Belfast Parliament. Results were effectively pre-ordained. So much so that Westminster warned James Craig of the injustice that the FPTP system meant for

²⁹ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid.*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, pp. 33-40.

³⁰ Explanatory Note: It is the abstentionist policy of Sinn Féin not to take their seats in Westminster.

³¹ Explanatory Note: “Fenianism is a revolutionary movement originating in the greatly expanding Irish immigrant community of the USA (...) John O’Mahony (1816-77), Michael Doherty (1805-63) and Joseph Deniffe, together with James Stephens (...) were chiefly responsible for initiating the Fenian movement. Stephens, having established a leadership role and with limited financial backing from America, launched a revolutionary society in Dublin on St. Patrick’s Day 1858, dedicated to secrecy and the establishment of a democratic Irish republic. Initially the organization had no specific title, being known variously as “The Society”, “The Organization” or “The Brotherhood”. The name ‘Fenian’ is a reference to the warriors of ancient Ireland Oxford, *Ibid.*, (14) *Op.Cit.*, p. 198 Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

the minorities, but direct rule was never threatened during his governance. The advantage of this was that a continual flow of landslide victories for Unionists meant that Nationalists and Republicans gave up hope of achieving anything of significance through the political process. Behind them a long history beckoned a return to violent resistance.

Moreover, Catholic unemployment rates were twice as high as Protestant ones. Protestants controlled most public and private sector jobs, such as the courts, housing, senior jobs and the police force. The Ulster Special Constabulary was entirely Protestant, while the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC. 1921-2001), now the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), was constructed in the same way. The RUC effectively acted as a paramilitary organisation, arresting Nationalists and searching their houses without warrants, so that Catholics eventually thought of them as the protectors of Unionists. The Orange Order played an important role in achieving unity among the different Protestant churches (Presbyterian, Anglican etc) and resisted the rise of what they called “romanism”. As James Craig himself had said back in the day: “All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State”. This was the political fabric of Northern Ireland’s early years, exclusive and alienating.

The Catholic Church was left in charge of the education of their own in Northern Ireland. Ever mindful of the separate identities constructed by their opposing interpretations of history, neither community was eager to establish an integrated education, and many Catholics rarely voted or applied for public appointments. And while Catholics constituted a small majority in rural areas such as Tyrone or Armagh, (Derry/Londonderry had always been much more nationalist than unionist), Protestants controlled Belfast and its surrounding areas (in the main because, as already noted, the Catholic population was denied the right to vote on the basis that many did not own their own properties). Nationalists were abandoned to a sense of living in an unwelcoming world, where Dublin was more of a home than Belfast. However, as a British colony, which effectively Northern Ireland was, nothing prohibited freedom of speech, so that local Catholic newspapers, such as the Irish News, freely criticised the Parliament of Northern Ireland (or the “Six-County State” as many called Northern Ireland for decades in reference to the trimming of historical Ulster). In other words, what was coming together was, on one hand, the functioning of a colonial state –there was still a British Governor, resident in Hillsborough Castle, on the outskirts of Belfast– and, on the other, the long-standing echoes of a resistance that continually commemorated and re-vindicated a Nationalist interpretation of history.

At Stormont, meanwhile, Unionist prime ministers followed one another in apparently endless succession (James Craig, James Andrew and Sir Basil Brooke), a procession of power that was to continue unbroken, as we have mentioned, right up until the final closing of Stormont by Westminster during the Troubles, The outbreak of the Second World War, in 1939, saw Great Britain immersed in a conflict with Nazi Germany and, in the years before the US joined the conflict, in desperate need of help. In 1940, Churchill approached the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of the Irish Free State, Eamon De Valera –who, ironically, had been under threat of execution after the 1916 Rising and was only saved by his American lineage– at the time, and proposed that in exchange for Irish assistance in the war, a united Ireland would be granted. The Irish Free State refused

³² Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T *Ibid*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, p. 46 Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

³³ Stewart, A. T. Q. *The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule 1912-1914*. Great Britain (1967) Faber and Faber Limited, Great Britain p. 48 Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

³⁴ Explanatory Note: As we have noted, “The Orange Order is a Protestant political society dedicated to sustaining the ‘glorious and immortal memory’ of King William III and of his victory at the Boyne. It was instituted in September 1795 (...)”Oxford, *Ibid*, (14) *Op.Cit.*, p. 434.

³⁵ Stewart, A. T. Q. *Ibid*, (32) *Op.Cit.*, pp. 69-70.

³⁶ Wikipedia “Ulster Volunteer Force” [S.D] [Online] [Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulster_Volunteer_Force#Deaths_as_a_result_of_activity] Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

³⁷ Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid*, (7). *Op.Cit.*, p. 46.

because of lack of resources and capital, but it is still unclear whether the proposal was studied with any degree of seriousness or not. Thus, it is impossible to avoid speculating on an alternative history. If the unification of Ireland had taken place, would the Dáil have learnt from past errors regarding the Protestant faith and opted for more integrationist policies? How would Protestants have accommodated themselves in the new Ireland? In reality, however, all that arose from Churchill's proposal was the anger of the Unionist population, who felt abandoned by a Britain they had always viewed as their protectors.

The constitutional sovereignty of Northern Ireland, however, was re-affirmed in 1949. The year before, Dublin had announced its intention to leave the Commonwealth and become a formally constituted wholly-independent republic; the age of colonialism was passing, but, paradoxically, the situation of Northern Ireland was confirmed in the 1949 Ireland Bill, which granted the Republic of Ireland (no longer the Irish Free State) its independence. It featured a clause, introduced by the Labour government of Clement Attlee (1883-1967), that declared Northern Ireland to be part of the United Kingdom for as long as a majority in Stormont wanted it. Of course, the British Government was fully aware that the Unionist Party's grip on parliamentary majority was tight enough to not have to consider enabling the clause. On top of that, in the era of post-war reconstruction, Northern Ireland, with its heavy industries and geographical position, was of high geostrategic importance for Westminster.

The 1960s were known as the "O'Neill era" in Ulster, as Captain Terence O'Neill took office as the fourth prime minister (1963-1969), succeeding Basil Brooke. During his period in power, he became the first Unionist politician to soften his tone on the Catholic community, and began a programme of visiting Nationalist schools. The late 1950s and early 1960s had seen a resurgence of IRA violence, although on a much smaller scale than what was to break out in 1968. O'Neill thought that by recognising the legitimacy of the Catholic presence in Northern Ireland, the focus of the Province could then shift from protectionism to modernising the economy, and that shared prosperity could be the basis for shared living. Post-industrialism was taking a heavy toll on Northern Ireland, where the linen and shipyard industries were increasingly failing, with the result that unemployment was one of the highest in the UK. A growing sense of a new politics saw the rise of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, formed by a mixture of Catholics and Protestants alike. Its leftist ideologies and its analyses of the colonial condition of Northern Ireland helped the party strengthen its bonds with Harold Wilson, elected Labour Prime Minister in 1964, a leftist politician who was openly critical of the Unionist *modus operandi*. In an attempt to heal the recent wounds between Stormont and a Westminster increasingly embarrassed internationally by the Unionist ways of the Ulster state, O'Neill started to introduce reforms as a show of good faith that were to reduce friction between both parliaments. In 1965, O'Neill did what none of his predecessors had ever done by inviting the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass (1899-1971), to Northern Ireland on a political visit. After a warm handshake and O'Neill's famous "Welcome to the North", the talks held by both men focused on economic cooperation between the two states. Although the visit seemed to recognise partition as the post-colonial status quo of the island, and was welcomed by, among others, members of the Orange Order, who considered that NI-ROI relations should be normalised, other loyalists thought differently.

³⁸ *Ibid.*,

³⁹ History Ireland "The Irish Republican Brotherhood History Ireland" Nov/Dec, 2011 [Online] [Available at <http://www.historyireland.com/18th-19th-century-history/the-irish-republican-brotherhood/>] Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

⁴⁰ BBC History "Sinn Féin BBC History" 2014 [Online] [Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po18.shtml>] Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly; Arthur, Paul "Sinn Féin Encyclopedia Britannica" 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sinn-Féin>] Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

⁴¹ Explanatory Note: "Clan na Gael is an Irish-American revolutionary organization formed to pursue Irish Independence (...)"Oxford, *Ibid.*, (14) *Op.Cit.*, p. 102. Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

⁴² Paor De, Liam. On the Easter Proclamation and other Declarations. Dublin (1997) Four Courts Press, Dublin p. 11, Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

⁴³ Explanatory Note: These men were Thomas Clarke, Sean McDermott, Thomas MacDonough, Joseph Plunkett, Eamon Ceannt, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly. Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. *Ibid.*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, pp. 52-53.

Among those was the Reverend Ian Paisley (1926-2014), a radical loyalist preacher who continuously defined “romanism” as the enemy of God and rallied his supporters regularly against what he considered to be the abomination of the Catholic religion. Paisley argued that the visit of Lemass was a declaration of war on loyalism and unionism and that loyalists would be ready to spill their blood if necessary to avoid the reunification of Ireland. Paisleyism, as it became known, showed little appreciation for O’Neill from then onwards and continued to grow stronger in Northern Ireland because it drew on the complex sense of righteousness and isolation that marked the Unionist experience, and its influence on Northern Ireland’s political scenario lasted for more than fifty years. But, as we shall see later, Ian Paisley ended up becoming one of the pivotal figures in the Northern Irish peace process and, in his own way, as later discussion will show, an icon of the possibility of progressive transformation.

Due to the impediments set by O’Neill’s conservative cabinet on introducing reforms, Nationalists and Republicans were starting to doubt the prime ministers’ initial good nature. In this way, O’Neill was caught between the historical intransigence of unionism and Wilson’s government, who made it clear that if reforms were not introduced, Britain would consider cutting its economic subsidy. The slow pace of reform, therefore, fuelled an already growing concern and in 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was born (NICRA, already referred to in the Introduction). The movement was formed by both Catholics, who had started to realise that a united Ireland might not be achieved in a short period of time and that the injustices they felt that they were suffering might, in fact, be long term, and by Protestants who were unable to tolerate the injustices that maintained the powerbase of the Northern Irish state.

NICRA’s frequent public protests were always shadowed by Paisley’s followers who stood close by and sang ‘God Save the Queen’ or unveiled sectarian banners. Among the peaceful protesters, as had also happened with the United Irishmen (see Chapter One) were many IRA activists, who sought to provoke further tension between the protestors and the local authorities, normally in the form of the RUC (viewed by the IRA as servants of the Crown and, therefore, traitors). On the 5th of October, 1968, in the wake of what many felt to be the winds of revolution blowing from Paris, a march was organised by NICRA and the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) in Derry. Ronald Bunting (1924-1984), a friend of Paisley’s, organised the Unionists and Loyalists to vehemently oppose the march, while the Minister of Home Affairs William Craig declared that a certain route should be followed by the association. When his orders were disobeyed, the police clashed violently at Burntollet Bridge with the protesters, as well as with Bunting’s improvised committee. And Northern Ireland lurched from civil disobedience to open resistance.

The 1968 march and its repression marked a changing point for Northern Ireland. The images of bloodied Nationalist MPs, such as Gerry Fitt and the bruises on people’s faces from police batons, gave the rest of the world a glimpse of the reality of life in Northern Ireland. Even though O’Neill won the ensuing election, the damage was already too great, and his resignation was handed in shortly after. In many ways it is possible to see this incident as the spark that both ignited the Troubles and opened up international scrutiny of Northern Ireland’s internal divisions.

At the heart of this dissertation is a desire to draw out the lessons of Northern Ireland’s arduous journey from the brink of Civil War to peace. But if there is one small lesson to be learned from the O’Neill years, it is that the sheer determination that he showed in attempting to construct a more modern Northern Ireland, where integration and economic reform were designed as stepping stones on the path to maturity, was thwarted by greater forces of resistance inherited from an undead history, where Loyalists and Unionists were not ready

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, (7) *Op.Cit.*, pp. 65-68.

to surrender privilege, and Republicans and Nationalists would not accept partition as a reality. The end of the O'Neill era and the violence of Burntollet cast a long shadow over the future of Northern Ireland, one that was entirely predictable and determined by the past.

2.2. Northern Ireland: The Troubles 1968-1979

Given the constraints of this dissertation, this section, like the ones before, can only focus on the key events of the Troubles that, beginning with Burntollet, form the basis for the way in which the Troubles are mapped in the collective memory as either a period of unjustifiable and brutal violence, or as a legitimate war against a colonial oppressor.

Following O'Neill's resignation on the 28th of April of 1969, and Chichester Clark's appointment as Prime Minister, tensions between Protestants and Catholics continued to escalate. On the 12th of August there was serious rioting in the Bogside area of Derry, a strongly Republican neighbourhood, when Loyalist marches passed close by. As noted above, this city, whose name is deeply symbolic, has always had a special meaning for the two communities. so that it is in its own way a microcosm of division. The three-day 'battle of the Bogside', as it was later called, was the precedent for the arrival of the first British troops in Derry and Belfast (on the 14th & 15th of August). Essentially, the initial objective was that of a peacekeeping mission, leaving security matters to Stormont. Opinions on this were once again diverse and controversial. Protestants at first welcomed the troops, but later ended up resenting them for meddling in Northern Irish society and acting as a kind of militarised police force. Interestingly, a number of Catholics (not diehard Republicans) regarded the British Army as a force that could protect them from persistent sectarian assaults. But very soon they would recognise the Army's presence as an act of intrusiveness and clear provocation from Britain. Be that as it may, the British Government knew that soldiers who were sent to Northern Ireland would face a hostile environment, and that their appearance would in all likelihood make things worse in the long run. The question remains: might the conflict have been shorter if the armed forces had not intervened?

In the meantime, the IRA had maintained a relative silence. After its fruitless and unproductive series of operations in the 50s and early 60s, Cathal Goulding, a Marxist thinker and the leader of the group at the start of the Troubles, had decided to shift away from the violence and focus instead on a deeper political activity, based around the civil rights movement. Other Republicans, like the young Gerry Adams (a name to which we shall return), argued for a return to the old ways of the IRA, on the basis of an analysis of history that showed, in his view, that only armed struggle would unify Ireland. These two divergent views brought internal division and on the 29th of December, 1969, the IRA announced that it was splitting into two factions: the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. The second branch, in its vow to protect the Catholic community through force, was to become the more violent of the two for the duration of the Troubles. In fact, the first British soldier to die in Northern Ireland was killed by the Provisional IRA in 1971.

As unrest spread, curfews were imposed in one of the main Nationalist and Republican areas of Belfast, the Lower Falls road, leading to major riots which resulted in five dead and more than sixty injured. From a political point of view, the situation was becoming intolerable. On the 9th of August, 1971—four months after

⁴⁵ *Doc. Cit.*, British Government. "Government of Ireland Act, 1920" 1920. [Online] [Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1920/67/pdfs/ukpga_19200067_en.pdf] pp. 5-6 Accessed on the 4th of March, 2017.

⁴⁶ *Doc. Cit.*, Treaty Exhibition. The National Archives of Ireland. "Anglo-Irish Treaty" 6th of December, 1921. [Online] [Available at <http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/document-gallery/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921-page-4/>] Page: 4. Accessed on the 4th of March, 2017.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

Chichester resigned and Brian Faulkner (1971-1972) had replaced him—internment was introduced, by which those suspected of being involved in paramilitary activities could be arrested and detained without having to go through a procedural trial. As a result, 1972 was one of the most turbulent years yet. On Sunday the 30th of January fourteen men were shot dead by the British Parachute Regiment while marching for civil rights in Derry. The troops denied opening fire first and claimed that some of the people present were carrying firearms, and it was not until 2010 that the 'Bloody Sunday Report' found the murders of innocent civilians unjustifiable, leading to the then Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron issuing an apology. Bloody Sunday was the biggest British military killing of civilians on UK soil since 1819, and remains as such today. Once again the events of the past were mobilised to radicalise the young, and large numbers of young Nationalists and Republicans, who were angered by what happened in Derry, flocked to join the Provisional IRA. The old battle lines had been re-drawn.

On the 30th of March of the same year, Stormont was suspended from all political activity and direct rule from Westminster was introduced. The situation had become unsustainable and Prime Minister Edward Heath (1970-1974) opted to administer an increasingly fragile Northern Ireland by appointing William Whitelaw as the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Less than two months later, the Official IRA announced a permanent ceasefire, with the exception of the right to self-defence if they were to be attacked by sectarians or British troops. But the Provisional IRA continued its campaign, and on the 21st of July, in direct response to London's actions, they detonated 26 bombs throughout Belfast, killing 11 people and injuring 130 on what was later to be called "Bloody Friday".

In 1973, the British Government proposed the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly, and on the 22nd of November, as both Catholic and Protestant politicians (formed by the Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland) agreed on a new power-sharing Executive, Northern Ireland regained its autonomy. On the 6th of December of the same year, talks between the Irish and British governments and the power sharing Executive, at the so-called Sunningdale Conference, resulted in an agreement to create a Council of Ireland where a certain number of issues would be administered by North and South together. As a protest to this, the Ulster Worker's Council organised a series of massive general strikes in May that paralysed the country for weeks, and led to Brian Faulkner's resignation as Chief Executive. The brief experiment in power-sharing came to a bitter end, and direct rule returned with the prorogation of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

The Irish Republican Army, as active as they had been in the past couple of years, announced a surprising ceasefire in 1975 after Sinn Féin held talks with the British Government and the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) to arrange the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland. To monitor the activities of IRA members, seven incident centres managed by Sinn Féin together with the NIO opened across Northern Ireland, and in response the British army reduced its patrols and house searches. But violence continued to bubble under the surface. The killing of four British soldiers in Armagh on the 17th of July and the IRA's retaliatory actions against attacks carried out by loyalists in Catholic neighbourhoods kept the ceasefire on thin ice. After repeatedly breaching the truce agreement, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Lord Merlyn-Rees (1974-1976) announced the closing of the incident centres and the IRA announced an official end to the ceasefire in 1976. In response to the IRA "ceasefire", 1975 also saw the end of internment without trial, a mechanism that in its four years of existence had led to an astonishing 1981 detainees (1874 of them Catholic, and 107 Protestant). After the collapse of the ceasefire, the IRA expanded its campaign round the British Isles. Over the three years

⁴⁸ Óglaigh na hÉireann. Defense Forces Ireland. "The Civil War 1922-1923" [S.D.] [Online] [Available at <http://www.military.ie/info-centre/defence-forces-history/the-civil-war-1922-1923/>] Accessed on the 4th of March, 2017.

⁴⁹ A.T.Q Stewart. Michael Collins: The Secret File. Northern Ireland (1997) The Blackstaff Press Limited. pp. 35-36. Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

after their return to violence, the sectarian republican group increased the toll of its victims: Christopher Ewart-Biggs, British Ambassador in Dublin; 12 Protestants at the La Mon House Hotel in Castlereagh, as well as bombs in the English cities of Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Coventry and Southampton.

2.3. Northern Ireland: The Troubles during the Premiership of Margaret Thatcher 1979-1990

On the 3rd of May, 1979, Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and the Conservative Party were returned convincingly in the British general election. Quickly dubbed the Iron Lady, Thatcher's determined policies caused division all over Britain and Ireland, but particularly in Northern Ireland. Her first year in office was accompanied by yet another turning point, the hunger strikes and eventual deaths of ten Republican prisoners held in the Maze Prison (known then as Long Kesh) in County Down. The strikes had been called because Republican prisoners demanded to be treated as political prisoners rather than common criminals, a status that would allow them to wear their own clothes or have the right to freedom of association, among other things. In 1981, just four days after he had started to refuse food, IRA leader in the Maze, Bobby Sands, was elected MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone after a historic nomination by Sinn Féin. In spite of this, Thatcher did not grant the Republican prisoners any concessions, and her famous "we do not negotiate with

terrorists" reaffirmed her adamant position even after Sands and three other strikers died. After 217 days of protests which left ten dead inside the Maze, some demands were met, such as the right of the prisoners to wear their own clothes, and the hunger strikes were called off.

As a minority fighting for civil rights and emancipation, the treatment given to Nationalists and Republicans by the Conservative Government was contemplated with a mixture of shock and horror by much of the rest of the world. The oppressed Catholics conditions were highlighted both internationally and nationally even

Percentage turnout: 66.2%

| Party | First Preference Votes | % Valid Poll |
|---|------------------------|---------------|
| Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) | 176,816 | (26.6%) |
| Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) | 176,342 | (26.5%) |
| Social Democratic & Labour Party (SDLP) | 116,487 | (17.5%) |
| Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) | 59,219 | (8.9%) |
| Irish Independence Party (IIP) | 25,859 | (3.9%) |
| Loyalist (Loy.) | 21,699 | (3.3%) |
| Ulster Popular Unionist Party/Unionist Party of N.Ireland (UPUP/UPNI) | 12,491 | (1.9%) |
| Workers Party Republican Clubs (WPRC) | 12,237 | (1.8%) |
| Labour Party (Lab) | 9,854 | (1.5%) |
| Independent Nationalist (Ind. Nat.) | 9,487 | (1.4%) |
| Others | 45,011 | (6.7%) |
| Total | 665,502 | (100%) |

Source: Flackes and Elliott (1994)

more after the hunger strikes, and many in the international community, especially in the US and EU, pushed for Irish unity. Thatcher, on the other hand, was increasingly perceived as cold-hearted and ideologically ultra-right wing.

Concurrently, the Irish Government, whilst concentrating on their own affairs, had not forgotten about the North of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland had suffered the repercussions of the Troubles more than once. On the 17th of May, 1974, two bombs in Dublin and Monaghan had killed 33 people (more than 40 years on, those

⁵⁰ Pat Coogan, *Tim, Ireland in the Twentieth Century*, United Kingdom (2004), Arrow Books Page: 323. Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

⁵¹ *Doc. Cit.*, Electronic Irish Statute Book "CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE (SAORSTÁT EIREANN) ACT, 1922." 6th of December, 1921. [Online] [Available at <http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print.html>] Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

⁵² Mahon, Derek, *Collected Poems*, Meath (1999) Gallery Press. Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

responsible remain unknown). So it is no surprise that the North of Ireland and its pacification remained a priority on the South's political agenda. Therefore, the New Ireland Forum was created in 1983, its main goal being the return of peace to the whole of Ireland via democratic processes. Although all non-violent parties were invited to join, only four took part: the Fianna Fáil Party, the Fine Gael Party, the Labour Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The parties involved represented almost three quarters of the Catholic population in Ireland, while no Unionist or Loyalist party was present. The Forum's first report was published a year later and touched on a range of various topics, ranging from the origins of the problems in Ireland (the failure of the 1920 settlement, the consequences of the division of Ireland up to 1968 and the cost of violence arising from the Northern Ireland crisis since 1969) to assessments of the current problem (a report on Nationalist and Loyalist identities and attitudes) and analysis of the possibility of a unified or federal Irish State. While the New Ireland Forum essentially blamed Britain for partition and the start of the Troubles, their talks on a unified country never excluded the Protestant population of Northern Ireland. The Protestants, however, continued to exclude themselves.

In spite of these ultimately fruitless but well-meaning attempts to restore peace, violence continued. Margaret Thatcher herself was an IRA target and narrowly escaped assassination when the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where the Conservative Party Conference was being held, was bombed in October 1984, resulting in the death of five people.

2.4. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985

The moderate Nationalist Party, the SDLP, formed on 21st of August, 1970, had been the strongest Catholic political force in Northern Ireland since its creation. Middle class Catholicism in the North was slowly on the rise, and many did not want to be associated with Sinn Féin due to their close ties with the IRA (see table above, which reflects the result of the 1981 Local Government Election on the 20th of May). Nevertheless, Sinn Féin began to gather increasing support during the 80's as they reorganised their strategies and continued to encourage Irish rights to self-determination. In 1982, Sinn Féin received more than 10% of the votes in the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, meaning that this was the first time that the Republican Party made its mark in Northern Irish politics. A year later, Gerry Adams was elected for West Belfast, replacing Ruairí Ó Bradaigh as Sinn Féin's leader. As a result of this slow but steady growth of the Republican electorate, the SDLP started to lose ground and Thatcher decided to enter negotiations with the Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, Garret FitzGerald (1982-1987), to try and strengthen Anglo-Irish relations and to provide a stabilising framework for the Northern Irish situation. As a result, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was signed in November of 1985.

But the AIA, or Hillsborough Agreement as it was also known, in recognition of the place where it was signed, met with dissent in its early stages. FitzGerald wanted Joint Authority over Northern Ireland, which Thatcher rejected. In the end, both governments agreed as stated in the AIA that a) "any change in the status of Northern

⁵³ Wilkinson, Michael, The Telegraph, "What is the 'First Past The Post' voting system?" 24th of April, 2017 [Online] [Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/first-past-post-voting-system/>] Accessed on the 25th of April, 2017.

⁵⁴ Explanatory note: A process used internationally to redraw electoral boundaries to suit the demographic requirements of a particular party (usually the governing one). For its particular application to Northern Ireland, see the BBC film archived at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjLCnckqXwQ>. BBC, YouTube "Gerrymandering in Northern Ireland-BBC" 19th of June, 2015 [Online] [Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjLCnckqXwQ>] Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

⁵⁵ McKittrick, David; McVea, David (2002) Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland. New Amsterdam Books, United States. [Online] [Available at https://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=0SS_AAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=northern+ireland+before+the+troubles&ots=qmTTp5hhXr&sig=zDOSnue3qmY23rikEdDAAofFNZ4#v=onepage&q=northern%20ireland%20before%20the%20troubles&f=false] Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017. pp. 6-10.

⁵⁶ McKittrick, David; McVea, *Op.Cit., Ibid.*, p. 13.

Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of ' the people of' Northern Ireland"; b) "the present wish of a majority of' the people of' Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland"; c) "if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish". A number of common targets were also set, like stopping radical republicanism -Sinn Féin and therefore the IRA- and increasing the cooperation between governments in relation to security and counter-terrorism issues. It goes without saying that the Agreement was primarily concerned with finding a peaceful solution to the Troubles, but this did not stop the rising of Sinn Féin, as can be seen from the results of the 1985 local Government elections (see below):

| Party | First Preference Votes | % Valid Poll |
|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) | 188,497 | (29.5%) |
| Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) | 155,297 | (24.3%) |
| Social Democratic & Labour Party (SDLP) | 113,967 | (17.8%) |
| Sinn Féin (SF) | 75,686 | (11.8%) |
| Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) | 45,394 | (7.1%) |
| Loyalist / Unionist (Loy./U.) | 19,712 | (3.1%) |
| Workers Party (WP) | 10,276 | (1.6%) |
| Independent Nationalist (Ind. Nat.) | 8,191 | (1.3%) |
| Irish Independence Party (IIP) | 7,459 | (1.1%) |
| Labour Party (Lab) | 3,692 | (0.6%) |
| Others | 11,451 | (1.8%) |
| Total | 639,622 | (100%) |

Source: Flackes and Elliott (1994)

Results of the 1985 Local Government Election, 15th of May. Source: CAIN Web Service.

A few days later 100,000 unionists gathered at Belfast City Hall to express their total discontent for the AIA. Ian Paisley, now leader of the DUP, and the leadership of the UUP felt that the 'privileges' granted to the Republic of Ireland over Northern Ireland signified a step closer towards Ireland's reunification. In 1985, all 15 Unionist MP's resigned from the Northern Ireland Assembly in protest against the AIA, and did the same in the Westminster by-elections of 1986 under the slogan "Ulster Says No". On Monday the 3rd of March, another general strike (or 'Day of Action') was called in support of Loyalist and Unionist resistance to the AIA. Barricades were set up on the streets and riots started against the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), who even though they were a Protestant-based governmental police force. were considered traitors for not standing up against the Hillsborough Treaty. A campaign of political and civil disobedience was instigated by UUP leader James Molineux and Ian Paisley, and on the 23rd of June 200 loyalist supporters clashed with the RUC outside Stormont as the Northern Ireland Assembly was dissolved. On the other hand, Sinn Féin and other parties from the Republic also argued against the AIA in that, in their analysis, it violated articles 1-3 of the Republic of Ireland's constitution (Bunreacht na hÉireann), which, as we have noted, refused to acknowledge the existence of Northern Ireland beyond the legitimacy of the "Irish nation".

The AIA did not manage to change anything in Northern Ireland during the final years of Thatcher's administration. The IRA continued its campaign of violence in order to prove that the AIA had not succeeded, and that any meaningful deal concerning the British Government's presence in Ireland would have to

⁵⁷ Explanatory note: The second biggest city of Northern Ireland is known both as Londonderry (to Unionists, who re-named it after the English capital) and Derry (to Republicans, in recognition of the Gaelic roots of the name – Doire, meaning oak grove). The use of two names is in itself highly symbolic of a divided community, and it is interesting today, in the new climate, to observe the BBC's current policy to use both names alternately.

⁵⁸ McKittrick, David McVea, *Ibid., Op.Cit., (54)* pp. 16-21.

accommodate the all-island vision of their political wing Sinn Féin. Moreover, during the final year of Thatcher's premiership, increasing allegations were made that British security forces and loyalist paramilitaries from the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) had colluded in the death of Republican targets, through the involvement of Brian Nelson, a Force Research Unit recruit (the FRU had been created in 1982 and was part of the British Army Intelligence Corps) who had eventually become the Ulster Defence Association's intelligence chief. An official enquiry was launched by Sir John Stevens, then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, leading to the conclusion that there was clear evidence of collusion through the "wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence (...) the extreme of agents being involved in murder." Thanks to the Commissioners' work, Army Agent Nelson was charged with thirty five terrorist offences and jailed for ten years. The Army was also forced to review the FRU's operations in Northern Ireland, after which they published a number of reports that contained guidelines for future Agent operations. Stevens undertook a total of three such enquiries, although interestingly none were published until 2003.

While it is an understatement to say that Margaret Thatcher was not popular amongst both communities in Northern Ireland, with her response to the hunger strikes and support for the AIA, for example, alienating Catholics and Protestants alike, growing evidence of complicity between the state and Loyalist terrorists led to increasing Sinn Féin anger. The day after Thatcher's death, on the 8th of April, 2013, Gerry Adams wrote in an article that during the Thatcher years, "shoot to kill actions" by the British Army had increased and that Brian Nelson, convicted after the first Stevens Enquiry, had travelled to South Africa to negotiate the buying of weapons for Loyalist paramilitary groups, such as the UVF or the UDA, all with the full knowledge of the British Government. This had effectively led to the number of murders carried out by Loyalists increasing from 34 to 224 in the space of three years. All in all, Adams concluded, Thatcher's Irish policy had "failed miserably". Only in 1990 did the Prime Minister allow Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland between 1989 and 1992 to talk to Sinn Féin if the IRA renounced its campaign of violence. Yet Gerry Adams claims in this article that Sinn Féin was already studying and participating in peace processes round the world –in Germany and South Africa, for example– in an effort to bring external influences to bear on the Northern Ireland issue. Sinn Féin, of course, realised that by campaigning for the release of Mandela and supporting the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall, they would gain international support that would help cleanse their image of links to the IRA. By doing so, they hoped to re-invent themselves as a political party that had turned its back on terrorism. For all of her interest in Northern Ireland, all that can be said is that what Thatcher achieved in the region was a reviving and strengthening of sectarian attitudes through her handling of the divisions of a history she never really understood.

2.5. The loss of hope

Up to 1991, the Troubles had barely achieved anything for the Nationalist cause in terms of bringing the reality of a united Ireland closer, but on the political side of things there had been a number of advances in terms of producing a more integrated society. The Catholic population now had a bigger presence in politics, suffered much less job discriminations and their treatment by local authorities was not as discriminatory as it had been just a decade earlier. Middle class Catholicism and Protestantism had slowly grown, and there was a sense of common-ground values; and yet there remained much progress to be made.

Even with such changes, a sizeable minority of the population still had not clearly distanced itself from the

⁵⁹ McKittrick, David McVea, *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 21-25.

past. Radicalism as way of life was still evident throughout Ulster and even the political institutions, like the Northern Ireland Assembly, were deeply and at times bitterly divided. But there had always been a cross-community feeling of disgust at the violence. The years of the Troubles witnessed countless peaceful demonstrations and protests by a population who had grown tired of the deaths of innocent civilians and weary of the stalemate that the conflict had reached. In short, most Protestants rejected Loyalist violence, while the same was also true in Republican and Nationalist areas. A catalyst for this feeling occurred in 1976 when a car, driven by a Republican gunman being chased by British soldiers, collided with a woman with her four children, three of whom were killed. The following day, fifty women marched with their baby prams in protest and women went from door to door asking for signatures for a petition against sectarian violence. Mairead Corrigan, the sister of the woman involved in the incident, went live on Ulster Television (UTV) and pleaded for the unnecessary violence to end. Out of all the misfortunes that thirty years of the Troubles created, this was one of the most touching for people all around the world. Just like the recent deaths of Syrian children in a chemical attack during the civil war in April of 2017, the loss of young lives touches all sorts of invisible chords.

The events of that August in 1976 spurred Mairead Corrigan, along with another local woman, Betty Williams, to found the movement known as the “Peace People”. Through studying the roots of the conflict and campaigning to end violence with the specific goal of creating a more just and equal society in Northern Ireland, the Peace People brought together thousands of marchers in the North and South alike. In fact, according to the organisation, violence in Ulster decreased by almost 70% during the first six months that followed the creation of the Movement. The year 1976 had recorded a total of 297 deaths, but was the last twelve-month cycle of the Troubles to witness such losses. The birth of the Peace People contributed to the decline of these high numbers and was also an important factor during the peace process. In 1976, both Mairead Corrigan and Betsy Williams were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (they formally received it in 1977) for their work in promoting peace within Northern Ireland.

Their work was, of course, a step in the right direction. But throughout the 70s and 80s, and after Margaret Thatcher left Downing Street, the horrors that were a part of everyday life in Northern Ireland continued. The citizens of Northern Ireland grew more hopelessly accustomed to the everyday nature of threat and violence as they sought to resume their daily lives in a place that looked to be spiralling out of control. In the Republic people are also feared for their own safety, and their idea of not abandoning the North of Ireland changed as the Troubles worsened. In contrast to this, in other parts of the United Kingdom the Troubles had too produced fear in families thereafter the IRA planted bombs in different cities of the nation, and a growing lobby for Irish reunification began to make itself felt. Polls were conducted throughout the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, touching on a range of different subjects in relation to Northern Ireland and its conflict. The opinions varied greatly from one community to the next and depending on what country the poll had happened in. Below are just some examples (1*, 2*, 3*):

⁶⁰ McKittrick, David McVea, *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (54) pp. 27-28.

⁶¹ Explanatory note: NI: Northern Ireland; ROI: Republic of Ireland.

⁶² Levine, Joshua *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (25) pp. 88-89.

⁶³ Levine, Joshua *Ibid.*, *Op. Cit* (25) pp. 90-92; 94.

(1*) Survey 1* shows that, in 1979, the Republic of Ireland greatly opposed British presence in Ireland. The Republic also suffered many attacks derived from the Troubles, which also explain the percentages shown on the poll. Source: CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster.

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1979 | |
| Date of survey: | October 1979 |
| Survey conducted by: | Economic and Social Research Institute |
| Survey sponsored by: | Economic and Social Research Institute |
| Main topic: | Attitudes to the situation in Northern Ireland |
| Reported / published: | <i>Irish Times</i> , 16 October 1979 |
| Additional information: | The survey was conducted in the Republic of Ireland. Of those surveyed 72% were in favour of unilateral British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, and 21% supported IRA activities. |

(2*) Survey 2* shows the attitudes of people in Britain in relation to Northern Ireland Source: CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster.

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Date of survey: | 25 March 1992 |
| Survey conducted by: | MORI |
| Survey sponsored by: | The London Times; and The Irish Times |
| Main topic: | Attitudes of those living in Britain towards Northern Ireland |
| Reported / published: | <i>Irish Times</i> , 25 March 1992 |
| Additional information: | The poll involved the questioning of 1,109 people in 55 constituencies across Britain. Of those questioned, 31% said they were in favour of Northern Ireland becoming independent; 29% favoured the region remaining part of the United Kingdom; 23% were in favour of a United Ireland; 17% had no opinion |

(3*) Survey 3* shows the attitudes of people in England in relation to Northern Ireland. Having had troubles with the IRA in the past, English opinions on Ulster were different than those of their British and Irish counterparts.

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Date of survey: | March 1993 |
| Survey conducted by: | |
| Survey sponsored by: | |
| Main topic: | The future status of Northern Ireland |
| Reported / published: | <i>Sunday Telegraph</i> , 1993 |
| Additional information: | The survey questioned a sample of people living in England on the issues related to Northern Ireland. Of those questioned, 56% said that they no longer wanted the region to remain part of the United Kingdom. |

The creation of the “Peace People” was a sign of faith by Northern Ireland’s public majority that normality could someday arrive before irrevocable bloodshed shaped the region’s reality forever. However, and as mentioned before, the killings (although in lesser quantity) continued throughout the years, and society started to grow increasingly alienated from their government as they felt that even politics would not be able to solve what looked like an everlasting and despairing conflict. The ability to imagine a common history and culture looked to be in peril as people tried to grow accustomed to the fact that Ireland’s past was still annulling Ulster’s present and thus blocking its future.

⁶⁴ BBC History, “Day the Troubles began” [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/day_troubles_began] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017. For an eye-witness account of one Civil Right’s activist, published recently in the Irish News, see <http://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/01/03/news/burntollet-attack-on-civil-rights-activists-remembered-861101/>. Ainsworth, Paul, The Irish News “Burntollet attack on civil rights activists remembered” 3rd of January, 2017 [Online] [Available <http://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/01/03/news/burntollet-attack-on-civil-rights-activists-remembered-861101/>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

⁶⁵ Levine, Joshua *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (25) p. 96.

3. The Peace Process in Northern Ireland

It is impossible to say when the actual peace process in Northern Ireland began, but unofficially, as we have seen, the British and Irish governments had been trying to find a peaceful solution to the Troubles since the mid 1980's with the signing of the AIA and the implementation of the New Ireland Forum. Nevertheless, Margaret Thatcher's eleven years as Prime Minister had effectively stalled the impetus for peace. Some of her friends, such as Airey Neave and Earl Mountbatten, had died at the hands of the IRA, which might explain the hard line she adopted with Sinn Féin and the IRA. However, as Gerry Adams asserted in his article, there had been unofficial contact between the British authorities and the young leaders of the IRA, Adams himself and the Derry born Martin McGuinness, who had stated clearly that if Britain did not withdraw from Northern Ireland, the armed struggle would continue.

When John Major replaced Thatcher, after she was effectively ousted from office by her own party, he instructed Secretary of State Peter Brooke on the 30th of April, 1991, to begin conversations with the main parties in Northern Ireland (DUP, UUP, SDLP and APNI) with the intention of creating a devolved government in Northern Ireland under the joint control of the British and Irish Governments. But the negotiations failed partly because of Unionists' refusal to participate in the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (the creation of the AIIC was part of the Anglo Irish Agreement or AIA) due to the fact that they had always been strongly opposed to the AIA because of the involvement of the Irish Government in Northern Irish politics. However, Major continued to work through official and unofficial channels, and a little under a year later, with Sir Patrick Mayhew as the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, a role he held from 1992 to 1997, he picked up where Brooke had left off, once again attempting to bring the parties round the table. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which had been one of the main problems during the last talks, suspended its meetings in order to enable negotiations between parties. Yet there was a dispute over the Irish Constitution, as the Unionists pressed for the Irish government to change articles 2 & 3, which would have effectively recognised Northern Ireland's sovereignty within the UK. The Republic refused, saying that Unionists would first have to concede certain demands in order for such a change to materialise. relating in particular to political structures internal to Northern Ireland. In September 1992, the leader of the UUP James Molineux attended a conference in Dublin to discuss the broad issues of constitutional, security and cross-border cooperation, and although Paisley's DUP did not attend the meeting, this was the first time that Unionists had discussed political issues in Dublin since 1922. No major breakthrough was attained, but the presence of Northern Irish Protestant politicians in the South was a symbolic gesture akin to a token of good faith, demonstrating a clear commitment to the realisation that if the Troubles and direct rule were to persist, peace would never return to Northern Ireland.

But symbolism did not appeal to the British Government, and a deadline was set for the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference to resume its regular meetings. When this finally happened, Unionists, ever suspicious of their neighbours in the Republic, abandoned the meetings, leading the Brooke/Mayhew talks- which had cost the taxpayer around 5million pounds to end up, once again, in failure. The position continued to seem intractable. Sinn Féin, still heavily linked to the IRA, was left out of the talks, which explains one of the reasons why the negotiations failed. Republican support for Sinn Féin was still strong, and leaving them out of the meetings meant not counting on a large percentage of Nationalist voters.

⁶⁶ Explanatory Note: Catholics make up 70% of the urban population due to the city's proximity to the Republic's border. The name Londonderry was given to it in 1613 by King James I. BBC History "Derry-Londonderry" [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/places/derry_londonderry] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

⁶⁷ Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "The Deployment of British Troops- Summary of Main Events" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/troops/sum.htm>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

3.2. The peace process: The Downing Street Declaration and the first IRA ceasefire

The deeply rooted, visceral unpopularity among Unionists of the Anglo-Irish Agreement had taken both governments by surprise. In order not to repeat the same mistake, Dublin and London explicitly consulted the opinion of Protestant clergymen when sitting back down again to negotiate. The result was a joint statement issued on the 15th of December 1993, known as the Downing Street Declaration. Divided into twelve paragraphs that set a different tone in comparison with other previous documents. The text, for the first time, looked at the historical background to the Troubles; it talked about the cultural traditions of Northern Ireland and the Republic and recognised the right of all people living on the island to self-determination. Britain's Prime Minister and the Irish Taoiseach stated in the declaration that their governments would respect the democratic will of the people living in Northern Ireland if they wished to remain as either part of the Union or part of an independent Ireland. The two governments also affirmed that any political party committed to peaceful methods and democratic processes would be invited to join in the dialogue about the Northern Irish situation. The message to Sinn Féin was clear.

Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution were also explicitly referenced in the declaration. For the first time, the Taoiseach admitted that some elements found in the Constitution of the Republic were offensive to Northern Irish Unionists and that these elements were open to revision. Nevertheless, despite clear softening of positions, not all Unionist parties found the Downing Street Declaration palatable; Ian Paisley's DUP famously called it an act of treason on the part of their government.

Because the declaration focused more on shared understanding and a vision for the future of the region rather than a detailed political scheme, Sinn Féin and the Loyalists remained sceptical. However, the contents did represent a breakthrough in that the acknowledgment of history provided some sort of framework of understanding for the present, while at the same time sending a clear message to terrorist organisations that political process and democracy were not compatible with violence. By acknowledging the past, it out-manoeuvred the terrorists. If the IRA in particular persisted with its campaign, there could be no future for the Republican cause in the North of Ireland and Sinn Féin would lose all political credibility. The question was clear: if self-determination was now officially acknowledged, why continue fighting for it?.

So it was with the prime objective of enabling Sinn Féin to participate in inclusive negotiations that the IRA eventually announced a ceasefire on the 31st of August, 1994. This produced a domino effect, with another ceasefire announced on the 13th of October by the Combined Military Loyalist Command (CMLC, a group formed in the nineties that included the UDA, UVF and the Red Hand Commando). Although John Major's cabinet was doubtful about the IRA truce, Taoiseach Albert Reynolds considered it permanent, and on the 6th of September he met in Dublin with the President of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, and leader of the SDLP, John Hume, in an act of considerable symbolic importance in that it cemented Sinn Féin's position with mainstream constitutional republicanism. At the same time, the British Government tried to convince Sinn Féin that the IRA needed to surrender their weapons, an act of military decommissioning that was not to happen until years later. In the meantime, ex-IRA leaders Martin McGuinness and Gerry Kelly met with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram (1994-1997), marking the first time that Sinn Féin had 'officially' met with a government minister. Slowly but surely, progress was being made.

⁶⁸ Levine, Joshua *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (25) p. 112.

⁶⁹ Dixon, Paul O'Kane, Eamonn (2011) Northern Ireland since 1969. Pearson Education, United Kingdom. Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017. p. 14.

⁷⁰ Melaugh, Martin CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "Internment-Summary of Main Events" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

While Sinn Féin was having meetings with British officials, the Ulster Unionist Party was also undergoing transformation. Just as Adams and McGuinness emerged from unlikely backgrounds as peace-makers, Molineaux was replaced by David Trimble as the UUP's party leader, serving between 1995 and 2005. Trimble, with deep and not uncontroversial roots in the Orange Order, recognised that the Downing Street Declaration spoke of "democratic proceedings", and many parties (Loyalist and Republican alike) had still not been consolidated democratically. For this legitimate consolidation to take place, he proposed the creation of a new Northern Ireland Assembly, a proposal initially rejected by Nationalist and Republican parties, who thought that the Assembly would prevent further agreements between Republicans in the North of Ireland and the Irish Government. Yet there was a certain truth and not just self-interest in what Trimble had planned. Decommissioning was still a worrying matter, but that did not mean that it was incompatible with developing new political institutions. Furthermore, there was no need for Republicans to fear political fraud anymore –gerrymandering had long been forgotten in a society that was becoming more demographically equal, more democratic and more politically tolerant.

On the 24th of January 1996, the International Body on Arms Decommissioning published the Mitchell Report, which argued that the disarmament of all paramilitary factions –by an assigned independent Commission– should take place during the negotiations and not before or after, as some parties wanted. The thrust of the paper was similar to that of the Downing Street Declaration and appealed for peace and democracy to replace the violence and punishment killings and beatings carried out by paramilitaries. Sinn Féin, however, still wasn't involved in the negotiations as much as they wished at a time when events were now moving more quickly than ever. The British and Irish governments had put in place a strategy, the so called twin track negotiations, which consisted of running parallel party talks while disarmament took place at the same time. While all-party talks were to begin at the end of February, meetings had only taken place between the Social Labour Democratic Party, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). The UUP, on the other hand, refused to meet with the Irish Government twice when they were invited to negotiate. As people who since the time of the Plantation had perceived their privilege to be under threat, they remained intransigent.

It is possible that Sinn Féin may have felt out of place here. They had met with both governments in Stormont in mid-January, but only for preparatory talks. Might Sinn Féin have felt that, due to their radical Republican links, disarmament was still more significant for Westminster and the Dáil than including them in the talks? If this was true, then the twin track negotiations were illegitimate as far as Sinn Féin was concerned. George Mitchell (President Clinton's envoy, as noted in Chapter One) who, at that time, was Chair of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, warned that if there was no evidence of quick movement towards the all-party talks, there was danger that some members of the IRA might return to violence. And that was indeed what happened. Five days later –on the 9th of February 1996– the IRA, in protest at the exclusion of Sinn Féin from the multiparty talks, bombed Canary Wharf in London.

The Irish and British government immediately broke off all contacts with Sinn Féin, while Gerry Adams, signally refusing to condemn the acts, wrote in the Belfast Telegraph (16th of February, 1996) that the absence of negotiations had caused the ceasefire to fail. Irish history is full of half-planned, ill-thought-out actions. Whether this was a huge mistake on the IRA's part, putting the peace process in jeopardy again, or a well-calculated move to get Sinn Féin to the table was yet to be seen.

⁷¹ McDonald, Henry; Bowcott, Owen, The Guardian "Bloody Sunday report: 38 years on, justice at last", 15th of June, 2010 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/15/bloody-sunday-report-soldiers-prosecuted>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

⁷² Dixon, Paul; O'Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, (67) p. 15.

⁷³ BBC News "1972-75: The failure of Sunningdale" 18th of March, 1999 [Online] [Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/history/64733.stm] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

3.3. The peace process: Stormont talks begin in 1997

In a proposal similar to that of David Trimble's new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government proposed the creation of a Northern Ireland Forum through which the main parties and their leaders would be selected to start participating in the negotiations and multiparty talks. Surprisingly, Prime Minister John Major had decided to include Sinn Féin in these elections. The reasons for this were the need to incorporate the Republicans in contemporary Northern Irish political institutions if he wanted to pacify the IRA, as the bombing in Canary Wharf showed, and the massive electoral support that the party was beginning to attract from people who realised that violence might be more effectively channelled into politics. This last point was proved when, on the 30th of May 1997, the crucially important election results to the proposed Northern Ireland Forum gave Sinn Féin 17 seats and a 15.47% historic share of the vote, its highest ever. However, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) remained the biggest political force with 30 seats (24.17% of the votes), followed by John Hume's nationalist SDLP (21 seats with 21,36% of the votes) –still considered by most Catholics as a non-extreme option to Sinn Féin. But the turnout at the election was 64.7%. taken as an indicator that many people in Northern Ireland did not wish to vote because of their sectarian ideologies or simply because of their disenchantment with a stalled region, still under direct rule. Many, it seemed, were still unable to believe in the hope for change offered by the new political process.

After the elections, the elected politicians agreed a framework for the talks to take place. Amid these was the appointment of three chairmen from the International Body on Arms Decommissioning (George Mitchell once again, John de Chastelain and Harri Holkeri) who were to supervise the negotiations. The American Mitchell later proved to be a decisive moderator between the parties. The resulting 'Stormont talks' began on the 10th of June, but Sinn Féin, although they had performed credibly in the Forum's elections, were excluded. To explain this decision, John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (1994-1997) released a short statement declaring that "Sinn Féin are not at today's talks because there has been no restoration of the August 1994 cease-fire. It has been the consistent position of both Governments since February, reflected in paragraph 9 of the Ground-rules for Substantive All-Party negotiations, that the resumption of Ministerial dialogue with Sinn Féin and their participation in negotiations, requires the unequivocal restoration of the cease-fire of August 1994." But if the impatience of the IRA that resulted in the bombing at Canary Wharf was, in part at least, a calculated mistake, the firmness in leaving Sinn Féin out of the first talks was no less so. While it was true that the IRA had not declared another ceasefire, it was nonetheless implicit in its position that it would do so once it had guarantees that Sinn Féin would be included in the peace process. Above all, they had a democratic mandate. So when Sinn Féin was left out of the talks yet again, this time in the Northern Ireland Forum, the IRA responded by detonating a one and a half tonne bomb in Manchester City centre, injuring 200 people. Nevertheless, the organisation stated a few days later that it was "prepared to enhance the democratic peace process". signalling that, despite the recent attack in England, the IRA were willing to uphold their end of the deal-providing that the British Government kept theirs. In relation to this, a poll published on the 22nd of October of 1996 by the Belfast based paper *The Irish News* revealed that 70% of Sinn Féin supporters agreed that the Irish Republican Army should announce an immediate ceasefire. Momentum was building. The future was beginning to seem more important than the past.

⁷⁵ Melaugh, Martin, *Ibid.*, Loc. Cit. (68) ; Lynn, Brendan CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "IRA Truce: 9 February 1975 to 23 January 1976 - Summary of Main Events" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/sum.htm>] Accessed on 9th of March, 2017.

⁷⁶ BBC History "Republican hunger strikes in the Maze prison" [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/republican_hunger_strikes_maze] Accessed on the 9th of March, 2017.

⁷⁷ Explanatory Note: Following the death of Bobby Sands, two more prisoners were elected as members of the Irish parliament. Dixon, Paul; O'Kane, Eamonn, *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (67) p. 17.

But street violence in Northern Ireland was far from disappearing. Punishment beatings continued, bombs were defused by the British Army on a daily basis and killings of innocent civilians were carried out by the IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF, an undercover name or branch of the Ulster Defence Association or UDA) or the Ulster Volunteer Force, amongst others. New groups still continued to form and evolve from the old ones, like the Liberation Volunteer Force (LVF) integrated by ex UVF and UFF members who considered their previous organisations too bland and compromising towards disarmament and the peace process. Future peace was being called by a majority, but the entrenchments of the past, and the sectarian violence they generated, still remained. In a society refusing to release itself from the clutches of said past, acts of commemoration had an inordinate symbolic importance. Marching had always been a public assertion of group identity and green or orange affiliation. The planned routes for marches became a major bone of contention. These marches, escorted by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, often passed through rival communities and caused outrage and rioting for many days. Because of the ferocity of the disturbances, an extra 1000 British Army troops were sent to Northern Ireland in support of the RUC. Shortly afterwards, Secretary of State Mayhew agreed to establish a Parades Commission to regulate all parades in Northern Ireland. In the new Northern Ireland, at the time of writing, the Commission is still in operating, and its deliberations are still fractious.

As peace talks continued, the summer of 1996 and the months that ensued remained chaotic. The IRA bombed the British Army HQ in Lisburn, a town on the outskirts of Belfast, while petrol bombs were thrown at Catholic houses in arson attacks. The peace process had been seriously compromised in 1996, and a sense of the old hopelessness was once again making itself felt. It was as if Northern Ireland had exhausted its own goodwill. If anything was to happen, it might have to come from outside the Province.

As part of his New Year's message, Bill Clinton, his presidency renewed for another four years, called on the IRA to announce another ceasefire. American support for the peace process in Northern Ireland was very significant, as we shall see in the following chapters. The call was significant, but it was not heeded immediately. A British soldier was shot on the 12th of February at an army checkpoint in Armagh, and was the last death of a member of the British Armed Forces in Northern Ireland during the Troubles (the killing of two British Soldiers would take place in 2009, spreading temporary fears across the population that the conflict might return). Moreover, on the 5th of March the political talks in Stormont were adjourned to allow the leaders of the main parties to prepare their campaigns for the British general election that was due to take place on the 1st of May. The talks were set to continue on the 3rd of June.

Clinton's call echoed throughout Irish and British politics, further galvanising support for Sinn Féin at the expense of the more moderate SDLP. In that way Sinn Féin was increasingly brought into the political process by external forces and its own electorate alike. Unionism, however, was beginning to fragment. In the UUP's annual meeting in Belfast on the 22nd of March, David Trimble spoke about "aggressive, loudmouth Unionists". a message that was clearly directed at the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, Ian Paisley. The DUP later commented on Trimble's words, calling them "vile, vicious and venomous", but for many Trimble had accurately described Paisley's radical views and fiery sermons on what he called 'romanism'. his dismissive gestures towards anything Irish-related and sheer defence of unionism to the point of irrationality as leftovers from the past. There was growing recognition that extremist views would have to cease, although Paisley's own realisation of this, dramatic though it was, was yet to come.

⁷⁸ Sinn Féin "Report of the New Ireland Forum" 2nd of May, 1984 [Online] [Available at <http://www.sinnFéin.ie/contents/15214>] Accessed on the 9th of March, 2017.

⁷⁹ Alonso, Rogelio *Ibid*, *Op.Cit.*, (24) pp. 250-252.

The UK general elections on the 1st of May saw Tony Blair's Labour Party win by the largest margin since 1945, while the Conservative Party's eighteen year period in power ended with one of their worst defeats since 1906. Many progressives in Northern Ireland (Catholic and Protestant) were caught up in the euphoria of the moment, and saw this as a step closer to the end of the Troubles on the basis that this change of politics meant a 'breath of fresh air' in terms of direct rule over Ulster. Among the local parties, Sinn Féin became the third largest party in the region –after the UUP and SDLP– with 2 MP's selected: Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness (the President and Vice President of Sinn Féin, respectively), both of whom were to play significant roles in the subsequent development of the peace agreement. The stage was being set.

Blair immediately appointed Marjorie Mowlam as new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (1997-1999), succeeding Patrick Mayhew. She travelled to Belfast, but in a patriarchal and mostly conservative society like Northern Ireland, struggled to win trust. However, her reforms were significant –employment equality, attracting Catholics into the RUC by abolishing the outdated practice of an oath of allegiance to the Queen, and promising that Sinn Féin could re-enter the political talks at Stormont once the IRA had declared a ceasefire. Before long, the IRA replied that they were "ready to do business with the British Government". These words can be attributed to two things. Firstly, to the huge popularity of 'Mo' Mowlam, who was a woman of extraordinary courage and personality, which the IRA quickly recognised. And secondly, because the Blair Government in itself represented a break with the past, both in terms of British politics and, more specifically, with 'old Labour'. The time was ripe for change in the region.

Local Government elections were held in Northern Ireland on the 21st of May, with the UUP, SDLP, Sinn Féin and DUP emerging as the strongest parties. Twelve days later, the first Nationalist Mayor of Belfast was elected (Alban Maginness of the SDLP), and the Stormont talks continued on the 3rd of June. The results of the local elections proved that Sinn Féin had now become a major Nationalist and Republican political force, soon to eclipse the SDLP, and that since the 1980's they had transformed into a party that slowly but surely managed to attract all Catholics without distinguishing between social classes. McGuinness and Adams, ever mindful of the power of the American lobby, realised that the appropriate time had arrived to call for a renewed IRA ceasefire in order to take advantage of the party's momentum and be included in the Stormont talks. Accordingly, on the 18th of July, 1997, a ceasefire was announced. On the same date a joint statement from the SDLP's hugely respected John Hume and Sinn Féin's Gerry Adams was released, albeit not the first one. In the course of the previous ten years, four other statements had been released following the parties' first meeting in 1988, intended as an act both to reassure all Nationalists in the North that their interests were secure, and as an appeal to translate Irish nationalism into a peaceful process. The five declarations in total addressed the burning issues of history, recognising that the people of the island were divided and that consensus was necessary for the achievement of peace and for the return of a devolved government. Self-determination was mentioned on various occasions (the first time this was brought up, in 1988, it helped the Downing Street Declaration to take form) and even if Britain thought of the statements as biased towards a united Ireland, the Adams/Hume talks were considered a cornerstone for future agreements and the peace process. Effectively, they formed a bridge between the divisions of the past, fuelled by a Catholic sense of grievance and a Nationalist sense of impotence, along with the hopes of a new political process.

After an agreement was signed by Britain and the Republic of Ireland to set up an Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) in August, Sinn Féin were included in the multi-party talks at Stormont and on the 9th of September they signed a pledge committing to the Mitchell Principles included

⁸⁰ *Doc.Cit.*, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster. "ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985 between THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM" 15th of November, 1985 [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

in the Mitchell Report (this would later cause a split in both the IRA and Sinn Féin, leading to the establishment of the so-called Real IRA, a direct echo of the split between diehards and free-staters nearly eighty years earlier, as explained in Chapter One). On the 24th of September, Unionists – apart from Paisley’s DUP, whose absence was criticised by David Trimble – and Republicans sat at the same table for the first time in seventy years. Another historic landmark was reached in December when a delegation of Sinn Féin and its leaders met with Tony Blair in Downing Street after seventy-six years of refusing to do so. Peace for Northern Ireland and the whole island was starting to become a reality after centuries of conflict.

3.4. The peace process: The Good Friday Agreement in a new Northern Ireland (1998)

If a complete cessation of paramilitary and terrorist violence were to take place, all organisations had to agree to the terms that were being studied and constantly amended at the parliament of Stormont. And essentially, they had to take into account that the safeguard for Northern Ireland’s future depended on respecting the impartiality of its modern institutions and the political, religious and ideological plurality of its people. For that to happen the members of the paramilitary organisations currently serving prison sentences needed to be wholly involved in the process, which is why Secretary of State Mowlam decided to pay a visit to the Loyalist and Republican prisoners inside the Maze Prison, scene of the hunger strikes barely a generation earlier, to persuade them to support the peace process. Both the UDA and the UFF agreed to support it, allowing their political representation, the Ulster Democratic Party, to re-enter the talks, though they were expelled just weeks later after the UDA/UFF (supposedly on ceasefire) were accused of killing three Catholic civilians. The DUP, meanwhile, rejected Mowlam’s actions, along with the families of the victims killed during the Troubles, but they were welcomed by Trimble and Adams.

As soon as Christmas was over, the negotiations at Stormont resumed. Over the holiday period Britain and the Republic of Ireland had been working on yet another paper that included suggestions for all parties involved in the negotiations. The resulting ‘Proposition of Heads Agreement’ and its contents were not detailed, but they included several elements that would later inspire the Good Friday Agreement. The proposals included the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly, and the replacement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985 with a new one that studied the creation of a summit type intergovernmental council, to include all the nations of the British Isles, and an all-Irish ministerial council for specific matters of concern to the two sides involved. The enhancement of civil and human rights and the protection of the cultural identity of Catholics and Protestants in all of the island was another important topic, along with the security measures (prisoners, decommissioning etc) that were to be imposed to protect the peace. The inherited concerns of history were being carefully addressed.

⁸¹ Explanatory Note: In 1993, the RUC was made up of 7% Catholics. In the years of the AIA protests, these numbers would probably have been lower. As time passed, ideologies in civil and public services became less important during the Troubles. McKittrick, David, Independent “Catholics make up 7% of RUC” 28th of January, 1993. [Online] [Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/catholics-make-up-7-of-ruc-1481268.html>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

⁸² Alonso, Rogelio. *Ibid., Op.Cit.*, (24) pp. 250-252; Dixon, Paul; O’Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, Op.Cit., (67) Page: 18; Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “The Northern Ireland Assembly, November 1982 - June 1986 - A Chronology of Main Events” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/assembly1982/chronology.htm>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017; Doc. Cit Taoiseach “Bunreacht na hÉireann-Constitution of Ireland” 1st of July, 1937 [Online] [Available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/The_Constitution/February_2015_-_Constitution_of_Ireland_.pdf] Page: 22 Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

⁸³ Stevens, John Doc. Cit, Cain Web Services, University of Ulster “Steven Enquiry: Overview & Recommendations” 17th of April, 2003 [Online] [Available at <http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.pdf>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017 pp. 3; 9; 15; 16.

The negotiations transferred to Dublin in February. The Progressive Unionist Party had been included in the talks after the UVF eventually accepted the peace process as legitimate, but Sinn Féin were once again removed after two IRA killings occurred at the beginning of February –they re-joined on the 23rd of March. It is important to remember that the IRA, torn between the methods of the past and the hope for peace, had split at the outset of the Troubles into the Official and the Provisional IRA (PIRA). The Officials by now had almost disappeared and most of its senior members were either retired or integrated into Sinn Féin. The IRA, as we have already noted, was to suffer more internal divisions during the late stages of the Troubles as tensions between past and future intensified. In 1986 the Continuity IRA (CIRA) had been formed after a split in Sinn Féin, simultaneously creating the group known as Republican Sinn Féin or RSEF whose political impact was minimal. The split was motivated by Gerry Adams's decision to end the boycott of the Irish Parliament and therefore recognising the institutions of partition. CIRA and RSEF, whose appropriation of the names was a clear indication of what they would have considered to be loyalty to the past, opposed disarmament and refused any deal for the six counties other than an end to partition. Furthermore, we have seen, the Real IRA (RIRA) also broke away in 1997, on the basis that Sinn Féin and the PIRA had negotiated alternative deals (rather than reunification) with the British and Irish Governments. Once again, as the epithet 'Real' indicates, this was a call of loyalty to a past considered authentic. The PIRA had been responsible for the killings of Protestant civilians, British soldiers and loyalist paramilitary members up until their 1994 ceasefire, when the CIRA took over most of the military operations. The RIRA started its campaigns from 1998 onwards; the ultimate objective of all factions remained the same, the main difference being their stand on whether history was best dealt with through politics or conflict.

Stormont had begun discussing talks more than a year and a half earlier, but still, in 1998, nothing was close to being finalised. This led George Mitchell, who presided over the meetings and was the architect of the Mitchell Report, to set the 9th of April as the deadline for all parties to reach an agreement. The strategy worked, and the Good Friday Agreement was signed on the 10th of April, 1998. People were tired of violence; there was a sense of a new start. This was reflected in the Agreement itself, a thirty-five page document structured around various key points that form the basis of the institutions currently in place in Northern Ireland. The first pages spoke about initiating a "fresh start" and a commitment to "partnership, equality and mutual respect" in Northern Ireland, its relations with the Republic and with the rest of the United Kingdom. In the following paragraphs, the parties accepted the new British-Irish agreement drafted from the Proposition of Heads Agreement in January and recognised that, for the time being, a majority of people living in Northern Ireland wanted to remain as part of the United Kingdom. The right to self-determination was also mentioned, however, as well as the "binding obligation" of both Britain and the Republic of Ireland to accept the will of the people if a united Ireland were ever to be agreed by a majority. Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution were also changed to the satisfaction of Unionists, declaring that "It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island". A major change is identifiable in these initial statements in terms of the mutual recognition as a principle exercised by both communities with regards to the possibility of a future united Ireland and the modification of the Irish Constitution, which for the first time in its history admitted, although not explicitly, the partition of Ireland.

⁸⁴ BBC News, "The Stevens Inquiry: Chronology" 17th of April, 2003 [Online] [Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2954383.stm] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

⁸⁵ Adams, Gerry, The Guardian "Margaret Thatcher made the north of Ireland a more bitterly divided place" 9th of April, 2013 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/09/thatcher-legacy-bitterness-north-ireland>] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

The rest of the document described the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly –acting as a “prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities”– with 108 members, the executive authority consisting of a First Minister and Deputy First Minister elected on a “cross-community basis”, a North-South Ministerial Council that was to meet twice a year and decide on matters that could concern the whole island (i.e: agriculture, education, transport, tourism, social security or health issues), and a British-Irish Council. The election of First and Deputy First Ministers, representing the two political strands, was one of the most significant signs of cooperation between two sides who were unused to listening to each other. This remains one of the most important achievements in Northern Ireland to date.

The Agreement stipulated that a Human Rights Commission in Northern Ireland would also be set up and act as part of a joint committee with the South. In terms of security, the British Government would progressively reduce the number of British forces in Northern Ireland and its security installations as the threat level in the region diminished. Additionally, the decommissioning of all paramilitary organisations was to be successfully carried out in a space of two years by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. Finally, one of the last points, and without doubt the most controversial, was the decision by both governments to release all current prisoners who had Troubles related convictions, irrespective of the magnitude of their offences. If the paramilitary groups they belonged to did not surrender their weapons, they would not be released. Once again, the future was prioritised over the past, receiving heavy criticism from the families and relatives of victims killed during the Troubles; but the peace process sought to act as a rehabilitation programme of sorts, giving the convicts the opportunity to be a part of a combat-free Northern Ireland.

The Good Friday Agreement was, of course, not to everyone’s liking –notably Ian Paisley and Republican Sinn Féin fought a powerful campaign against it– but all the major parties had voted in favour of signing it. Sinn Féin even changed its constitution in support of the Agreement by allowing its members to take their seats in the new Northern Ireland Assembly and to further participate in all of its institutions. Despite this, and in order to bring the entire population into the new ambit of peaceful politics, the Good Friday Agreement was still to be subjected to a referendum in the North and South of Ireland. On the 22nd of May the results of the referendum favoured the Agreement, with 71.1% approval in Northern Ireland and 94.4% in the Republic.

Nevertheless, stability remained fragile, as the past still had a claim on the present. On the 15th of August the Real IRA detonated a massive bomb in the market town of Omagh, killing a total of 29 people –the worst incident in Northern Ireland since the start of the Troubles– and injuring hundreds more. The atrocity, however, unified people across Ireland and the United Kingdom and was the last bombing in the Troubles. The RIRA had expressed their anger over the Good Friday Agreement, but were later to confess to the Irish News that they had only intended to cause property damage. Such a horrific action would never be forgiven or forgotten, but the events and its profound effects on a society that was starting to feel the Troubles coming to an end took their toll on the RIRA and also on the INLA, who both announced a ceasefire in the forthcoming months. What had happened in Omagh was the reckless and indiscriminate murder of Catholics and Protestants alike, and it made resistant organisations like the RIRA realise such shared suffering could not continue.

⁸⁷ Peace People “History: Peace People the beginnings...” [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.peacepeople.com/?page_id=8] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

After thirty years of violence, the Good Friday Agreement marked the end of the most recent phase of the Troubles. The conflict had taken a heavy toll not just on Northern Ireland, but also on the lives of those in England and the Republic of Ireland. However, Northern Ireland continued to distance itself from the Troubles in the years after the Good Friday Agreement. The Executive was established, and David Trimble (UUP) and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) became the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland in 1999. On the 4th of November, 2001, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was replaced officially by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). effectively demilitarised in order to satisfy the Nationalist community. Devolution of powers to the Northern Irish Government was fully restored in 1999. There were, of course, disagreements along the way, incidents that threatened to destabilise the process. Devolution was suspended again in 2002 when Sinn Féin was investigated as a result of allegations that IRA spies were infiltrated in the party and gathering Republican intelligence, and power was only returned to the Northern Ireland Executive in 2007. after the IRA had affectively completed its disarmament.

Following the 2007 Assembly Elections, the two most popular parties, now the DUP and Sinn Féin, agreed to form the Executive. On the surface, it would seem that the electorate was returning to the old division of range and green, republicanism and loyalism, but both parties were now committed to making the new institutions work. And events were moving apace. On the 31st of July, 2007, the last British soldiers stationed in Northern Ireland returned home, marking the end to 'Operation Banner'. Even though the Troubles notionally ended in 1998, political discrepancies still remain and require careful consideration. But with the withdrawal of the British Army in 2005 and the final stage of disarmament carried out by the IRA on the 28th of July that same year, the conditions for an end to centuries' violence seemed to have been met. The Continuity IRA (CIRA) and the Real IRA (RIRA) carried out random attacks in 2009, killing two soldier at an Army base in county Antrim, but they currently do not have anything like the influence, weaponry or power that the Provisional IRA displayed during the Troubles.

3.5. Internal pressures during the peace process

Of all the politicians in Northern Ireland who fought for peace and reconciliation, John Hume and David Trimble stand out. Hume, leader of the SDLP from 1979 till 2001, was an MP in Westminster since 1983 and became an MEP for the European Union in 1979. In fact, it was this last experience and his thorough commitment to the European ideal, forged in the face of the continent's post-war experience, which gave him the perspective to realise that a peaceful solution to Northern Ireland's Troubles, in spite of the weight of historical denial, was always possible. His time in Brussels taught him about cooperation within the context of the relationships between EU member states, and demonstrated how borders were becoming less important. Hume began to ask himself what it meant to be European rather than Irish or British (based on territorial issues), and he argued strongly for cross-border partnership in Ireland after witnessing the creation of the single market and the elimination of customs, restrictions and regulations for the EU's participant countries.

Born and brought up in a Catholic Nationalist environment, he was in favour of opening up dialogue with other members of his community (including the IRA) and convincing them that the problems in Northern Ireland were more complex than the single solution of a united Ireland implied. He argued with conviction

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Sutton, Malcolm CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster. "Revised and Updated Extracts from Sutton's Book" October, 2002 [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/index.html>] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017. ; Nobel Prize "The Nobel Peace Prize 1976" [S.D] [Online] [Available at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1976/] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

so that ex-IRA combatants, such as Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams –with whom he later cooperated, as we have seen– came round to his vision although never specifically to the SDLP itself. Moreover, his carefully cultivated relationship with Irish-American leaders gained him considerable influence within the British Government, so that, together with David Trimble, he is considered one of the chief architects of the Good Friday Agreement.

David Trimble, who as we have noted was leader of the Ulster Unionist Party between 1995 and 2005, was the first Unionist to distance his views from the traditional ones of his own party. In that way, like Hume he represented a break with the past. Notwithstanding his inevitable disagreements with Sinn Féin, linked to the IRA and the decommissioning process, he pushed for the Republican party to be included in the Stormont talks and, equally significantly, criticised Ian Paisley, the Democratic Unionist Party and even the more conservative wing of his own party for their hostility to what was effectively the only solution to the Northern Irish question -that is, accepting an Irish-British partnership in Northern Ireland.

When the negotiations started, these two parties, UUP and SDLP, were the dominant political forces in Northern Ireland, and the influence they had on the population was substantial. Today this is no longer the case, as the DUP and Sinn Féin have replaced them, to the extent that in the June 2017 general elections both the UUP and the SDLP lost all their elected representative to these parties. In that regard, one can see how much these leaders sacrificed in terms of their own political groupings for the wellbeing of Northern Ireland. But their efforts were noted and internationally rewarded outside of Northern Ireland. John Hume and David Trimble were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998. During his speech, Trimble said that “Ulster Unionists, fearful of being isolated on the island, built a solid house, but it was a cold house for Catholics. And northern nationalists, although they had a roof over their heads, seemed to us as if they meant to burn the house down (...) None of us are entirely innocent”. The analysis sums up seven centuries of conflict, and by acknowledging this, Trimble points out that, like an everlasting argument in which each side thinks it is in the right, sometimes the only solution is to take a step back and try to understand the bigger picture; the framework in the picture itself and the origins that have caused the argument in the first place.

Other important personalities who were involved in the peace process, as this dissertation has been suggesting, were the Republicans Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. In the eyes of expert British security chiefs, they played a dual role because of their leadership of both Sinn Féin and the IRA. McGuinness had been one of the top commanders of the IRA, while Adams had always been, ostensibly at least, more publicly connected to politics. Thanks to their vision and risk-taking, they steered Sinn Féin away from its connections with violence. Adams has not taken much part in Northern Irish parliamentary life since, as he is now an MP for the Dáil, but McGuinness became Deputy First Minister for Northern Ireland in 2007 until 2016, when he was forced to step down due to an illness that would eventually claim his life in March of 2017.

McGuinness was a character with huge charisma and won the affection of sizeable sections of the people of Northern Ireland, beyond what one would normally see as his natural constituency. However, it is true that some Unionists branded him a former terrorist, which he had undeniably been, although he always admitted this– unlike Gerry Adams. It was this degree of honesty that enabled him to undertake the role of Deputy First Minister, along with his probable (but not historically proved) capacity of convincing the IRA's high chain of command to abide by the peace process. Under his influence and over the course of the last decade, Sinn Féin have become more important to Nationalists and Republicans than the IRA, as they kept their appeal and consolidated their electoral powerbase in the North but also began to expand it in the South.

⁹⁰ Melaugh, Martin; Lynn Brendan CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster. “Brooke / Mayhew Talks (April 1991 to November 1992) - A Chronology of Main Events” [S.D.] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bmtalks/chron.htm>] Accessed on the 15th March, 2017.

Extraordinarily, the man who partnered Martin McGuinness's tenure as Deputy First Minister was Ian Paisley, who assumed the role of First Minister when Stormont was re-instated in 2007. Here was a man who had despised Catholicism with a dark passion but who, from the Good Friday Agreement onwards, for reasons that were never publicly explained, developed into a more understanding and inclusive leader. He struck up an unlikely but powerful and genuine friendship with McGuinness, and despite their differences they agreed to share power at a time when they both knew that the future of Northern Ireland was at stake. Like McGuinness with Unionists, Paisley suffered criticism at the hands of Republicans, who felt that even though he had now changed his mentality, his past actions and harsh words would not absolve him in the present. But following his death in September of 2014, both Adams and McGuinness issued heartfelt statements on behalf of Sinn Féin, which in its own way speaks eloquently of the extent Northern Ireland's process of peace and reconciliation.

3.6. External Pressures

Even though the political process started during John Major's final years as Prime Minister, real progress was made under the leadership of Tony Blair. Blair was more flexible with Sinn Féin than the Conservatives, as he held the first face to face meeting with the Republicans since the times of Lloyd George. The leader of the Labour party was aware of the need to rectify the wrongs done to the Catholic community, in great part of course to gain their trust, which is why he started to negotiate with Gerry Adams's party no sooner had he become Prime Minister. He even apologised in the name of Britain for the disastrous management of the potato famine crisis that, as described in Chapter One, had caused the death of hundreds of thousands in the 19th century, admitting that "those who governed London at the time failed their people". Unlike his predecessors, he undertook a revisionist analysis of Irish history through the prism of its complicated relationship with England, and reassessed it with honesty. Ireland's ideological/religious battles have always been related to the interpretation of history, as we have seen, and Tony Blair was the first Prime Minister to confront some of these historic issues and, although not in their entirety, recognise, with huge symbolic importance, the blame charged to the United Kingdom from them.

Reinforcing this was his positive relationship with the then Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, with whom he spent endless months working towards what they could agree as the right solution for the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Political agreements regarding Northern Ireland between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland had been reached in the past, so cooperation was not, in a way, innovative. But the fact that both Westminster and the Dáil had to think this time in holistic terms about all the people of Northern Ireland if the conflict was to ever end was a new factor. Old loyalties were still present, but this was a sign that they had diminished among the political sphere. Accordingly, the Republic of Ireland changed articles 2 and 3 of its constitution so that Unionists would feel more welcome in the South and trust them not to have expansionist desires in the North, while the two countries agreed the release of imprisoned paramilitaries who had inflicted damage and hurt in cities such as London, Dublin or Manchester. It was an act of forgiveness that, as we have noted, drew much criticism from affected families and victims, but the fact remains that it was a gesture of reconciliation and forgiveness in the public realm nonetheless.

If these changes were the only elements standing in the way of peace, then the question to be asked is why had they not come sooner? The answer is not simple. First and foremost, the sacrifices made by Dublin and London were far greater over the years, as has been explained during this dissertation. Secondly, the political

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

vision and attitudes of previous leaders were more conventional, and did not change until the late 80's, when globalisation arrived and introduced a wider perspective on everything. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of dictatorships in Europe and of the armed struggle in South Africa, as well as the consolidation of the European Union, helped the people in Northern Ireland, the Republic and the rest of the United Kingdom to develop a wider sense of cooperation in a modernised world.

Of these factors and historic events mentioned above, the South African case surely acted as a positive role model for Northern Ireland. It reminded the international community that positive change was always a possibility. The African National Congress (ANC), which had taken up armed and political struggle to fight for black people's rights in the country since 1912, had become the main political party in 1994. Starting a remarkable transition to democracy under Nelson Mandela, a man who in his own personal trajectory had shown that a fighter can change and thus become a peacemaker. Multiple conversations between ANC leaders and the South African Apartheid Government had taken place before, but Mandela's presidency and cross-community work was exemplary to the politicians of Northern Ireland. 'Madiba' integrated blacks and whites, granting them the same privileges and without exercising any form of repression to those who had kept him behind bars for thirty years. He changed the flag and the anthem, and enhanced collaboration between the inhabitants of his country, regardless of skin colour. Therefore, this model of peace and reconciliation was powerful.

Mandela also worked to achieve peace in Northern Ireland and met with leaders of Sinn Féin and other Unionist parties in Cape Town in 1997. He was initially frowned upon by Unionists due to his terrorist connections, but this changed as people like David Trimble or the DUP's Jeffrey Donaldson recognised his personality and commitment to finding peace in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, Sinn Féin and the Republican movement viewed him as a freedom fighter and saw in his story a resemblance to what they themselves were trying to achieve in the North of Ireland. When it was announced, Mandela applauded the Good Friday Agreement and called it a "beautiful initiative". Following his demise in 2013, First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness described him as "inspirational" and "a true friend of Ireland".

The European Union was another major external factor during the peace process. The Troubles were the only internal conflict in which an EU member state was involved in and this undermined the organisation's core principles, which were the preservation of peace and the combined political and economic efforts of its associates. In 1995, the European Council approved the PEACE funding programme which has been extended a total of four times since its creation (the last edition, PEACE IV, will last until 2020). Its objectives are to ensure social and economic stability in Northern Ireland and the peaceful coexistence of Protestants and Catholics in the region. In 2007 the special Commission Task Force that was to supervise the programme authorised the creation of the Northern Ireland Task Force (NITF) which today works together with the local authorities in projects linked to educational, agricultural, energy and cultural matters. The PEACE programme is funded by non-governmental organisations and between 1995 and 2013 received an allocated sum of 1.3 billion euros. Indicating not only that the European Union has shown dedication in achieving harmony in Northern Ireland, but also in maintaining it by working closely with its people and trying to enhance integration at a regional level.

⁹² Alonso, Rogelio *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (24) pp. 282-284; 289.

⁹³ Dixon, Paul O'Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (67) p. 20.

⁹⁴ Alonso, Rogelio *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (24) pp. 309, 312.

In 1986, Britain and Ireland together created the International Fund for Ireland, an independent organisation that aspired to build peace in Ireland by ending sectarianism and uniting Unionists and Nationalists under the aegis of a shared culture. Since its creation, the projects it has set out to accomplish have drawn sizeable donations from the European Union, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Canada. These large quantities of money –working towards the goal of social balance– have helped to develop infrastructure throughout Ireland, improving the economic impact that the island has had both on itself and on the world. The International Fund for Ireland still exists and is another organisation devoted to retaining the peace that the whole of Ireland has enjoyed for over one generation.

But of all the countries, nations and states which aided Northern Ireland in its search for the peace process, the United States was the most important. Waves of Irish emigration to the United States as a result of the Famine in the 19th century, as we have noted in Chapter One, accounts for the great number of Irish Americans currently living in the country. In 2015, 32.7 million Americans (the equivalent of 10.2% of the population) said they had Irish heritage, an identity that they proudly celebrate every Saint Patrick’s Day parade, particularly on America’s East coast. Ever since the Irish community consolidated in North America there has been great sympathy towards Ireland’s fight for independence. And when partition arrived, Northern Ireland was not forgotten. To most Irish Americans living in the US, the creation of Northern Ireland signified the institutionalisation of the oppressive rule of the Protestant population over the Catholics. When the Troubles started, many Americans with relatives in Ulster reacted emotionally to the news, and it was not long before people from the Catholic neighbourhoods of Derry or Belfast were asking their contacts in the United States for weapons aimed at defending their own from Unionists and Loyalists. In the late 60s and early 70s, American media informed their huge readership about the conflict, prompting marches and fund-raising events to be organised in support of anti-British sentiment in Ulster, with the Irish National Caucus lobbying for a stronger US intervention in the conflict. English products were boycotted in American stores and support for the IRA grew bigger, with an increasing hostility aimed towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), who provided the British Army with weapons, some of which were being created and distributed as a result of American taxes.

As the conflict intensified, various United States presidents called for an end to the violence –for example, Jimmy Carter in 1977. North American administrations were officially neutral in terms of finding a peaceful solution to the Troubles, but much public opinion thought otherwise. Donations for IRA prisoners were common, and the Republican group mainly looked to the US primarily for monetary rather than political support. Furthermore, Irish American mobsters like the Boston-born James ‘Whitey’ Bulger identified proudly with the IRA and supported what was commonly perceived as Ireland’s “fight for freedom” by donating money to the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID; the Organisation that, as we have noted in Chapter One, funded the Provisional IRA). He also sent weapons and ammunition to Ireland hidden in vans and ships, until in September 1984 the Irish authorities seized a boat off the coast of Kerry that carried seven tonnes of weapons and ammunition meant for the IRA. Given that many Americans and Irish share the same narrative of the past, it was not uncommon to see heavy support for Northern Ireland’s Catholic minority coming from the United States.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 319.

⁹⁶ Millbank Systems “Commons Sitting. Northern Ireland (Mitchell Report)” 24th of January, 1996 [Online] [Available at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1996/jan/24/northern-ireland-mitchell-report>] Accessed on the 18th of March, 2017.

⁹⁷ McKenna, Fionnuala, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “British and Irish Governments. Joint Communiqué, 28 November 1995” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/com281195.htm>] Accessed on the 18th of March, 2017.

However, Britain has always been a powerful ally to the US, tied into what is frequently described as a “special relationship”, and while a part of American society rejected the British presence in Northern Ireland, the diplomatic approach had to be followed in a way that would not upset Downing Street or Westminster. The United Kingdom and the US were closely bound into the same trade deals and organisations, including NATO, so that no action could be taken that would have meant a breach in their mutual understanding and shared systems of intelligence. But nor could any administration be seen to be indifferent to what was happening in Northern Ireland. So, in a neutral initiative, a 250 million dollar aid package was sent from the United States to Northern Ireland in support of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1986. This was a move designed to strengthen North American relations with England and Ireland, but it was also interpreted as a tactic from the White House to gain leverage in Europe through their policy of bringing peace and democracy to all corners of the world.

It was Bill Clinton’s eight year period in the Oval Office, between 1993 and 2001, that was to prove indispensable for the peace process; he was the first American President to grant Gerry Adams a visa to travel to the United States at a time where John Major’s Conservative Party was not ready or willing to negotiate with Sinn Féin. His innovative way of thinking about Northern Ireland was different from that of Britain’s, and Adams’s visit in January of 1994 proved an opportunity for Clinton to talk to him about possibly convincing the IRA to renew their ceasefire, which the organisation effectively did a couple of months later. Clinton’s visit to Northern Ireland in 1995, with his wife Hillary, was the first time a US president had set foot in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. The visit was hugely symbolic, as had been Gerry Adams’s visit to the US. At Belfast City Hall, Clinton told the enormous crowd gathered there that “America will stand with you as you take risks for peace.” Their tour round Northern Ireland’s most famous Nationalist and Loyalist areas (like the Falls and the Shankill Road) added to the Clinton’s commitment of finding a solution to the Troubles, and proved to Unionists and Loyalists that the US would not abandon them as they attempted to rebuild a peaceful Ulster. Before his arrival in Belfast, the President of the United States had promised to increase his donations to the International Fund for Ireland from 20 million dollars to 30 million per year, and additionally appointed Senator George Mitchell, as we have noted in earlier chapters, as a kind of peace envoy, who was later to chair the ‘Stormont Talks’. Mitchell was an impartial figure while the negotiations lasted, but his presence was also a way of indirectly implicating the US in the peace process. Clinton maintained constant contact with most of the Northern Irish and Irish political parties and urged them to find a solution, which finally culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. He also increased US investment in the whole of Ireland (primarily in the technology sector) in order to secure his position in Europe, which of course responds to America’s own interests, but at the same time takes nothing away from the fact that Bill Clinton was the first US president to truly show interest in the peace process outside the partisan pressure of the powerful Irish-American Lobby.

Clinton travelled to Northern Ireland more than once, before and after the Good Friday Agreement. He showed his support –together with former Prime Minister Tony Blair– for the people of Omagh after the bombing of 1998, and nowadays still works to encourage US investment in Northern Ireland. To this day, Bill Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Irish peace process is his greatest triumph as far as foreign policy goes, and this is because of the fact that he was able to steer Irish American support for the IRA in another direction; one that was more adequate for the increasingly non-violent and globalised western world.

⁹⁸ Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “A Chronology of the Conflict – 1996” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch96.htm>] Accessed on the 18th of March, 2017.

⁹⁹ Alonso, Rogelio *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (24) p. 338.

4. Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. Nationalism and the Decommissioning Process

4.1. The Basque problem and Northern Ireland

There are those among the Irish Republican and Nationalist population in Northern Ireland, anxious to internationalise their own situation, that have interpreted their own struggle as similar to that of the Basque Country in Spain. The origins of the independence movement in the Basque Country (Euskadi in Basque), an autonomous community located in the north of Spain, on the border with France, go back only as far as the 19th century when native Sabino Arana (1865-1903) sought to reclaim, among other things, the purity of Basque lineage and the unique roots and importance of their language. His appeal to racial purity masked both a dislike of the immigrants who had come to Spain because of the industrial revolution and a distrust of anything to do with economic modernisation. His belief that Spain as a country was becoming increasingly diluted in terms of its identity led to his dislike for Spaniards, whom he considered too liberal and a weaker race than his fellow countrymen. He claimed that the Basque Country had been independent until 1839. and created the name 'Euskadi' as a synonym for the Basque Country, where Basque or 'Euskera' was spoken, as well as establishing the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) in 1895. Basque, it should be noted, is also spoken in the regions of Navarra and in the French Basque Country, comprised of Labourt, Basse-Navarre and Soule, but ever since Sabino Arana, part of the Basque population of the Spanish Basque Country has fought for independence in a way that bears some similarity to the struggle of Irish Republicans and Nationalists against Westminster before and after the partition of Ireland. The Basque struggle was led by an organisation called Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Euskadi and Freedom, ETA), that came into being in 1959. During the Francoist period (1939-1975), oppressive political and social policies pushed ETA increasingly into conflict with a dictatorial Spain that was not going to grant nationalism any concessions. This brief introduction shows that, in historical terms, there is little in common between the Basque problem and the Irish one. Nevertheless, a comparative study can be addressed through the similarities of the conflicts, that rest on the fact that nationalist armed movements were initiated in both regions and that Spain and Northern Ireland underwent difficult procedures in order to obtain their objectives.

Like the IRA, ETA focused primarily on targeting politicians and police (in this case, the Spanish Civil Guard) but collateral damage frequently occurred in the form of innocent deaths. In 1968 they claimed their first victim, a Civil Guard, and from then on fought a campaign of violent resistance to the Franco regime until the dictator's death in 1975. During Spain's transition into a third wave democracy, to use Samuel Huntington's term, politicians argued that the terrorist group needed to be dealt with in a way that showed the country's firm commitment to modernisation. Madrid, however, stood firm on the issue of negotiation, just as Britain had done with the IRA during the worst years of the Troubles. As with the Troubles, it took Spain a long time to commence the talks for a truce and once again, the processes of globalisation and increasing European integration, as well as close scrutiny of the ongoing situation in Northern Ireland, helped to bring about this key change of policy and mentality. The Spanish Government tried on two different separate occasions, in

¹⁰⁰ Whyte, Nicholas. Northern Ireland Elections "The 1996 Forum Elections and the Peace Process" 3rd of June, 1998 (Last updated 7th of May, 2003) [Online] [Available at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ff96.htm>] Accessed on the 19th of March, 2017.

¹⁰¹ Major, John. Bruton, John. CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "Joint Statement by the British and Irish governments at the start of All-party negotiations in Stormont, Belfast, (10 June 1996)" 10th of June, 1996 [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/pmo/jmjb100696.htm>] Accessed on the 19th of March, 2017.

¹⁰² Melaugh, Martin *Ibid.*, *Loc. Cit.*, (96).

1989 and between 1998 and 1999, to open up meaningful channels of communication, but failed to do so with the result that ETA continued its attacks on the authorities on almost a weekly basis.

By the time the Northern Irish process had firmly established itself, and was being considered as an international model of good practice, secret meetings were being organised in the Basque Country in 2003 between Jesús Eguiguren, a member of the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero español, PSOE) and Arnaldo Otegui, the leader of ETA's political wing the Abertzale Leftist Group (Izquierda Abertzale: IA), which was formed in turn by two main parties, Herri Batasuna (HB) and Euskal Herritarrok (EH). Perhaps under the influence of the highly-publicised return to peace in Northern Ireland, many people in the Basque Country were starting to grow weary of violence, and, like Adams and McGuinness, Otegui argued that a change was compulsory if Basque nationalism was ever to gain something from the Spanish Government. In pursuance of this, past narratives had to be forgotten. For him, the issue had to be resolved through politics, leaving behind the concept of 'the socialising of suffering' that ETA had tried to create through terror since its creation. When the PSOE won the general elections in 2004, its leader and now president of the country, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who held office between 2004 and 2011, decided that the time was right to change its stance on ETA and open negotiations with Batasuna (HB), the main political party of Izquierda Abertzale (IA). By now, the PSOE knew of Eguiguren's meetings with Otegui, and chose Geneva, Switzerland, as a suitable location where the confidential negotiations could start. The Swiss capital was chosen because of its symbolic significance in diplomatic negotiations over the course of history, such as the 1954 Asian peace conference. The President's move to open up a dialogue with ETA was approved in the Spanish Parliament by all parties apart from one, the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), which insisted, like Paisley's loyalist DUP, that Zapatero was betraying the memory of the dead and their relatives. Consequently, the party organised marches against the negotiations in 2005. The Victims' Association also felt- and in a way still feel- betrayed by their government, as the victims of the Troubles also had done after the Good Friday Agreement pardoned former 1998 paramilitary convicts, but nevertheless the talks with ETA persisted.

Arnaldo Otegui and part of his comrades (as well as all the other democratic politicians of Spain), who had campaigned for peace as a substitute of war at a Batasuna summit in 2004, thought of the IRA ceasefire as something that ETA could copy from the Irish Republicans. In Geneva an agreement for a truce was reached and later ratified in Oslo by Eguiguren and ETA representatives as the talks progressed. A strategy similar to the twin track negotiations in Northern Ireland (see Chapter Three) was implemented, where disarmament of ETA in exchange for the release of prisoners ran alongside the resolve to decide the Basque Country's political future. In this way, negotiators dealt simultaneously with both ETA (to end their violence) and IA – initiating new beginnings for the nationalist movement generally and especially HB, which had been banned by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2003- just as Britain and the Republic of Ireland had done with the IRA and Sinn Féin, effectively translating political violence into political process.

The PSOE, PNV and HB started a three-way negotiation in between 2005 and 2006, while the meetings in Oslo continued. HB's ways of dealing with the talks angered ETA, who saw that the party that was supposed to defend their interests was negotiating with a government that continued to arrest its members on suspicion of terrorist activities. Even though the Basque group called a permanent ceasefire in March of 2006, they replaced their representative in Oslo with the more hardline Francisco Javier López Peña, or 'Thierry', who threatened to terminate the ceasefire and the negotiations unless the nature of the talks changed radically. Again, as was the case of the IRA's warning bomb in Canary Wharf (1996), this anger symbolically culminated the day after Zapatero publicly expressed his optimism as to progress with ETA, when the faction exploded a

¹⁰³ Alonso, Rogelio *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (24) p. 351.

car bomb in Terminal 4 of Madrid's Barajas Airport. Zapatero admitted his mistake and the negotiations ended, stalling the Spanish approach to the ETA problem indefinitely and leaving the whole Basque situation effectively unresolved.

In the event, it was Sinn Féin who advised ETA to reopen negotiations with the government if they ever wanted to achieve their political goal. Leaders like Adams, McGuinness and Gerry Kelly (all mentioned in Chapter Three) knew from experience that this was the way forward, so that the party acted as a mentor figure to HB and ETA, guiding them towards an understanding with Madrid. A South African by the name of Brian Currin, was chosen to try and convince HB to persuade ETA, in turn, to renounce violence. Currin was a lawyer who had participated in the Northern Irish peace process and was probably chosen for the job through Sinn Féin's recommendation, in recognition that both cases shared a number of similar circumstances. The Geneva talks re-started in 2007, but the Madrid Government would not recognise the people of Euskadi's right to self-determination, which Westminster had granted the Catholic community of Northern Ireland during the Troubles. Of course, national circumstances and the pressing reality of the electorate differed widely between the UK and Spain, but even though they innovated in deciding to secretly initiate talks with ETA, Zapatero and his cabinet regarded Basque nationalism as a movement with no historical justification. In the eyes of the Government, the Basque Country's three provinces of Alava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa had been a part of Spain since its people were voluntarily annexed to the crown of the Kingdom of Castilla, between the 13th and 15th centuries. History it seemed, once again, was being invoked against future peace.

Because self-determination was denied to the people of Euskal Herria, ETA announced a return to violence in June of 2007 and, approximately six months later, two Civil Guards were shot and killed in a café in France by its members. Accordingly, the Minister of the Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba (2006-2011) issued an ultimatum to HB, demanding that they convinced ETA to cease its activities or else to distance themselves completely from the armed organisation. When Isaías Carrasco, a member of PSOE in the Basque Country, was murdered in 2008, marches were organised all over Euskadi in favour of peace, proving that many Basque people had changed their way of thinking in relation to ETA, and that they did not support the terrorist's activities. After Carrasco's death, the Civil Guard increased its arrests of ETA activists, reinforced by the French Gendarmerie. A side note here is that the counter-terrorist alliance of France and Spain proved effective in the 90s and 2000s, as had the cooperation between Britain and the Republic of Ireland in apprehending IRA volunteers. Cross-border cooperation between countries who share the same security issues is necessary in terms of fortifying their future international relations, and in Northern Ireland and Spain's case this proved to be crucial.

Meanwhile, Francisco Javier López Peña 'Thierry', along with the Bizkaia branch of ETA, were all arrested in 2008. Various leaders of the IA and HB were also incarcerated in 2009 following reports that they had tried to rebuild HB on ETA's orders. Arnaldo Otegui was one of them and spent from 2009 to 2016 in prison. Spaniards are divided as to whether Otegui was wrongfully jailed due to the anti-violence campaign he had proclaimed since 2004. In Belfast, the Nationalist and Republican communities supported Otegui and pressed for his freedom, seeing in the HB leader a reflection of Bobby Sands (see Chapter Three) and even of Nelson Mandela.

¹⁰⁴ Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "A Chronology of the Conflict – 1997" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch97.htm>] Accessed on the 19th of March, 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Explanatory Note: This had been one of the main pillars of Paisley's political personality. He ultimately demonstrated it in 1988, acting as an MEP for the European Parliament, when he protested by interrupting Pope John Paul II speech inside the EU's institution in Strasbourg, saying: "I renounce you as the Antichrist" and holding up posters that read "John Paul II-Antichrist". He was shortly expelled from the meeting. Loc. Cit. The New York Times "Ulster Protestant Interrupts Pope, Yelling 'Antichrist!'" 12th of October, 1988 [Online] [Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/12/world/ulster-protestant-interrupts-pope-yelling-antichrist.html>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017.

¹⁰⁶ UK Parliament "No 68. GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1 MAY 1997" 1st of May, 1997 [Online] [Available at <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-office/m15.pdf>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017. pp. 2-3.

The timing of the detention may have been counterproductive though, because even if the Basque insurgents had not yet declared a ceasefire, reconciliation programmes were already in place as relatives of ETA victims and activist prisoners met at Nanclares Prison in Álava.

In November 2009, following on from this, IA presented a document that rejected violence. By February 2010, 80% of the electorate had ratified the document, and a year later they presented a new political party, Sortu. Another huge step towards reconciliation was taken in March 2011, when the Constitutional Court approved Bildu's (a branch of Sortu) participation in the 2011 Spanish general elections. Feeling that the end of ETA was near, a peace conference was organised in the Palace of Ayete (San Sebastián) on the 16th October. Dozens of important leaders and figures attended, Gerry Adams and former Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland Bertie Ahern included. The presence of the two Irishmen was a powerful symbol for the end of violence in Spain and it is no surprise that Ahern, a man skilled in negotiations, was chosen to read a public statement in which he asked ETA for a definitive ceasefire. The group -physically diminished thanks to the efforts of the Spanish and French police- declared a truce four days later. but the alleged decommissioning of its weapons would not commence until recently, in 2017 (see below). From 1968 to 2010, ETA had claimed the lives of 823 people.

As we have noted, there are both historical differences and political similarities between the Basque and the Northern Irish problem. Essentially, both are regions divided between those who wish to be independent and those who choose to remain in the Spanish State, a division that evolved into the creation of dissident groups who have fought politically and militarily for their nationalist cause for decades. Another core similarity is that the peace or negotiation processes of the two conflicts started from a political impulse reinforced by societal pressure. Many Irish and Basque Nationalists supported the IRA and ETA's actions at the beginning of the struggle, but as these actions seemed to become more violent and indiscriminate, and as the possibility of a just peace beck, the political process presented itself as the only viable option to secure future well-being and ETA's public backing declined.

However, all of this must be understood within the context of what are also notable differences. Firstly, Ireland is an island, and although claims of national unity have always been exaggerated, as Chapter One notes, the military occupation and economic exploitation of the English State of their neighbouring island without the consent of its locals ended up unifying most of the people, who fought against English rule for more than six hundred years. The Basque independence movement, on the other hand, started much later, centuries after the Basque Provinces were unified under one crown. Furthermore, while a majority of Basques want to remain in Spain, a much higher percentage of the population in Northern Ireland have republican aspirations and want a political union with the Irish State. The Troubles started in Northern Ireland partly because of this, but it was fundamentally the denial of basic rights –economic and political– to Catholics by a succession of Unionist governments that caused the conflict to escalate. The Basque population did not have to endure any similar repression from Madrid during Spanish democracy, although we have already referred to the oppressive atmosphere it suffered while Franco was in power, thereby strengthening the nationalist movement. It is understandable that the nationalists of Northern Ireland and Euskadi should sympathise with one another, both because of their similar political aspirations and the fact that they are fighting as revolutionaries against what they consider to be foreign occupants in the form of imperialist nations. However, we also need to recognise that the concept of nationalism varies from one country to another, and that its different meanings are based on the multiple interpretations of history rather than what that word means in a dictionary.

¹⁰⁷ Melaugh, Martin *Ibid, Loc. Cit., (102)*.

¹⁰⁸ Whyte, Nicholas, Northern Ireland Elections "The 1997 Local Government Elections in Northern Ireland" 7 June 1998; (Last updated 17th of February 2001 [Online] [Available at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/flg97.htm>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Melaugh, Martin *Ibid, Loc. Cit., (102)*.

Also, Arnaldo Otegui claims that he has never condemned ETA's actions and that his party (HB) paid the price for that. As a member of Bildu, his position is the same as that of Gerry Adams with the IRA or Nelson Mandela with the African National Congress (ANC). So he asks himself and those that criticise him: what is more important? The gesture of condemning armed groups or the act of separating the armed struggle from politics? Some people may think that these elements should be intertwined, while others do not. It is true that Gerry Adams fought for peace in Northern Ireland –which, as we have seen, he has been acknowledged for– but he never condemned the IRA, or referred to them as terrorists. Yet if one is fighting for politics, surely one must be prepared to condemn any future actions of the terrorist or freedom fighter groups that one once defended? Otherwise, there is no perceptible legitimacy in one's words. Gerry Adam's denial of being involved in the IRA, when he clearly was, has caused him a huge lack of credibility among Northern Ireland society.

Contrary to this claim, Martin McGuinness admitted that he was an IRA top commander for years, even going as far as saying that he ordered the killing of British authorities and Loyalists. Admission in return for a rejection of violence seemed to work in a peaceful Northern Ireland, and McGuinness went on to become Deputy First Minister and, although his past and the IRA's victims always haunted him, he became a much more popular, and therefore influential, personality in the North than Adams. He was also morally able to later condemn the activities of groups such as the RIRA & CIRA (see Chapter Three). In a society like Northern Ireland's, South Africa's or Spain's, to condemn as well as to forgive, or even just forget, becomes not just a sign of peaceful development and reconciliation between rival communities, but also sets a good precedent for similar conflicts.

It must finally be noted that ETA and the Spanish Government did not finalise an agreement, nor is there a signed document that indicates ETA's complete cessation of military activities, unlike the Good Friday Agreement of Northern Ireland, which symbolised, among other things, the end of paramilitary violence. There was, however, widespread awareness of the secret dialogue between the Government and the Basque insurgents, and it might well have been the excessive publicity surrounding the talks and the pressure behind them that contributed to the failure of reaching a common ground between the parties involved. From 2008 onwards, one can be confident in saying that it was effectively the armed authorities of Spain and France who weakened and defeated the few remaining activists of ETA -the Spanish Civil Guard estimates that of the more than a thousand active members that the group had in 2000, approximately only 50 remained by 2010. Be that as it may, the question remains as to whether the peace process –or in the Basque case, the negotiations– in Spain was unsuccessful or not. While it is a fact that ETA declared a truce, but still has not officially issued a document announcing its withdrawal from its military campaign, there are indications that a peaceful solution to the Basque problem has been addressed by all sides, including HB in the Basque Country and legal provision in the Spanish State, under which Bildu's parliamentary presence would not have been acceptable had its connections with a still-active ETA been a proven fact.

4.2. The decommissioning process of the IRA and ETA

The disarmament of the IRA was a long process, and certainly not the main objective of the peace process, which focused more on the commitment to end the violence. However, if this was to be done in any meaningful way, decommissioning had to be a part of the negotiations. After one of their first major

¹¹⁰ McKenna, Fionnuala, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "Joint statement issued by Sinn Féin President Mr Gerry Adams MP and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader Mr John Hume MP, Friday 18 July 1997" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ha180797.htm>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017.

¹¹¹ Melaugh, Martin *Ibid, Loc. Cit., (102)*.

campaigns in Northern Ireland –which lasted approximately from 1956 to 1962 before being eventually suppressed– the organisation announced that it had carried out a ‘dumping of arms’ in a number of secret locations. This was nothing like a proper decommissioning process per se, but the question of what to do with the paramilitary weapons was properly raised after the Republican groups (IRA and Irish National Liberation Army or INLA) and Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) announced ceasefires in August of 1994. The absence of arms in Northern Ireland was necessary both for the negotiations to continue and for Sinn Féin to join the peace talks. But these did not go as planned and, as we have noted, the IRA abruptly ended its ceasefire after the Canary Wharf bombings of 1996; there was no other option but to put the decommissioning on hold.

It was not until after the Good Friday Agreement that the procedure really started to take form. Still, there were some difficulties during the first years that followed the Agreement, as the IRA failed to inform the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) when disarmament would commence. This prompted Secretary of State Peter Mandelson (1999-2001) to suspend the Assembly in February of 2000, as by this stage it had commonly been agreed that the peace process was not going to advance without this crucial point being tackled first. Mandelson’s resolve forced the IRA to announce on the 6th of May that it had decided to put its arms “beyond use”. The decommissioning process was then layered out into a number of stages.

The first stage was an initial measure that consisted of the IRA bringing the weapons to what they considered to be ‘safe places’, where they were examined by two international arms inspectors who then directly reported to the IICD when the arms had been scrutinised. The inspectors would revisit these locations twice more to ensure that the contents of the depot had not been interfered with. Cyril Ramaphosa, then the South African Secretary General to the African National Congress (ANC), and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari were the men chosen for the job, along with two local priests from Northern Ireland. One of them was the Reverend Harold Good, also involved in ETA’s disarmament process.

Three reports (following the three visits to the IRA weapon dumps) were submitted by Ramaphosa and Ahtisaari to the IICD. formed in 1997 by General John de Chastelain, former Deputy Head of the Canadian Army, a Finnish secretary and ex-army officer, Tauno Nieminen, and the American General Andrew D. Sens. After the reports were sent to the Commission, the methodology for the disposing of the weapons was not set out in public detail, nor was the amount that would be delivered or the place they would be delivered to. All the public knew was the fact that the weapons were going to be put beyond good use to the satisfaction of de Chastelain and his team. The full inventory was handed over to Boston University by agreement of all the parties, reflecting the key role that Americans like George Mitchell, Bill Clinton and Andrew D. Sens were playing in the peace process.

Disarmament was compulsory for all paramilitary groups, who all handed in their arsenal at different times but through strikingly similar methods. Despite this, the IRA was the main group that the IICD focused on, largely because the Irish question could not be resolved if Sinn Féin was not included in the talks. Other Republican groups, like INLA, who had also decommissioned, did not have political backing, so they were relatively unimportant as far as the Commission was concerned. In 2005-2006, the IRA terminated its

¹¹² Mullin, John, The Guardian “Mowlam visits the Maze” 10th of January, 1998 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1998/jan/10/devolution.uk>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017; Melaugh, Martin CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “A Chronology of the Conflict – 1998” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch98.htm>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

¹¹³ McKenna, Fionnuala, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “Propositions on Heads of Agreement’, issued by the British and Irish governments, 12 January 1998” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/hoa12198.htm>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

campaign and the IICD concluded that the Republican side had met its demands adequately. A year later, in 2007, Sinn Féin took another key step towards cementing the peace process by voting in favour of accepting the Police Service of Northern Ireland as a legitimate authority. Decommissioning took so long –effectively between 1998 and 2005/06– because of the lack of trust between the sides involved, in particular between the polarized extremes of the Loyalist DUP and the IRA and Sinn Féin.

It is worth noting that throughout the Troubles, several countries with so-called ‘freedom fighters’ maintained close contacts with the IRA (the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the ANC in South Africa and ETA in Spain, for example). On the other hand, Unionists and Loyalists had very little support from the outside world, being seen as the defenders of an outmoded colonialism. For that reason, it was necessary for the Commissioners to find representatives of countries that would support both Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, which is why delegates from Commonwealth countries like Canada (de Chastelain) were chosen. Moreover, Loyalist paramilitaries had been close to the South African Apartheid Government in the past, so all groups respected South Africa –the ANC and IRA on one side, the Afrikaners and the CLMC on the other– although for completely different reasons, which was why South Africa was acceptable to all parties concerned.

But are there any parallels between the Northern Irish decommissioning process and that undertaken by ETA? On the 18th March, 2017, ETA declared that it would be fully decommissioned by the 8th April. The process would start and finish in France, with an International Verification Commission, that oversaw all the operations. The Commission had been set up in 2011 by the Basque regional Government and Basque civil society groups (churches, trade and employer unions, community organisations etc) five years prior to ETA’s public declaration –although it had already secretly contacted the Commission and initiated a first act of decommissioning in January, 2014– and when the time was ripe five people, all of them with significant and relevant international experience, were assigned to oversee the second process: Ronald Kasrils, former operations director of the ANC –one of its few white members– before becoming Minister of Intelligence in South Africa; Satish Nambiar, former deputy head of the Indian Army and senior General; Araceli Santana, native Ecuadorian and assistant secretary in the United Nations; Ram Manikkalingam, Director of the Dialogue Advisory Group, Professor at Amsterdam University and a former Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka for negotiations with the Tamil Tigers ; and Christopher Maccabe, political Director of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and top advisor to the Secretary of State, Director of the prison service after the hunger strikes of 1981, as well as special Assistant to the Chief Constable during the strikes and Brian Faulkner’s private secretary during the first power sharing executive of Northern Ireland, in 1974.

The final decommissioning act of the organisation’s weapons took only weeks, far less than Northern Ireland’s multiple staged system. But in order for any International Commission of such characteristics to begin terrorist disarmament, immunity needed to be granted by the Government of the country where the operation is to take place. In this case, terrorists must also be allowed immunity. This concession is required because it is a criminal offence to deal with terrorist groups in any way or form. In the Northern Irish peace process, the Dáil and Westminster were dually in charge of passing an act that gave legal immunity (as well as other, more specific conditions) to the IICD. In terms of the circumstances that surrounded the arms reduction of ETA, the Commission had no immunity either in France or Spain, but the French and Basque governments, as well as the French authorities, understood the task ahead and approved it. However, the Spanish Government in Madrid never recognized the authority of the International Verification Commission to mediate in the Basque

¹¹⁴ TRAC, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium “Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/real-irish-republican-army-rira>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017. ; Sturcke, James, The Guardian “Explainer: Real IRA and Continuity IRA” 10th of March, 2009 [Online] [Available <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/mar/10/real-ira-continuity>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

issue, and diplomatic theory states that a mediator has to be accepted by all the parts involved if it is to be considered legitimate.

After the announcement of intent, the five members of the Commission were taken to a conference room, where the Reverend Harold Good and the Archbishop of Bologna, Matteo Zuppi, acting as observers, were handed a booklet by a representative of Basque civil society that contained the location of all of ETA's eight arms dumps. Both clergymen then delivered it to a group of plain-clothed police that, together with Manikkalingam, as Head of the Commission, and a French procurator, examined the contents and provided the information on the location of the inventories to eight teams of specialist Gendarmes. Finally, the French police filmed and confiscated the listed weaponry that appeared in the booklet/document. The list included 120 firearms, three tons of explosives and thousands of detonators and rounds of ammunition. ETA's supposed 'decommissioning' went according to plan and was completed on the 8th of April. It is unclear how much Sinn Féin influenced the group in making their decision, but some input is evident. The Spanish Government –currently run by the conservative Partido Popular (PP) since 2011– who had never managed to reach an agreement with ETA, viewed their “decommissioning” as more of a media stunt than as a declaration of true intentions. The executive branch issued a brief statement on the 8th of April, claiming that ETA's actions were nothing more than a response to the group's categorical defeat at the hands of Spanish democracy and international cooperation, among other factors. On top of this, the government does not fully believe that all of ETA's weapons have been decommissioned and, even if they were, they continue to insist on the organisation's complete dissolution.

In a move similar to the one after the Good Friday Agreement, ETA prisoners may have demanded early release in exchange for the organisation's surrender, but Madrid refuses to give in to these demands, insisting that the maximum concession in the future might be a transfer to prisons closer to the Basque Country. The Spanish Government's decision to keep ETA prisoners as far away from the Basque Country as possible has provoked a great deal of protest –mostly from relatives and sympathisers– in favour of the protection of the prisoners' human rights (the most recent public protest took place on the 15th January, 2017, in Bilbao). There is a marked difference here from the Northern Irish case, in that Irish prisoners in British jails were brought closer to home. Nevertheless, it is possible that Madrid could finally agree to change its stance on the prisoner issue if ETA apologises to its victims, although the pressure from the victims' relatives or the fact that the government will only accept a definite surrender from the group, might prove to be a decisive factor in this.

As noted above, the IRA and ETA have always maintained contact. Over the last decades, the two groups trained, advised and supported each other, creating their own concept of statehood through their own interpretation of the past, their own reading of history, as this dissertation has been concerned to show. But when the time was right, senior leaders from the IRA and ETA crucially changed their views on the armed struggle, deciding that disarmament would both foster peace and legitimise their increasing involvement in a meaningful political process. In the case of the Irish organisation, this change came much earlier, as Britain and the Republic of Ireland had worked closely to ensure that a satisfactory deal was reached. The IRA realised –or ended up being convinced– that violence was only going to cause the group to lose more support,

¹¹⁵ Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Doc. Cit “The Agreement” 10th of April, 1998 [Online] [Available at <https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfa-websitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-agreement-1.pdf>] Accessed on the 1st of April, 2017. p. 2.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid, Doc. Cit.*, p. 3.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid, Doc. Cit.*, (115) p. 6.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid, Doc. Cit.*, (115) p. 7.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid, Doc. Cit.*, (115) pp. 9; 14; 15; 16; 17.

particularly in a US traumatised by the events of 9-11, and that only via a political process could they possibly attain their goals in the future. The ceasefire and decommissioning of the IRA prompted Loyalist paramilitaries to do the same, as groups like the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) felt that this was the only way by which they could protect their own British legacy and state.

While the IRA's decommissioning of weapons was finalised in 2005-2006, ETA took much longer to accept the end of violence. This may be attributed to a series of circumstances. The Francoist regime had assumed a hostile position in relation to the Basque problem, and Nationalist protesters felt more persecuted than ever under his rule, thereby boosting ETA's sense of legitimacy. The result was that when democracy was restored in Spain, Basque secessionism had never been stronger, as was its support for ETA. However, the lessons of the Northern Irish peace process, which emerged from what was clearly a much longer and more difficult history of colonial oppression and brutality, set an example to both ETA and the Spanish Government of the benefits of dialogue and of the fact that, if history cannot be rewritten, at least with consent the future might be reimagined.

Conclusion

This dissertation has structured itself around a number of key questions emerging both from the conflict in Northern Ireland, and from the process of peace and reconciliation that is still ongoing there. Accordingly, this conclusion will present a series of final reflections that look to summarise the discussion that has arisen in response to each of those questions.

1. In terms of how the past has been used as a narrative and how these narratives enable us to understand the reality of reconciliation as emerging from the shared experience of a divided history, Chapter One discusses how history is subject to appropriation and partial interpretation. We often find that in divided societies like Northern Ireland there are two conceptions of the past, both of which are utilised by conflicted communities to explain both their own sense of the present and their resentment towards the other community, which is profiled through religious difference. In the Northern Irish case, this has produced a series of narratives of both past and future that encapsulate the thinking of the Protestant and Catholic populations, who each thought that they were in the right within the context of a never-ending argument. As the Troubles continued and history seemed increasingly inescapable, Northern Ireland sank into violent unrest.

2. But there must always be hope that change is an ever-present possibility in human life. History itself is, of course, in the past, unchangeable, but its meanings may change as circumstances develop. In response to a variety of factors, internal and international, that this dissertation has set out, the people of Northern Ireland have managed –or, are managing– to distance themselves from the narratives of the past and push in unison for a ‘Troubles-free’ life. In answer to the question, discussed in Chapter Two, as to the circumstances and actions that allowed the people of Northern Ireland to free themselves from the constraining narratives of history in benefit of peace, the discussion has highlighted the fact that, while ordinary people were responsible for physically ending the conflict, much credit must be given to the politicians -Unionist, Nationalist and Republican alike- who progressively abandoned the rhetoric of

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Doc. Cit.*, (115) pp. 21; 25.

¹²¹ Melaugh, Martin. *Ibid.*, *Loc. Cit.*, (110).

difference in favour of a public discussion of peace and shared purpose. This meant letting go of history, its narratives and other symbols of petty disagreements, and instead concentrating on writing a new chapter that focused on reconciliation in Northern Ireland. This meant that people had to learn to look away from the inherited resentments of the past, which divide and turn communities against each other, and instead focus on achieving a shared future within the wider contexts of Europe and globalisation.

Of course, the past is still with us, but in a way that no longer explicitly threatens a return to violence. Catholics and Protestants have refocused their narratives and, although their historical roots are still a source of pride which continue to influence their political goals, at least those goals are now recognized as legitimate democratic aspirations rather than calls to arms. In consequence, the lines of division have become increasingly blurred as the old divisions disappear. For example, there are Catholics who remain proud to be Irish but who no longer want a united Ireland because they prefer the education and health systems that the United Kingdom offers, while some Protestants have come to see Irish reunification as something important in terms of this benefiting their employment or commercial opportunities. But this is politics. On top of this, many in Northern Ireland have come to view the Troubles as a common and cultural bond that brings together two different interpretations of the same history. Everyone suffered during the Troubles, either directly or indirectly, and the division of history did not distinguish between the victors and the defeated, because in this particular conflict none existed. In the final analysis, it might be concluded that it was the perpetration of violence over the decades that was ultimately the deciding factor in prompting the majority of people in Northern Ireland to reject their one-sided readings of the past and push towards reconciliation.

3. How the international context has been a factor in contributing to Northern Ireland's separation from its past has been an issue that has surfaced at various stages throughout this entire dissertation but, specifically, as one of the main discussion points of Chapter Three. Regarding this question, the European Union offered Northern Irish leaders important ways of thinking about breadth of identity, Mandela's presidency provided lessons in the moral authority of forgiveness, and globalisation convinced them that Ulster's situation was increasingly isolated in the context of contemporary Europe -apart from the issues surfacing in relation to the end of the old Soviet Union and the increasing expansionism of Russia. But if these were factors that influenced the immediate context of the peace process, Irish emigration over the centuries, mainly to the United States, was a key long-term factor in this developing international awareness, as the US, whose political and economic influence had been unchallenged since the break-up of the USSR in 1989, felt that it had to intervene in the peace process as an obligation to its Irish American citizens. As a result of globalisation, the world had become more interconnected through commerce and politics, leading the US and the EU to fear a "butterfly effect" from Northern Ireland's conflict. Figures like Mandela or Clinton who worked to bring the Troubles to a close might not have fully comprehended every detail of the divide that had emerged from Irish history, but they did understand how opinion is shaped by a particular narrative of the past, such as the ANC/Apartheid case in South Africa or the black against white confrontations in the United States. This understanding contributed to the expansion of international diplomatic endeavours aimed at halting sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland.

4. The Northern Irish peace process is viewed as exemplary. But it is not yet finished. Integration between Catholics and Protestants has yet to be fully completed, notably in some inner city areas, and the debate on Irish reunification -or not- still features largely in the manifestos of the political parties. The future

¹²² Dixon, Paul. O'Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (67) p. 22.

¹²³ Dixon, Paul. O'Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (67) p. 22-23.

¹²⁴ Explanatory Note: Martin McGuinness said that the attackers were "traitors to the island of Ireland". These words truly reflect the changes of the partisan attitudes that are less visible in Northern Ireland today. Dixon, Paul; O'Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (67) pp. 23-24.

is also uncertain, as the Catholic population continues to grow at a faster pace than the Protestant one, and Brexit and its possible outcomes presents another major concern for Northern Ireland –along with Scotland, the only two regions of the UK that voted to remain in the European Union. With part of the Scottish Parliament arguing in favour of a second referendum on independence, a border poll in Northern Ireland might be closer than ever. This, added to the possibility of a hard border between the North and South of Ireland, that might re-ignite memories of the divided past, means yet more unpredictability for Northern Ireland's future. But whatever the outcome, the population of Northern Ireland seems unwilling to descend back into a conflict that remains too fresh in the memory. Finally, all these questions and their corresponding answers, taken together, provide insight into what might be learned from the Northern Irish peace process. It is certainly true that Northern Ireland, socially, politically and economically, has made considerable progress since the Good Friday Agreement marked the end of the conflict. Mixed marriages, friendships and education are at a higher level than ever, and young people talk less and less about the past. Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, after thirty years of conflict has, not surprisingly, drawn the attention of other countries immersed in similar problems, such as the Basque Country in Spain. And while it is true that the Basque and Irish question both present striking differences in terms of political or historical backgrounds, as Chapter Four is concerned to show, there are lessons to be learned from the ways in which the authorities opened up sophisticated channels of communication and found a way that allowed communities in a historical conflict to look more towards the future. In that way, the lessons learnt from the Northern Irish peace process might be applied to countries in similar situations, like in Colombia and the issues arising from the activities of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), although this dissertation has not been able to address this issue due to limitations of space.

The Troubles have shown how, if people free themselves from the shackles of history and focus on building a new relationship from the foundations of the old, society can progress towards peace. The reality of this conclusion, by way of final example, was perceptible at Martin McGuinness's funeral on the 23rd March, 2017. In the homage that Bill Clinton dedicated to the deceased politician, the former president of the United States affirmed how McGuinness had "expanded the definition of 'us' and shrunk the definition of 'them'". Beside Clinton stood others such as Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, Michelle O'Neill, former Taoiseachs Bertie Ahern and Enda Kenny, as well as the Republic of Ireland's President, Michael D. Higgins. But they were not the only politicians who attended. Peter Robinson, former First Minister for Northern Ireland and member of the Loyalist DUP also attended in order to pay his respects, along with current First Minister and leader of the DUP Arlene Foster, who received a warm applause as she took her seat in a Republican-filled church. In conflicts like the Northern Irish one, such small gestures prove the power of a symbolism that speaks this time not of division, but in recognition of the legitimacy of different narratives of history.

¹²⁵ Interview by Carlos Johnston on the 13th of April, 2017, with DEVENPORT, Mark (BBC Northern Ireland Political Editor).

¹²⁶ Nobel Prize "David Trimble-Nobel Lecture" 10th of December, 1998 [Online] [Available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1998/trimble-lecture.html] Accessed on the 15th of April, 2017.

¹²⁷ Explanatory Note: From saying that Catholics in Ireland "breed like rabbits and multiply like vermin" to admitting that the discrimination of Catholics is what eventually lead to the Troubles, Paisley's ideological transformation over time was surprising. ITV News "Dr Ian Paisley's most famous quotes" 12th of September, 2014 [Online] [Available at <http://www.itv.com/news/2014-09-12/dr-ian-paisleys-most-famous-quotes/>] Accessed on the 16th of April, 2017.

Bibliography

A.T.Q Stewart. Michael Collins: The Secret File. Northern Ireland (1997) The Blackstaff Press Limited. Pp: 35-36. Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

Adams, Gerry The Guardian “Margaret Thatcher made the north of Ireland a more bitterly divided place” 9th of April, 2013 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/09/thatcher-legacy-bitterness-north-ireland>] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

African National Congress “A brief history of the African National Congress” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.anc.org.za/content/brief-history-anc>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017.

Ainsworth, Paul The Irish News “Burntollet attack on civil rights activists remembered” 3rd of January, 2017 [Online] [Available <http://www.irishnews.com/news/2017/01/03/news/burntollet-attack-on-civil-rights-activists-remembered-861101/>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

Alonso, Rogelio. Irlanda del Norte: Una historia de guerra y la búsqueda de la paz. Madrid (2001) Editorial Complutense, p. 85. Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017

Azevedo, Felipa Haase, Diána European Parliament “Northern Ireland PEACE programme” April of 2017. [Online] [Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.1.9.html] Accessed on the 21st of April, 2017.

Barrow, Mandy “Facts and figures about Northern Ireland” Project Britain [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://projectbritain.com/northern_ireland.html] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

Bartlett, Thomas “The 1798 Irish Rebellion” BBC History, 2011 [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/irish_reb_01.shtml] Accessed on the 25th of February, 2017.

BBC History “Derry-Londonderry” [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/places/derry_londonderry] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

BBC History “Republican hunger strikes in the Maze prison” [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/republican_hunger_strikes_maze] Accessed on the 9th of March, 2017.

¹²⁸ Marks, Kathy, Independent “Blair issues apology for Irish Potato Famine” 1st of June, 1997 [Online] [Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/blair-issues-apology-for-irish-potato-famine-1253790.html>] Accessed on the 16th of April, 2017

¹²⁹ Interview by Carlos Johnston on the 13th of April, 2017, with DEVENPORT, Mark (BBC Northern Ireland Political Editor).

¹³⁰ African National Congress “A brief history of the African National Congress” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.anc.org.za/content/brief-history-anc>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017

¹³¹ Purdy, Martina, BBC News “Nelson Mandela's ties to Northern Ireland” 5th of December, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-15756000>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017

¹³² Loc. Cit. Farley, Adam; Langan, Sheila, Irish America “Remembering Mandela, in Ireland and Northern Ireland” 6th of December, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://irishamerica.com/2013/12/remembering-mandela-in-ireland-and-northern-ireland/>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017

¹³³ BBC News Loc. Cit. 7th of December, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25250340>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017.

BBC History “Sinn Féin BBC History” 2014 [Online] [Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po18.shtml>]

BBC News “1972-75: The failure of Sunningdale” 18th of March, 1999 [Online] [Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/history/64733.stm] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

BBC News “Clinton: His role in Northern Ireland” 11th of December, 2000 [Online] [Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1065913.stm] Accessed on the 13th of May, 2017.

BBC News Loc. Cit. 7th of December, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25250340>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017.

BBC News “The Stevens Inquiry: Chronology” 17th of April, 2003 [Online] [Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2954383.stm] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

Brophy, Daragh, The Journal “‘He expanded the definition of us’: Clinton's tribute to McGuinness, as thousands pay respects” 23rd of March, 2017 [Online] [Available at <http://www.thejournal.ie/martin-mcguinness-funeral-2-3302733-Mar2017/>] Accessed on the 13th of June, 2017.

CAINWeb Service, University of Ulster “Malcom Sutton: An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status.html>] Accessed on the 1st of June, 2017.

Clark, Dennis J. *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience*. Port Washington/London (1977), Kennikat Press Corp. Page: 18. Accessed on the 10th of May, 2017.

Collingwood, R.G, *The Idea of history* [1946] Revised edition with lectures 1926- 1928. (Jan van Der Dussen, Ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. Accessed on the 2nd of June, 2017.

Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly Arthur, Paul “Sinn Féin Encyclopedia Britannica” 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sinn-Féin>] Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

Cruickshank, Dan “Napoleon, Nelson and the French Threat” BBC History, 17th of February, 2011 [Online] [Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/french_threat_01.shtml] Accessed on the 25th of February, 2017.

Dictionary.com “Gaelic” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/gaelic>] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

¹³⁴ Azevedo, Felipa; Haase, Diána, European Parliament “Northern Ireland PEACE programme” April of 2017. [Online] [Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuid=FTU_5.1.9.html] Accessed on the 21st of April, 2017

¹³⁵ International Fund for Ireland “Background” 12th of June, 2009. [Online] [Available at <https://www.internationalfundforireland.com/background/36-about-the-fund/background/47-background>] Accessed on the 22nd of April, 2017.

¹³⁶ United States Census Bureau “Irish-American Heritage Month (March) and St. Patrick’s Day (March 17): 2017” 16th of February, 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff05.pdf>] Accessed on the 10th of May, 2017. Page: 1

¹³⁷ Clark, Dennis J. *Irish Blood: Northern Ireland and the American Conscience*. Port Washington/London (1977), Kennikat Press Corp. Page: 18. Accessed on the 10th of May, 2017.

¹³⁸ Dixon, Paul; O’Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*. *Op.Cit.*, (67) p. 16.

Dixon, Paul O’Kane, Eamonn (2011) Northern Ireland since 1969. Pearson Education, United Kingdom. Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017. Page: 14.

Doc. Cit Taoiseach “Bunreacht na hÉireann-Constitution of Ireland” 1st of July, 1937 [Online] [Available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/The_Constitution/February_2015_-_Constitution_of_Ireland_.pdf] Page: 22 Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

Doc. Cit. British Government. “Government of Ireland Act, 1920” 1920. [Online] [Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1920/67/pdfs/ukpga_19200067_en.pdf] Pp: 5-6 Accessed on the 4th of March, 2017.

Doc. Cit. CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster. “ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985 between THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM” 15th of November, 1985 [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

Doc. Cit. Electronic Irish Statute Book “CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE (SAORSTÁT EIREANN) ACT, 1922.” 6th of December, 1921. [Online] [Available at <http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print.html>] Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

Doc. Cit. Treaty Exhibition. The National Archives of Ireland. “Anglo-Irish Treaty” 6th of December, 1921. [Online] [Available at <http://treaty.nationalarchives.ie/document-gallery/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921/anglo-irish-treaty-6-december-1921-page-4/>] Page: 4. Accessed on the 4th of March, 2017.

El Confidencial “Esta es la ubicación de los zulos que ETA ha entregado a las autoridades francesas” 8th of April, 2017 [Online] [Available at http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/pais-vasco/2017-04-08/esta-es-la-ubicacion-de-los-zulos-que-eta-ha-entregado_1363708/] Accessed on the 8th of June, 2017.

El Mundo “La dictadura del terror: Así nació la banda terrorista” 2009 [Online] [Available at <http://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/index.html>] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

El País “El Gobierno afirma que “la actuación” de ETA no cambia su posición y exige la disolución de la banda” 8th of April, 2017 [Online] [Available at http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/04/08/actualidad/1491654004_446882.html] Accessed on the 8th of June, 2017.

Euronews “Sinn Fein vote to support police in historic poll” 28th of January, 2007 [Online] [Available at <http://www.euronews.com/2007/01/28/sinn-fein-vote-to-support-police-in-historic-poll>] Accessed on the 6th of June, 2017.

¹³⁹ Swaine, Jon Business Insider “How Whitey Bulger Smuggled 7 Tons Of Weapons To The IRA In Coffins” 18th of August, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/whitey-bulger-ira-weapons-smuggling-tale-2013-8>] Accessed on the 10th of May, 2017.

¹⁴⁰ Dixon, Paul O’Kane, Eamonn *Ibid.*, *Op.Cit.*, (67) p. 18.

¹⁴¹ O’Dowd, Niall, Irish Central *Loc.Cit.*, “How Martin McGuinness and Bill Clinton made peace in Ireland” 23rd of March, 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.irishcentral.com/opinion/how-martin-mcguinness-and-bill-clinton-made-peace-in-ireland>] Accessed on the 13th of May, 2017

¹⁴² BBC News “Clinton: His role in Northern Ireland” 11th of December, 2000 [Online] [Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1065913.stm] Accessed on the 13th of May, 2017.

¹⁴³ Explanatory Note: “Over 430 US companies operate in the Republic of Ireland, employing 60,000 people, and since 1980, 40 percent of all US investment in electronics in Europe has been in Ireland. Fifty-one US companies employing 14,000 people operate in Northern Ireland” These numbers correspond to a piece written in 1997, but reveal how important it was -and still is- for American industries to invest in Ireland. MacGinty, Roger, The Journal of Conflict Studies. The GREGG CENTRE For the Study of War and Society. *Loc. Cit.* “American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process” 1997 [Online] [Available at <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/11750/12521#a88>] Accessed on the 13th of May, 2017.

Farlex, The Free Dictionary [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/simony>] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

Finnegan, Richard B. McCarron, Edward T. Ireland, Historical Echoes, Contemporary Politics. United States of America (2000). WestView Press, p. 5. Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

Fundación Víctimas del Terrorismo “Asesinados por ETA” [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.fundacionvt.org/index.php?option=com_dbquery&Itemid=82&task=ExecuteQuery&qid=1&limit=10&limitstart=0] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

Gil Andrés, Carlos 50 COSAS QUE HAY QUE SABER SOBRE HISTORIA DE ESPAÑA, Barcelona (2016), Editorial Planeta S.A, Page: 139-140, Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

Gray, Peter The Irish Famine (1995) H.N Abrams, Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

History “This day in history” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/geneva-conference-begins>] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

History Ireland “The Irish Republican Brotherhood History Ireland” Nov/Dec, 2011 [Online] [Available at <http://www.historyireland.com/18th-19th-century-history/the-irish-republican-brotherhood/>] Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

Iglesias, Leyre El Mundo “Sabino Arana ‘el machista’” 3rd of November, 2015 [Online] [Available at <http://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2015/11/03/562a570f268e3ed5358b45c0.html>] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

International Fund for Ireland “Background” 12th of June, 2009. [Online] [Available at <https://www.internationalfundforireland.com/background/36-about-the-fund/background/47-background>] Accessed on the 22nd of April, 2017.

International Verification Commission “Statement of the International Verification Commission” 21st of February, 2014 [Online] [Available at <http://ivcom.org/en/statement-of-the-international-verification-commission/>] Accessed on the 6th of June, 2017.

Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Doc. Cit “The Agreement” 10th of April, 1998 [Online] [Available at <https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-agreement-1.pdf>] Accessed on the 1st of April, 2017. p. 2.

ITV News “Dr Ian Paisley's most famous quotes” 12th of September, 2014 [Online] [Available at <http://www.itv.com/news/2014-09-12/dr-ian-paisleys-most-famous-quotes/>] Accessed on the 16th of April, 2017.

¹⁴⁴ Iglesias, Leyre El Mundo “Sabino Arana ‘el machista’” 3rd of November, 2015 [Online] [Available at <http://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2015/11/03/562a570f268e3ed5358b45c0.html>] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

¹⁴⁵ Gil Andrés, Carlos 50 COSAS QUE HAY QUE SABER SOBRE HISTORIA DE ESPAÑA, Barcelona (2016), Editorial Planeta S.A, Pages: 139-140, Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

¹⁴⁶ El Mundo “La dictadura del terror: Así nació la banda terrorista” 2009 [Online] [Available at <http://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/index.html>] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

Levine, Joshua *Beauty and Atrocity: People, Politics, and Ireland's fight for Peace*. London (2010), HarperCollins Publishers, London p. 51, Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

Loc. Cit. Farley, Adam Langan, Sheila Irish America "Remembering Mandela, in Ireland and Northern Ireland" 6th of December, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://irishamerica.com/2013/12/remembering-mandela-in-ireland-and-northern-ireland/>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017.

Loc. Cit. The New York Times "Ulster Protestant Interrupts Pope, Yelling 'Antichrist!'" 12th of October, 1988 [Online] [Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/12/world/ulster-protestant-interrupts-pope-yelling-antichrist.html>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017.

MacGinty, Roger *The Journal of Conflict Studies*. The GREGG CENTRE For the Study of War and Society. Loc. Cit. "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process" 1997 [Online] [Available at <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/11750/12521#a88>] Accessed on the 13th of May, 2017.

Mahon, Derek *Collected Poems, Meath (1999)* Gallery Press. Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

Major, John Bruton, John CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "Joint Statement by the British and Irish governments at the start of All-party negotiations in Stormont, Belfast, (10 June 1996)" 10th of June, 1996 [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/pmo/jmjb100696.htm>] Accessed on the 19th of March, 2017.

Marks, Kathy Independent "Blair issues apology for Irish Potato Famine" 1st of June, 1997 [Online] [Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/blair-issues-apology-for-irish-potato-famine-1253790.html>] Accessed on the 16th of April, 2017.

McDonald, Henry Bowcott, Owen The Guardian "Bloody Sunday report: 38 years on, justice at last", 15th of June, 2010 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/15/bloody-sunday-report-soldiers-prosecuted>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

McKenna, Fionnuala CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "British and Irish Governments. Joint Communiqué, 28 November 1995" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/com281195.htm>] Accessed on the 18th of March, 2017.

McKenna, Fionnuala CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "Joint statement issued by Sinn Féin President Mr Gerry Adams MP and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader Mr John Hume MP, Friday 18 July 1997" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ha180797.htm>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017.

McKenna, Fionnuala CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster "'Propositions on Heads of Agreement', issued by the British and Irish governments, 12 January 1998" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/hoa12198.htm>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

¹⁴⁷ History "This day in history" [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/geneva-conference-begins>] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

¹⁴⁸ Webster, Justin Documentary "El fin de ETA" España (2016) Quality Media. Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

¹⁴⁹ Fundación Víctimas del Terrorismo "Asesinados por ETA" [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.fundacionvt.org/index.php?option=com_dbquery&Itemid=82&task=ExecuteQuery&qid=1&limit=10&limitstart=0] Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017

McKittrick, David, Independent “Catholics make up 7% of RUC” 28th of January, 1993. [Online] [Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/catholics-make-up-7-of-ruc-1481268.html>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

McKittrick, David; McVea, David (2002) Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland. New Amsterdam Books, United States. [Online] [Available at https://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=0SS_AAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=northern+ireland+before+the+troubles&ots=qmTTp5hhXr&sig=zDOSnue3qmY23rIkEdDAAofFNZ4#v=onepage&q=northern%20ireland%20before%20the%20troubles&f=false] Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017. pp: 6-10.

Melaugh, Martin CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “A Chronology of the Conflict – 1998” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch98.htm>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “A Chronology of the Conflict – 1996” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch96.htm>] Accessed on the 18th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “A Chronology of the Conflict – 1997” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch97.htm>] Accessed on the 19th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “Internment-Summary of Main Events” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “The Deployment of British Troops- Summary of Main Events” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/troops/sum.htm>] Accessed on the 7th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin, CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “The Northern Ireland Assembly, November 1982 - June 1986 - A Chronology of Main Events” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/assembly1982/chronology.htm>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin, *Ibid.*, Loc. Cit. (68) ; Lynn, Brendan CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster “IRA Truce: 9 February 1975 to 23 January 1976 - Summary of Main Events” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/sum.htm>] Accessed on 9th of March, 2017.

Melaugh, Martin; Lynn Brendan CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster. “Brooke / Mayhew Talks (April 1991 to November 1992) - A Chronology of Main Events” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bmtalks/chron.htm>] Accessed on the 15th of March, 2017.

Merikallio, Katri; Ruokanen, Tapani, Politico “How a Finn and a South African brought peace to Northern

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, (147).

¹⁵¹ Interview by Carlos Johnston on the 30th of May 2017 with MACCABE, Christopher (member of the International Verification Commission).

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ Merikallio, Katri; Ruokanen, Tapani, Politico “How a Finn and a South African brought peace to Northern Ireland” 23rd of February, 2016 [Online] [Available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/ringside-seat-at-irish-theater-of-war-ira-sinn-fein-irish-politics/>] Accessed on the 6th of June, 2017

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, (150).

¹⁵⁵ Euronews “Sinn Fein vote to support police in historic poll” 28th of January, 2007 [Online] [Available at <http://www.euronews.com/2007/01/28/sinn-fein-vote-to-support-police-in-historic-poll>] Accessed on the 6th of June, 2017.

Ireland” 23rd of February, 2016 [Online] [Available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/ringside-seat-at-irish-theater-of-war-ira-sinn-fein-irish-politics/>] Accessed on the 6th of June, 2017.

Millbank Systems “Commons Sitting. Northern Ireland (Mitchell Report)” 24th of January, 1996 [Online] [Available at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1996/jan/24/northern-ireland-mitchell-report>] Accessed on the 18th of March, 2017.

Mullin, John The Guardian “Mowlam visits the Maze” 10th of January, 1998 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1998/jan/10/devolution.uk>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

Nobel Prize “David Trimble-Nobel Lecture” 10th of December, 1998 [Online] [Available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1998/trimble-lecture.html] Accessed on the 15th of April, 2017.

Nobel Prize “The Nobel Peace Prize 1976” [S.D] [Online] [Available at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1976/] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency “Census Population Tables (2011)” 2011 [Online] [Available at <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/2011-census-results-population-estimates-summary-tables-25-september-2014.pdf>] Accessed on the 1st of June, 2017.

O’Dowd, Niall, Irish Central Loc. Cit. “How Martin McGuinness and Bill Clinton made peace in Ireland” 23rd of March, 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.irishcentral.com/opinion/how-martin-mcguinness-and-bill-clinton-made-peace-in-ireland>] Accessed on the 13th of May, 2017.

Óglaigh na hÉireann. Defense Forces Ireland. “The Civil War 1922-1923” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.military.ie/info-centre/defence-forces-history/the-civil-war-1922-1923/>] Accessed on the 4th of March, 2017.

Ormazabal, Mikel El País “Decenas de miles de personas exigen el acercamiento de los presos de ETA” 15th of January, 2017 [Online] [Available at http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/01/14/actualidad/1484395523_677702.html] Accessed on the 9th of June, 2017.

Oxford, The Oxford companion to Irish history. New York (2002) Oxford University Press. p. 484.

Paor De, Liam On the Easter Proclamation and other Declarations. Dublin (1997) Four Courts Press, Dublin p.11, Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

¹⁵⁶ International Verification Commission “Statement of the International Verification Commission” 21st of February, 2014 [Online] [Available at <http://ivcom.org/en/statement-of-the-international-verification-commission/>] Accessed on the 6th of June, 2017.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, (150).

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, (150).

¹⁵⁹ El Confidencial “Esta es la ubicación de los zulos que ETA ha entregado a las autoridades francesas” 8th of April, 2017 [Online] [Available at http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/pais-vasco/2017-04-08/esta-es-la-ubicacion-de-los-zulos-que-eta-ha-entregado_1363708/] Accessed on the 8th of June, 2017.

Pat Coogan, Tim, Ireland in the Twentieth Century, United Kingdom (2004), Arrow Books Page: 323. Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017.

Peace People “History: Peace People the beginnings...” [S.D] [Online] [Available at http://www.peacepeople.com/?page_id=8] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

Purdy, Martina, BBC News “Nelson Mandela's ties to Northern Ireland” 5th of December, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-15756000>] Accessed on the 18th of April, 2017.

Sachs L. William; Stanley Dean, Ralph “Anglicanism” Encyclopedia Britannica 7th of February, 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anglicanism>] Accessed on the 25th of February, 2017.

Sinn Féin “History of the conflict” Sinn Féin [S.D] [Online] [Available at <http://www.sinnFéin.ie/history>] Accessed on the 20th of February, 2017.

Sinn Féin “Report of the New Ireland Forum” 2nd of May, 1984 [Online] [Available at <http://www.sinnFéin.ie/contents/15214>] Accessed on the 9th of March, 2017.

Stevens, John Doc. Cit, Cain Web Services, University of Ulster “Steven Enquiry: Overview & Recommendations” 17th of April, 2003 [Online] [Available at <http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.pdf>] Accessed on the 11th of March, 2017 pp: 3; 9; 15; 16.

Stewart, A. T. Q. The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule 1912-1914. Great Britain (1967) Faber and Faber Limited, Great Britain p. 48 Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

Sturcke, James, The Guardian “Explainer: Real IRA and Continuity IRA” 10th of March, 2009 [Online] [Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/mar/10/real-ira-continuity>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

Sutton, Malcolm CAIN Web Service, University of Ulster. “Revised and Updated Extracts from Sutton's Book” October, 2002 [Online] [Available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/index.html>] Accessed on the 13th of March, 2017.

Swaine, Jon Business Insider “How Whitey Bulger Smuggled 7 Tons Of Weapons To The IRA In Coffins” 18th of August, 2013 [Online] [Available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/whitey-bulger-ira-weapons-smuggling-tale-2013-8>] Accessed on the 10th of May, 2017.

TRAC, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium “Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)” [S.D] [Online] [Available at <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/real-irish-republican-army-rira>] Accessed on the 24th of March, 2017.

¹⁶⁰ El País “El Gobierno afirma que “la actuación” de ETA no cambia su posición y exige la disolución de la banda” 8th of April, 2017 [Online] [Available at http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/04/08/actualidad/1491654004_446882.html] Accessed on the 8th of June, 2017.

¹⁶¹ Ormazabal, Mikel El País “Decenas de miles de personas exigen el acercamiento de los presos de ETA” 15th of January, 2017 [Online] [Available at http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/01/14/actualidad/1484395523_677702.html] Accessed on the 9th of June, 2017.

¹⁶² Brophy, Daragh The Journal ““He expanded the definition of us’: Clinton’s tribute to McGuinness, as thousands pay respects” 23rd of March, 2017 [Online] [Available at <http://www.thejournal.ie/martin-mcguinness-funeral-2-3302733-Mar2017/>] Accessed on the 13th of June, 2017.

UK Parliament “No 68. GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1 MAY 1997” 1st of May, 1997 [Online] [Available at <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-office/m15.pdf>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017. pp: 2-3.

United States Census Bureau “Irish-American Heritage Month (March) and St. Patrick’s Day (March 17): 2017” 16th of February, 2017 [Online] [Available at <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff05.pdf>] Accessed on the 10th of May, 2017. p. 1.

Whyte, Nicholas, Northern Ireland Elections “The 1996 Forum Elections and the Peace Process” 3rd of June, 1998 (Last updated 7th of May, 2003) [Online] [Available at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ff96.htm>] Accessed on the 19th of March, 2017.

Whyte, Nicholas, Northern Ireland Elections “The 1997 Local Government Elections in Northern Ireland” 7 June 1998; (Last updated 17th of February 2001 [Online] [Available at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/flg97.htm>] Accessed on the 22nd of March, 2017.

Wikipedia “Ulster Volunteer Force” [S.D] [Online] [Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulster_Volunteer_Force#Deaths_as_a_result_of_activity] Accessed on the 2nd of March, 2017.

Wilkinson, Michael, The Telegraph, “What is the 'First Past The Post' voting system?” 24th of April, 2017 [Online] [Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/first-past-post-voting-system/>] Accessed on the 25th of April, 2017.

Y.F, The Irish Famine: Opening old wounds. The Economist, 12th of December, 2012 [Online] [Available at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2012/12/irish-famine>] Accessed on the 1st of March, 2017.

Audiovisual material and Interviews:

BBC, Youtube “Gerrymandering in Northern Ireland-BBC” 19th of June, 2015 [Online] [Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjLCnckqXwQ>] Accessed on the 5th of March, 2017

Interview by Carlos Johnston on the 13th of April, 2017, with DEVENPORT, Mark (BBC Northern Ireland Political Editor)

Interview by Carlos Johnston on the 30th of May, 2017, with MACCABE, Christopher (member of the International Verification Commission)

Webster, Justin, Documentary “El fin de ETA” España (2016) Quality Media. Accessed on the 19th of May, 2017.

Números Publicados

Serie Unión Europea y Relaciones Internacionales

- Nº 1 / 2000 “La política monetaria única de la Unión Europea”
Rafael Pampillón Olmedo
- Nº 2 / 2000 “Nacionalismo e integración”
Leonardo Caruana de las Cagigas y Eduardo González Calleja
- Nº 1 / 2001 “Standard and Harmonize: Tax Arbitrage”
Nohemi Boal Velasco y Mariano González Sánchez
- Nº 2 / 2001 “Alemania y la ampliación al este: convergencias y divergencias”
José María Beneyto Pérez
- Nº 3 / 2001 “Towards a common European diplomacy? Analysis of the European Parliament resolution on establishing a common diplomacy (A5-0210/2000)”
Belén Becerril Atienza y Gerardo Galeote Quecedo
- Nº 4 / 2001 “La Política de Inmigración en la Unión Europea”
Patricia Argerey Vilar
- Nº 1 / 2002 “ALCA: Adiós al modelo de integración europea?”
Mario Jaramillo Contreras
- Nº 2 / 2002 “La crisis de Oriente Medio: Palestina”
Leonardo Caruana de las Cagigas
- Nº 3 / 2002 “El establecimiento de una delimitación más precisa de las competencias entre la Unión Europea y los Estados miembros”
José María Beneyto y Claus Giering
- Nº 4 / 2002 “La sociedad anónima europea”
Manuel García Riestra
- Nº 5 / 2002 “Jerarquía y tipología normativa, procesos legislativos y separación de poderes en la Unión Europea: hacia un modelo más claro y transparente”
Alberto Gil Ibáñez
- Nº 6 / 2002 “Análisis de situación y opciones respecto a la posición de las Regiones en el ámbito de la UE. Especial atención al Comité de las Regiones”
Alberto Gil Ibáñez
- Nº 7 / 2002 “Die Festlegung einer genaueren Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mitgliedstaaten”
José María Beneyto y Claus Giering
- Nº 1 / 2003 “Un español en Europa. Una aproximación a Juan Luis Vives”
José Peña González
- Nº 2 / 2003 “El mercado del arte y los obstáculos fiscales ¿Una asignatura pendiente en la Unión Europea?”
Pablo Siegrist Ridruejo

- Nº 1 / 2004 “Evolución en el ámbito del pensamiento de las relaciones España-Europa”
José Peña González
- Nº 2 / 2004 “La sociedad europea: un régimen fragmentario con intención armonizadora”
Alfonso Martínez Echevarría y García de Dueñas
- Nº 3 / 2004 “Tres operaciones PESD: Bosnia i Herzegovina, Macedonia y República Democrática de Congo”
Berta Carrión Ramírez
- Nº 4 / 2004 “Turquía: El largo camino hacia Europa”
Delia Contreras
- Nº 5 / 2004 “En el horizonte de la tutela judicial efectiva, el TJCE supera la interpretación restrictiva de la legitimación activa mediante el uso de la cuestión prejudicial y la excepción de ilegalidad”
Alfonso Rincón García Loygorri
- Nº 1 / 2005 “The Biret cases: what effects do WTO dispute settlement rulings have in EU law?”
Adrian Emch
- Nº 2 / 2005 “Las ofertas públicas de adquisición de títulos desde la perspectiva comunitaria en el marco de la creación de un espacio financiero integrado”
José María Beneyto y José Puente
- Nº 3 / 2005 “Las regiones ultraperiféricas de la UE: evolución de las mismas como consecuencia de las políticas específicas aplicadas. Canarias como ejemplo”
Carlota González Láynez
- Nº 24 / 2006 “El Imperio Otomano: ¿por tercera vez a las puertas de Viena?”
Alejandra Arana
- Nº 25 / 2006 “Bioterrorismo: la amenaza latente”
Ignacio Ibáñez Ferrándiz
- Nº 26 / 2006 “Inmigración y redefinición de la identidad europea”
Diego Acosta Arcarazo
- Nº 27 / 2007 “Procesos de integración en Sudamérica. Un proyecto más ambicioso: la comunidad sudamericana de naciones”
Raquel Turienzo Carracedo
- Nº 28 / 2007 “El poder del derecho en el orden internacional. Estudio crítico de la aplicación de la norma democrática por el Consejo de Seguridad y la Unión Europea”
Gaspar Atienza Becerril
- Nº 29 / 2008 “Iraqi Kurdistan: Past, Present and Future. A look at the history, the contemporary situation and the future for the Kurdish parts of Iraq”
Egil Thorsås
- Nº 30 / 2008 “Los desafíos de la creciente presencia de China en el continente africano”
Marisa Caroço Amaro
- Nº 31 / 2009 “La cooperación al desarrollo: un traje a medida para cada contexto. Las prioridades para la promoción de la buena gobernanza en terceros países: la Unión Europea, los Estados Unidos y la Organización de las Naciones Unidas”
Anne Van Nistelrooij

- Nº 32 / 2009 “Desafíos y oportunidades en las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Turquía”
Manuela Gambino
- Nº 33 / 2009 “Las relaciones transatlánticas tras la crisis financiera internacional: oportunidades para la Presidencia Española”
Román Escolano
- Nº 34 / 2010 “Los derechos fundamentales en los tratados europeos. Evolución y situación actual”
Silvia Ortiz Herrera
- Nº 35 / 2010 “La Unión Europea ante los retos de la democratización en Cuba”
Delia Contreras
- Nº 36 / 2010 “La asociación estratégica UE- Brasil. Retórica y pragmatismo en las relaciones Euro-Brasileñas” (Vol 1 y 2)
Ana Isabel Rodríguez Iglesias
- Nº 37 / 2011 “China’s foreign policy: A European perspective”
Fernando Delage y Gracia Abad
- Nº 38 / 2011 “China’s Priorities and Strategy in China-EU Relations”
Chen Zhimin, Dai Bingran, Pan Zhongqi y Dingchun
- Nº 39 / 2011 “Motor or Brake for European Policies? Germany’s new role in the EU after the Lisbon-Judgment of its Federal Constitutional Court”
Ingolf Pernice
- Nº 40 / 2011 “Back to Square One - the Past, Present and Future of the Simmenthal Mandate”
Siniša Rodin
- Nº 41 / 2011 “Lisbon before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives”
Mattias Wendel
- Nº 42 / 2011 “The Spanish Constitutional Court, European Law and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States (Art. 6.3 TUE). Lisbon and beyond”
Antonio López – Pina
- Nº 43 / 2011 “Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Paradox of less Rights and more Opportunities”
Désirée Emilie Simonetti
- Nº 44 / 2011 “China and the Global Political Economy”
Weiping Huang & Xinning Song
- Nº 45 / 2011 “Multilateralism and Soft Diplomacy”
Juliet Lodge and Angela Carpenter
- Nº 46 / 2011 “FDI and Business Networks: The EU-China Foreign Direct Investment Relationship”
Jeremy Clegg and Hinrich Voss
- Nº 47 / 2011 “China within the emerging Asian multilateralism and regionalism as perceived through a comparison with the European Neighbourhood Policy”
Maria-Eugenia Bardaro & Frederik Ponjaert
- Nº 48 / 2011 “Multilateralism and Global Governance”
Mario Telò

- Nº 49 / 2011 “Bilateral Trade Relations and Business Cooperation”
Enrique Fanjul
- Nº 50 / 2011 “Political Dialogue in EU-China Relations”
José María Beneyto, Alicia Sorroza, Inmaculada Hurtado y Justo Corti
- Nº 51 / 2011 “La Política Energética Exterior de la Unión Europea: Entre dependencia, seguridad de abastecimiento, mercado y geopolítica”
Marco Villa
- Nº 52 / 2011 “Los Inicios del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior”
Macarena Esteban Guadalix
- Nº 53 / 2011 “Holding Europe’s CFSP/CSDP Executive to Account in the Age of the Lisbon Treaty”
Daniel Thym
- Nº 54 / 2012 “El conflicto en el Ártico: ¿hacia un tratado internacional?”
Alberto Trillo Barca
- Nº 55 / 2012 “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Going Nowhere”
William Chislett
- Nº 56 / 2012 “Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y la Federación Rusa en materia de seguridad y defensa. Reflexiones al calor del nuevo concepto estratégico de la Alianza Atlántica”
Jesús Elguea Palacios
- Nº 57 / 2012 “The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020: A Preliminary analysis of the Spanish position”
Mario Kölling y Cristina Serrano Leal
- Nº 58 / 2012 “Preserving Sovereignty, Delaying the Supranational Constitutional Moment? The EU as the Anti-Model for regional judiciaries”
Allan F. Tatham
- Nº 59 / 2012 “La participación de las CCAA en el diseño y la negociación de la política de cohesión para el periodo 2014-2020”
Mario Kölling y Cristina Serrano Leal
- Nº 60 / 2012 “El planteamiento de las asociaciones estratégicas: la respuesta europea ante los desafíos que presenta el nuevo orden mundial”
Javier García Toni
- Nº 61 / 2012 “La dimensión global del Constitucionalismo Multinivel. Una respuesta global a los desafíos de la globalización”
Ingolf Pernice
- Nº 62 / 2012 “EU External Relations: the Governance Mode of Foreign Policy”
Gráinne de Búrca
- Nº 63 / 2012 “La propiedad intelectual en China: cambios y adaptaciones a los cánones internacionales”
Paula Tallón Queija
- Nº 64 / 2012 “Contribuciones del presupuesto comunitario a la gobernanza global: claves desde Europa”
Cristina Serrano Leal
- Nº 65 / 2013 “Las relaciones germano-estadounidenses entre 1933 y 1945”
Pablo Guerrero García

- Nº 66 / 2013 “El futuro de la agricultura europea ante los nuevos desafíos mundiales”
Marta Llorca Gomis, Raquel Antón Martín, Carmen Durán Vizán y Jaime del Olmo Morillo-Velarde
- Nº 67 / 2013 “¿Cómo será la guerra del futuro? La perspectiva norteamericana”
Salvador Sánchez Tapia
- Nº 68 / 2013 “Políticas y estrategias de comunicación de la Comisión Europea: actores y procesos desde que se aprueban hasta que la información llega a la ciudadanía española”
Marta Hernández Ruiz
- Nº 69 / 2013 “El reglamento europeo de sucesiones. Tribunales competentes y ley aplicable. excepciones al principio general de unidad de ley”
Silvia Ortiz Herrera
- Nº 70 / 2013 “Private Sector Protagonism in U.S. Humanitarian Aid”
Sarah Elizabeth Capers
- Nº 71 / 2014 “Integration of Turkish Minorities in Germany”
Iraia Eizmendi Alonso
- Nº 72 / 2014 “La imagen de España en el exterior: la Marca España”
Marta Sabater Ramis
- Nº 73 / 2014 “Aportaciones del Mercado Interior y la política de competencia europea: lecciones a considerar por otras áreas de integración regional”
Jerónimo Maillo
- Nº 74 / 2015 “Las relaciones de la UE con sus socios meridionales a la luz de la Primavera Árabe”
Paloma Luengos Fernández
- Nº 75 / 2015 “De Viena a Sarajevo: un estudio del equilibrio de poder en Europa entre 1815 y 1914”
Álvaro Silva Soto
- Nº 76 / 2015 “El avance de la ultraderecha en la UE como consecuencia de la crisis: Una perspectiva del contexto político de Grecia y Francia según la teoría del ‘chivo expiatorio’”
Eduardo Torrecilla Giménez
- Nº 77 / 2016 “La influencia de los factores culturales en la internacionalización de la empresa: el caso de España y Alemania”
Blanca Sánchez Goyenechea
- Nº 78 / 2016 “La Cooperación Estructurada Permanente como instrumento para una defensa común”
Elena Martínez Padilla
- Nº 79 / 2016 “The European refugee crisis and the EU-Turkey deal on migrants and refugees”
Guido Savasta
- Nº 80 / 2016 “Brexit. How did the UK get here?”
Izabela Daleszak
- Nº 81 / 2016 “Las ONGD españolas: necesidad de adaptación al nuevo contexto para sobrevivir”
Carmen Moreno Quintero
- Nº 82 / 2017 “Los nuevos instrumentos y los objetivos de política económica en la UE: efectos de la crisis sobre las desigualdades”
Miguel Moltó

Serie Política de la Competencia

- Nº 1 / 2001** “El control de concentraciones en España: un nuevo marco legislativo para las empresas”
José María Beneyto
- Nº 2 / 2001** “Análisis de los efectos económicos y sobre la competencia de la concentración Endesa-Iberdrola”
Luis Atienza, Javier de Quinto y Richard Watt
- Nº 3 / 2001** “Empresas en Participación concentrativas y artículo 81 del Tratado CE: Dos años de aplicación del artículo 2(4) del Reglamento CE de control de las operaciones de concentración”
Jerónimo Maíllo González-Orús
- Nº 1 / 2002** “Cinco años de aplicación de la Comunicación de 1996 relativa a la no imposición de multas o a la reducción de su importe en los asuntos relacionados con los acuerdos entre empresas”
Miguel Ángel Peña Castellot
- Nº 2 / 2002** “Leniency: la política de exoneración del pago de multas en derecho de la competencia”
Santiago Illundaín Fontoya
- Nº 3 / 2002** “Dominancia vs. disminución sustancial de la competencia ¿cuál es el criterio más apropiado?: aspectos jurídicos”
Mercedes García Pérez
- Nº 4 / 2002** “Test de dominancia vs. test de reducción de la competencia: aspectos económicos”
Juan Briones Alonso
- Nº 5 / 2002** “Telecomunicaciones en España: situación actual y perspectivas”
Bernardo Pérez de León Ponce
- Nº 6 / 2002** “El nuevo marco regulatorio europeo de las telecomunicaciones”
Jerónimo González González y Beatriz Sanz Fernández-Vega
- Nº 1 / 2003** “Some Simple Graphical Interpretations of the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index and their Implications”
Richard Watt y Javier De Quinto
- Nº 2 / 2003** “La Acción de Oro o las privatizaciones en un Mercado Único”
Pablo Siegrist Ridruejo, Jesús Lavalle Merchán, Emilia Gargallo González
- Nº 3 / 2003** “El control comunitario de concentraciones de empresas y la invocación de intereses nacionales. Crítica del artículo 21.3 del Reglamento 4064/89”
Pablo Berenguer O’Shea y Vanessa Pérez Lamas
- Nº 1 / 2004** “Los puntos de conexión en la Ley 1/2002 de 21 de febrero de coordinación de las competencias del Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas en materia de defensa de la competencia”
Lucana Estévez Mendoza
- Nº 2 / 2004** “Los impuestos autonómicos sobre los grandes establecimientos comerciales como ayuda de Estado ilícita ex art. 87 TCE”
Francisco Marcos
- Nº 1 / 2005** “Servicios de Interés General y Artículo 86 del Tratado CE: Una Visión Evolutiva”
Jerónimo Maíllo González-Orús

- Nº 2 / 2005 “La evaluación de los registros de morosos por el Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia”
Alfonso Rincón García Loygorri
- Nº 3 / 2005 “El código de conducta en materia de fiscalidad de las empresas y su relación con el régimen comunitario de ayudas de Estado”
Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo
- Nº 18 / 2006 “Régimen sancionador y clemencia: comentarios al título quinto del anteproyecto de la ley de defensa de la competencia”
Miguel Ángel Peña Castellot
- Nº 19 / 2006 “Un nuevo marco institucional en la defensa de la competencia en España”
Carlos Padrós Reig
- Nº 20 / 2006 “Las ayudas públicas y la actividad normativa de los poderes públicos en el anteproyecto de ley de defensa de la competencia de 2006”
Juan Arpio Santacruz
- Nº 21 / 2006 “La intervención del Gobierno en el control de concentraciones económicas”
Albert Sánchez Graells
- Nº 22 / 2006 “La descentralización administrativa de la aplicación del Derecho de la competencia en España”
José Antonio Rodríguez Miguez
- Nº 23 / 2007 “Aplicación por los jueces nacionales de la legislación en materia de competencia en el Proyecto de Ley”
Juan Manuel Fernández López
- Nº 24 / 2007 “El tratamiento de las restricciones públicas a la competencia”
Francisco Marcos Fernández
- Nº 25 / 2008 “Merger Control in the Pharmaceutical Sector and the Innovation Market Assessment. European Analysis in Practice and differences with the American Approach”
Teresa Lorca Morales
- Nº 26 / 2008 “Separación de actividades en el sector eléctrico”
Joaquín M^a Nebreda Pérez
- Nº 27 / 2008 “Arbitraje y Defensa de la Competencia”
Antonio Creus Carreras y Josep Maria Julià Insenser
- Nº 28 / 2008 “El procedimiento de control de concentraciones y la supervisión por organismos reguladores de las Ofertas Públicas de Adquisición”
Francisco Marcos Fernández
- Nº 29 / 2009 “Intervención pública en momentos de crisis: el derecho de ayudas de Estado aplicado a la intervención pública directa en las empresas”
Pedro Callol y Jorge Manzarbeitia
- Nº 30 / 2011 “Understanding China’s Competition Law & Policy: merger control as a case study”
Jerónimo Maillo
- Nº 31 / 2012 Autoridades autonómicas de defensa de la competencia en vías de extinción
Francisco Marcos

- Nº 32 / 2013 “¿Qué es un cártel para la CNC?”
Alfonso Rincón García-Loygorri
- Nº 33 / 2013 “Tipología de cárteles un estudio de los 20 casos resueltos por la CNC”
Justo Corti Varela
- Nº 34 / 2013 “Autoridades responsables de la lucha contra los cárteles en España (división de poderes y funciones con la UE, reparto interno con las CCAA, aplicación administrativa-judicial, dotación de recursos humanos y materiales).”
José Antonio Rodríguez Miguez
- Nº 35 / 2013 “Una revisión de la literatura económica sobre el funcionamiento interno de los cárteles y sus efectos económicos”
María Jesús Arroyo Fernández y Begoña Blasco Torrejón
- Nº 36 / 2013 “Poderes de Investigación de la Comisión Nacional de la Competencia”
Alberto Escudero
- Nº 37 / 2013 “*Screening* de la autoridad de competencia: Mejores prácticas internacionales”
María Jesús Arroyo Fernández y Begoña Blasco Torrejón
- Nº 38 / 2013 “Objetividad, predictibilidad y determinación normativa. Los poderes normativos ad extra de las autoridades de defensa de la competencia en el control de los cárteles”
Carlos Padrós Reig
- Nº 39 / 2013 “La revisión jurisdiccional de los expedientes sancionadores de cárteles”
Fernando Díez Estella
- Nº 40 / 2013 “Programas de recompensas para luchar contra los cárteles en Europa: una comparativa con terceros países”
Jerónimo Maíllo González-Orús
- Nº 41 / 2014 “La criminalización de los cárteles en la Unión Europea”
Amparo Lozano Maneiro
- Nº 42 / 2014 “Posibilidad de sancionar penalmente los cárteles en España, tanto en el presente como en el futuro”
Álvaro Mendo Estrella
- Nº 43 / 2014 “La criminalización de los hardcore cartels: reflexiones a partir de la experiencia de EE.UU. y Reino Unido”
María Gutiérrez Rodríguez
- Nº 44 / 2014 “La escasez de acciones de daños y perjuicios derivadas de ilícitos antitrust en España, ¿por qué?”
Fernando Díez Estella
- Nº 45 / 2014 “Cuantificación de daños de los cárteles duros. Una visión económica”
Rodolfo Ramos Melero
- Nº 46 / 2014 “El procedimiento sancionador en materia de cárteles”
Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo y José Luis Buendía Sierra
- Nº 47 / 2014 “Japanese Cartel Control in Transition”
Mel Marquis y Tadashi Shiraishi

- Nº 48 / 2015 “Una evaluación económica de la revisión judicial de las sanciones impuestas por la CNMC por infracciones anticompetitivas”
Javier García-Verdugo
- Nº 49 / 2015 “The role of tax incentives on the energy sector under the Climate Change’s challenges”
Pasqueale Pistone e Iñaki Bilbao
- Nº 50 / 2015 “Energy taxation and key legal concepts in the EU state aid context: looking for a common understanding”
Marta Villaz Ezcurra y Pernille Wegenen
- Nº 51 / 2015 “Energy taxation and key legal concepts in the EU state aid context: looking for a common understanding”
Joachim English
- Nº 52 / 2016 “The role of the polluter pays principle and others key legal principles in energy taxes, on an state aid context”
Dr. José A. Rozas
- Nº 53 / 2016 “EU energy taxation system & state aid control. Critical analysis from competitiveness and environmental protection objectives”
Dr. Jerónimo Maillo, Dr. Edoardo Traversa, Dr. Justo Corti, Dr. Alice Pirlot
- Nº 54 / 2016 “Energy taxation and state aids: analysis of comparative law”
Marta Villar Ezcurra, Dr. Janet E. Milne
- Nº 55 / 2016 “Case-law on the control of energy taxes and tax reliefs under European Union Law”
Prof. Dr. Álvaro del Blanco, Prof. Dr. Lorenzo del Federico, Prof. Dr. Cristina García Herrera, Prof. Silvia Giorgi, Prof. Dr. Concetta Ricci, Prof. Dr. Caterina Verrigni
- Nº 56 / 2017 “El modelo de negocio de Uber y el sector del transporte urbano de viajeros: implicaciones en materia de competencia”
Ana Goizueta Zubimendi

Serie Economía Europea

- Nº 1 / 2001** “Impacto económico de la inmigración de los Países de Europa Central y Oriental a la Unión Europea”
M^a del Mar Herrador Morales
- Nº 1 / 2002** “Análisis de la financiación de los Fondos Estructurales en el ámbito de la política regional de la Unión Europea durante el período 1994-1999”
Cristina Isabel Dopacio
- Nº 2 / 2002** “On capital structure in the small and medium enterprises: the spanish case”
Francisco Sogorb Mira
- Nº 3 / 2002** “European Union foreign direct investment flows to Mercosur economies: an analysis of the country-of-origin determinants”
Martha Carro Fernández
- Nº 1 / 2004** “¿Es necesario reformar el Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento?”
Ana Cristina Mingorance
- Nº 2 / 2004** “Perspectivas financieras 2007-2013: las nuevas prioridades de la Unión Europea y sus implicaciones en la política regional”
Cristina Serrano Leal, Begoña Montoro de Zulueta y Enrique Viguera Rubio
- Nº 3 / 2004** “Stabilisation Policy in EMU: The Case for More Active Fiscal Policy”
María Jesús Arroyo Fernández y Jorge Uxó González
- Nº 1 / 2005** “La negociación de las perspectivas financieras 2007-2013: Una historia de encuentros y desencuentros”
Cristina Serrano Leal
- Nº 9 / 2006** “La cuestión agrícola en las negociaciones comerciales multilaterales”
Ana Fernández-Ardavín Martínez y M^a Ángeles Rodríguez Santos
- Nº 10 / 2007** “El modelo de desarrollo finlandés y su posible adaptación a los países del Este”
Zane Butina
- Nº 11 / 2008** “La estrategia de Lisboa como respuesta de la UE a los retos de la globalización y al envejecimiento de su población”
Miguel Moltó Calvo

Serie del Centro de Estudios de Cooperación al Desarrollo

- Nº 1 / 2003** “Papel de la UE en las recientes cumbres internacionales”
Mónica Goded Salto
- Nº 1 / 2004** “La asociación Euro-Mediterránea: Un instrumento al servicio de la paz y la prosperidad”
Jesús Antonio Núñez Villaverde
- Nº 2 / 2004** “La retroalimentación en los sistemas de evaluación. Experiencias en la cooperación al desarrollo”
José María Larrú Ramos
- Nº 3 / 2004** “Migraciones y desarrollo: propuestas institucionales y experiencias prácticas”
Carlos Giménez, Alberto Acosta, Jaime Atienza, Gemma Aubarell, Xabier Aragall
- Nº 4 / 2004** “Responsabilidad social corporativa y PYMES”
Amparo Merino de Diego
- Nº 1 / 2005** “La relación ONG-Empresa en el marco de la responsabilidad social de la empresa”
Carmen Valor y Amparo Merino
- Nº 1 / 2008** “Dos modalidades de evaluación: evaluaciones de impacto aleatorias y evaluaciones participativas”
José María Larrú Ramos y Jorge Lugrís Llerandi
- Nº 2 / 2008** “A system not fit for purpose?”
Sven Grimm
- Nº 3 / 2008** “El fortalecimiento institucional de la sociedad civil: principal desafío de la cooperación internacional”
Ramón E. Daubón
- Nº 4 / 2009** “La relación entre las instituciones y el desarrollo económico de las naciones”
Pablo Bandeira
- Nº 5 / 2009** “El desarrollo institucional en el contexto de la ineficacia de la ayuda oficial: valoración crítica y propuestas de acción”
Pablo Bandeira
- Nº 6 / 2009** “El fortalecimiento de capacidades y el apoyo al desarrollo desde las bases: la experiencia de la RedEAmérica”
Rodrigo Villar
- Nº 7 / 2009** “Mind the gap: Addressing the “Delivery Challenge” in EC Development Cooperation”
Jean Bossuyt
- Nº 8 / 2009** “De la reforma política en nuevas democracias: aspectos sistémicos e institucionales y calidad de la democracia”
Manuel Alcántara Sáez y Fátima García Díez
- Nº 9 / 2009** “Algunas limitaciones metodológicas para analizar la gobernabilidad”
Miguel Fernández Trillo-Figueroa

- Nº 10 / 2009 “Fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil para la acción pública y la gobernanza democrática en contextos de desarrollo”
Gonzalo Delamaza
- Nº 11 / 2010 “La gestión de la información en organizaciones de desarrollo Vol. 1 y Vol. 2”
Rodríguez - Ariza Carlos
- Nº 12 / 2010 “¿Más es mejor?”
Larru, José María
- Nº 13 / 2010 “Civil society capacity building: An approach in Uganda”
Groenendijk, Kees
- Nº 14 / 2010 “El futuro de la cooperación europea al desarrollo: ¿Buscar soluciones globales o volver a un nicho para 2020?”
Sven Grimm y Erik Lundsgaarde
- Nº 15 / 2011 “Dos métodos de evaluación: criterios y teoría del programa”
Juan Andrés Ligeró Lasa
- Nº 16 / 2012 “Guía para el uso de herramientas de medición de la calidad de las instituciones públicas en la cooperación internacional”
Pablo Bandeira
- Nº 17 / 2012 “Fortalecimiento institucional y desarrollo: herramientas prácticas para los actores de la cooperación”
Daniel Gayo, Carlos Garcimartín, Roberto Pizarro Mondragón, Eloy Bedoya, Xavi Palau, Graciela Rico, M^a Jesús Vitón y Esther del Campo
- Nº 18 / 2012 "Cooperación técnica para el fortalecimiento institucional: herramientas prácticas para fomentar sus resultados"
Luisa Moreno, Luis Cámara, Juan Ramón Cañadas, Fernando Varela, Cristina Fernández, Jordi Montagud O'Curry, Inmaculada Zamora
- Nº 19 / 2013 “*Governance matters*. Algunas lecciones aprendidas en proyectos de fortalecimiento institucional”
Ana Fernández-Ardavín, Désirée Simonetti y Fernanda Villavicencio
- Nº 20 / 2013 “La integración de la evaluación en el ciclo de las intervenciones de las ONGD”
José María Larrú y María Méndez
- Nº 21 / 2013 “El fortalecimiento de las instituciones públicas en América Latina: situación actual y retos”
Pablo Bandeira
- Nº 22 / 2014 “Un marco de referencia para las ONGD en la construcción de instituciones para el desarrollo”
Déborah Itriago
- Nº 23 / 2014 “10 desafíos que enfrentan las ONGD en el fortalecimiento institucional para el desarrollo”
Déborah Itriago
- Nº 24 / 2014 “Calidad y utilidad de las evaluaciones en la Cooperación para el Desarrollo en España”
Rafael Monterde Díaz
- Nº 25 / 2014 “La Unión Europea y la Agenda de Desarrollo post-2015”
José María Larrú y Javier Sota

Nº 26 / 2014 “El seguimiento externo orientado a resultados (SER): una buena práctica para aumentar la eficacia de la ayuda al desarrollo”
Juan Manuel Santomé y Natalia Sagrario

Serie Arbitraje Internacional y Resolución Alternativa de Controversias

- Nº 1 / 2007** “Towards a new paradigm in international arbitration. The Town Elder model revisited”
David W. Rivkin
- Nº 2 / 2008** “Los árbitros y el poder para dictar condenas no pecuniarias”
David Ramos Muñoz
- Nº 3 / 2008** “La lucha contra las prerrogativas estatales en el arbitraje comercial internacional”
José Fernando Merino Merchán
- Nº 4 / 2009** “Due process and public policy in the international enforcement of class arbitration awards”
Stacie I. Strong
- Nº 5 / 2009** “The permanent court of arbitration and the uncitral arbitration rules: current interaction
and future prospectives”
Sarah Grimmer

Resumen: Los textos historiográficos de cualquier conflicto tienden a representar una clara división entre vencedores y vencidos. Pero en ocasiones los supuestos ganadores y perdedores están sujetos a una interpretación subjetiva de los hechos que los preceden y que suceden durante dichos conflictos, ya tengan un carácter regional o global. A menudo éste es el caso de las luchas armadas que parecen no tener fin y que se encuentran atrapadas entre recurrentes tensiones políticas y sociales que impiden distinguir un claro triunfador, incluso años después de su estallido. El conflicto norirlandés es un ejemplo de esto último. Desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX hasta la entrada del nuevo milenio, la guerra civil entre la comunidad católica y la protestante era una continua amenaza. Más de treinta años después, una frágil paz todavía se encuentra en proceso de desarrollo en la región. Un aspecto clave de ese proceso es la idea del consenso.

A través de un análisis retrospectivo, este trabajo se centra particularmente en los denominados *Troubles* de Irlanda del Norte, en los factores que apoyaron e influyeron en el proceso de paz y en cómo las múltiples interpretaciones históricas entre enemigos pueden dejarse de lado en beneficio de un objetivo común. Asimismo, el trabajo realiza un escrutinio de las lecciones que se pueden extrapolar de este singular caso para así ayudarnos a comprender otros conflictos, como por ejemplo el inspirado en el nacionalismo vasco.

Abstract: History in terms of its writing tends to record a clear division between the victorious and the vanquished of any conflict. Yet sometimes apparent winners and losers are determined by a subjective interpretation of the events that have both preceded and occurred during such conflicts, whether regional or global. This is often the case in what seem to be never-ending armed struggles, caught as they are between ongoing social and political tensions that prevent the sense of any clearly-defined victor, even years after these began.

The Northern Irish conflict is an example of this. Since the second half of the twentieth century, leading up to the approach of the new millennium, civil war was an ongoing threat between Catholic and Protestant communities. More than thirty years on, a developing but still frail peace is still in the process of being established within the region. Central to that process is consensus.

Through a retrospective analysis, this study focuses particularly on the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the factors underlying and supporting its peace processes, and how the multiple old readings of history can be set aside between perceived enemies in order to achieve a common goal. Furthermore, the study goes on to scrutinize the lessons that may be extrapolated from this particular case study to inform our understanding of other conflicts, such as the one inspired in the demands of Basque nationalism.

Keywords / Palabras clave: History, Peace Process, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Ulster, Troubles, Catholic, Protestant, Republican, Nationalist, Loyalist, Unionist, IRA, UVF, Spain, Basque, ETA, Government, Stormont, Madrid, Belfast, Dublin, Irish, Spanish.