Integration of Turkish Minorities in Germany

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1. Introduction[1]

The European Union is home to more than 500 million inhabitants[2] identifying with a very diverse range of religions, habits, conditions and backgrounds. The EU has been an immigration destination for the past decades and the integration of these immigrants from different geographical, ethnic and cultural backgrounds is a daunting challenge for the continent's politics and society. The United Kingdom, with Pakistanis and Indians; France, with Algerians; and Germany, with Turks, are the countries with the longest traditions of regularly massive influxes of foreign workers. Therefore, Germany's *Gastarbeiter* (guest-workers) agreements in the 60s and 70s paved the way to Turks becoming the most important migrant group in Germany.

This study will assess the state of integration of the Turkish minority in Germany, under the working hypothesis that deficits in political, cultural and economic integration reduces the likeliness of equal opportunities for citizens with Turkish immigration backgrounds vis-à-vis the native German population. By attending to this affirmation, this study will seek to verify the above-mentioned hypothesis by assessing the lack of integration of Turks in Germany in its political, cultural and economic dimensions.

In doing so, the study will use the term "Turks" or "Turkish minority" to denominate all permanent residents of Turkish origin in Germany, including all holders of German and Turkish citizenship, born in Turkey or in Germany.

In order to develop its argument, the present study will first provide an overview of the presence of Turkish immigrants in Germany, and then proceed to define the concept of a "good integration." It will then systematically assess the three dimensions of integration: political, cultural and economic. The primary questions answered will be as follows: firstly, up to what point are Turks politically integrated in the German society through both citizenship and active political participation? Secondly, how do language and religion influence the degree of integration of Turks in Germany? Thirdly, in what way does the economic factor influence in the level of integration of Turks in the German society?

The first level of integration, "Political Integration," is divided into two sections. These sections will be focused on the opportunities that Turkish immigrants have to be granted German citizenship and how the fact of possessing or lacking the German nationality can affect German politics. The second level of integration, "Cultural Integration," is also divided into two chapters, focusing on the impact of Islam in German society and the language deficits of immigrants of Turkish origin. Finally, the last level of integration, "Economic Integration," will expose how a good education and employment improve the economic integration.

In the final section, the study will revisit the working hypothesis and draw a number of conclusions regarding the state of integration of Turkish minorities in Germany and how it could be improved.

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[1]   Most literature used in this study is written by non-Turkish scholars and very little written by German citizens of Turkish origin. Therefore, it must be taken into account that the portrait sketched by most of the examined literature expresses objectively the poor level of integration of Turks in Germany. The goal of this dissertation is not to compare the points of view of German natives and German citizens of Turkish origin with respect to Turkish integration in Germany, but rather to study the integration from the Turkish side.

[2]   European Commission. Eurostat. "Population at 1 January 2012".

2. The turkish minority and the integration debates in Germany

2.1. The Turkish Minority in Germany

The Turkish community in Germany has been developing substantially since a series of recruitment agreements for temporary workers (*Gastarbeiter* or "guest-workers") between the German and the Turkish governments were concluded in the 1960s. These agreements were reached against the background of the pronounced workforce shortage Germany was experiencing in the 1950s due to its huge losses after the Second World War. During the subsequent years of rapid economic growth (*Wirtschaftswunder* or "economic miracle"), a large working force was needed to sustain growth. For this reason, Germany signed different economic contracts with Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain and Turkey.

The agreement with the latter was signed in a period in which Turkey was undergoing a difficult episode in providing employment opportunities domestically, hence the two countries' needs matched. However, as the term "guest worker" implied, Germans at the time did not imagine that those immigrating Turks, who were expected to stay in the country for a short period, would end up settling permanently in Germany[3], and that the issue of the integration of those immigrants would hence become an increasingly relevant domestic matter in German politics.

It is therefore still difficult for Turks to adapt to everyday life in the German society, not just because of differences in cultural and religious background, but also due to Germany's longstanding unwillingness to acknowledge its character as a primary destination for immigrants for 50 years[4]. This notion, until the late 1990s, formed the backbone of a collective rejection of permanent mass immigration, which led to numerous social tensions and fuelled a continuing social and political debate on integration and its criteria.

The following table shows figures on the total number of foreigners residing in Germany, as well as their country of origin:

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[3] The so-called "family-reunification" policy was a contributor to the decision of staying in Germany as well as the education of their children, the lack of economic opportunities in Turkey, and the development of technology connecting Germany with Turkey.

[4] In public debates, this attitude was often expressed by the formula: *Deutschland is kein Einwanderungsland* ("Germany is not an immigration country").

Table 1: Foreigners in Germany: Top 30 countries and EU Member States[5]

Total		6,753,620
EU citizens (EU-27)		2,443,202
– of which: New EU Member States		819,942
Third-country nationals		4,310,418

	Main countries of origin	
1	Turkey	1,629,480
2	Italy	517,546
3	Poland	419,435
4	Serbia*	335,332
5	Greece	276,685
6	Croatia	220,199
7	Russian Federation	191,270
8	Austria	175,244
9	Bosnia and Herzegovina	152,444
10	Netherlands	136,274
11	Romania	126,536
12	Ukraine	124,293
13	Portugal	113,208
14	Kosovo	108,797
15	France	108,675
16	Spain	105,401
17	United States of America	97,732
18	United Kingdom	96,016
19	Vietnam	84,301
20	China	81,331
21	Iraq	81,272
22	Bulgaria	74,869
23	Hungary	68,891
24	Macedonia	65,998
25	Morocco	63,570
26	Thailand	56,153
27	Iran	51,885
28	Afghanistan	51,305
29	Kazakhstan	51,007
30	India	48,280

*Including persons recorded under the former country names "Yugoslavia", "Serbia-Montenegro" and "Serbia or Kosovo".

Source: Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011

Since the late 50s and early 60s, three generations of Turks have now been living in Germany, and the differences between first-, second- and third-generation migrants are pronounced. Ayça Kılıçlı distinguishes two major groups: the so-called *Gastarbeiter*, on the one hand, and their children and grandchildren born in Germany, or second- and third-generation Turks[6]. Graph 1, below, shows the percentage of Turks residing in Germany by age, which also shows how many of them belong to each of the generations mentioned.

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[5] Federal Ministry of Interior (2011). "Migration and Integration. Residence law and policy on migration and integration in Germany".

[6] Kılıçlı, Ayça (2003). "Turkish Migrants in Germany, Prospects of Integration". *EU-Turkish Relations Dossier*. Observatory of European Foreign Policy. 2.

Graphic 1: Age Structure of Turks Permanently Residing in Germany (in percent)[7]

Source: Federal Office of Migration and Refugees, 2009

The guest-workers, or first generation migrants, account for about a quarter of the Turkish population in Germany[8]. Characteristics of this generation are those typical of many newcomers: they arrived not speaking the local language and with the expectation of a temporary stay, and thus tended to construct their own communities in parallel to the German mainstream community, which were conducive to an in-depth integration of first-generation Turks into the German society. Being surrounded by Turkish shops, supermarkets, newsagent`s and neighbors made learning the language of the host country unnecessary. Moreover, first-generation migrants were mostly unskilled laborers, and their lack of education and of specific profession caused them to be recognized as part of a low social class with a very poor education. At the same time, their ties to Turkey remained strong. As a result of these factors, first-generation migrants tended to see integration as unnecessary because, with the idea of an eventual return in mind, their main purpose was to uphold the culture and traditions of their Turkish origins. For the same reason, these immigrants did not consider the adoption of German citizenship. As a result, segregation has hence been an outstanding characteristic of first-generation Turks in Germany.

It is the second- and third-generation of Turkish migrants in Germany, however, that will be the focus of this study. These groups present different characteristics that distinguish them from the generations of their parents and grand-parents, respectively. Born and raised in Germany, they mostly speak German fluently and have a very different level of appropriation of German everyday life, and have easier access to citizenship. They show greater willingness to integrate into the mainstream of German society. They are altogether better educated and professionally trained than the former guest workers. However, even among second- and third-generation Turks, many preserve or are obliged to preserve (by their families and social environment) the Turkish culture and traditions. A consequence of this reality is an identity shaped especially in young Turks living in Germany, a *hybrid identity*, as it has been called by Naika Foroutan[9]. For these young second- and third-generation Turks, the parallel existence of two different cultures shaping their lives is something normal. They combine the customs and habits acquired by the mainstream German society with the ones transmitted to them in their family environment. Their *hybrid identities* are characterized by their feeling "that they belong to more than one cultural sphere[10]." Their sense of belonging is quite confused; they do not feel entirely

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[7] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam".

[8] Kılıçlı, Ayça (2003). "Turkish migrants in Germany, Prospects of Integration". *EU-Turkish Relations Dossier.* Observatory of European Foreign Policy. 2.

[9] Naika Foroutan, quoted in: Mershc, Britta (2012). "Young Moslems wish to lay their part in shaping Germany". An interview with Naika Foroutan". *Goethe Institüt*. Available at: http://www.goethe.de/ges/phi/red/en9494836.htm

[10] Ibid.

German because their parents and grand-parents originated from a different country, but they do not feel entirely Turkish because they were born and raised in Germany, inevitably altering their attitudes compared to first migrant generations. Although they lack the strong ties that connect the first-generation Turks with their Turkish homeland, elements of these ties are passed from one generation to the other.

Extreme examples of the (voluntary or forced) preservation of Turkish traditions among second- and third-generation Turks which receive widespread attention are arranged marriages, and conservative social customs, which Turkish women are especially obliged by their families to maintain. These examples will be explained in the section "Cultural Integration."

2.2. The Concept of "Integration"

Interpretations of the concept of integration of migrant minorities into receiving societies differ, as do views of what constitutes a potentially "good" or "successful" integration.

With "integration" constituting a fundamental concept and key subject of this study, the present section provides an overview of the different debates and definitions this notion has been given in contemporary public debates in Germany conditioning the country´s integration policies since the first recruitment-programs during the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to the above-mentioned longstanding non-acceptance of the German state and society of the fact that they are a country of immigration, the main concepts of integration under discussion have been those of multiculturalism, assimilation, and the debate on *Leitkultur* ("Leading culture").[11] Revisiting these competing concepts will be the key to understand the challenges that both the receiving country and the migrants are facing. In addition, this section of the study will also introduce the more recent concept of interculturality as a new social phenomenon defined by the German journalist and migration expert Mark Terkessidis.

The International Labor Organization defines integration as the "level at which immigrants have adopted the cultural traits of their host society."[12] However, this is a rather controversial definition because the word "adopt" suggests that a process of assimilation (in the sense of fully merging with the host society in cultural, political and economic terms) should be undertaken in order to become part of the host society. In the European context, the assimilation model of integration is most notably adopted in France, where integration measures envisage a full integration of migrants with the aim of maintaining the relative cultural homogeneity of society. By contrast, Germany´s position towards integration has not been following the assimilation model, although many among the German political elite in recent years advocate for a stronger assimilation focus.

In contrast to the assimilation model, advocates of multiculturalism propagate that in order a society to become multicultural; there must be a "legal and political accommodation of ethnic diversity."[13] For a country to undertake a successful multiculturalism, there are some conditions that must be taken into account. Those in favor of carrying out multicultural policies advocate for social relations between the state and minorities without taking these relations as security issues. In the same way, they also advocate for a respect on ethnic and religious diversity which rests in the defense of human rights. Multiculturalism will probably fail when

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[11]   *Leitkultur* was first introduced by the German political scientist of Syrian origins, Bassam Tibi.

[12]   ILO (International Labor Organization) (1998). "Integration Policies Germany". 5.

[13]   Kymlicka, Will (2012). "Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future". Transatlantic Council on Migration. Queen's University. 1.

states see that some minorities are unable to respect human rights as well as when a sense of border insecurity exists. Multiculturalism will be a successful policy when immigrant diversity exists –when migrants come from different countries and not just from one– because the latter brings controversies and polarized relations between the mainstream society and the minority.[14] Finally, the feeling that minorities are contributing economically within a community will also bring a successful multiculturalism.

With the aim of finding a solution to the possible failure of multiculturalism within European communities, there have been numerous debates carried out. One such debate is the previously mentioned debate on the so-called *Leitkultur* introduced at the end of the 1990s by the political scientist Bassam Tibi, who advocates a European "leading culture" based on democratic rules combined with a European values structure. His idea of the European *Leitkultur* "is based on the foundation of a democratic community whose members are bound together through a collective identity as citizens of that community."[15] In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, Tibi stated these as the main requirements to following order to solve the widespread problems created by what he calls open societies, European countries, and its "enemies", in this case Muslim societies.

The integration policies adopted by Germany have remained somewhere between these two poles, multiculturalism and assimilation. Germany cannot be considered as a multicultural society because according to Germany's chancellor Angela Merkel, by October 2010, "attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have utterly failed."[16] The reason of this failure is probably the inexistence of the previous mentioned conditions for successful multiculturalism. Germany perceives relations with minorities, especially with Muslim minorities, as a security issue rather than as a social issue. The same way, this European country has the feeling that those minorities are unable or unwilling to respect human rights, and that they do not contribute economically. Therefore, "this alleged policy of multiculturalism is blamed for current conflicts in a culturally diverse society. [Hence] the idea of a German *Leitkultur* (leading culture) and an assimilationist approach to integration are reinforced."[17] Comparing the case of Germany with the cases of Canada and the United Kingdom, which are often considered to be among the purest examples for multicultural society; German policies of integration courses, naturalization tests and the obligation of learning German, among others, show an increasing German desire to demand a minimum degree of assimilation from migrants. Therefore, in accordance to the failure of the German multicultural society, members of the German political elite took advantage of Tibi's debate on *Leitkultur* by advocating for the necessity of a German leading-culture to which all immigrants must adhere. The CDU politician Jörg Schönbohm reinforces the idea of the German version of the *Leitkultur* by ensuring that,

> "In the Middle Ages, ghettos were founded to marginalize the Jews. Today, some of the foreigners who live with us here in Germany have founded their own ghettos because they scorn us Germans. Those who come here have to adopt the German *Leitkultur*. Our history has developed over a thousand years... We can't allow that this basis of our commonality be destroyed by foreigners."[18]

The degree to which integration should involve the mandatory adoption of domestic social, cultural, political and economic features in both public and private life has been subject to intensive debate. A polemic debate

[14] Kymlicka, Will (2012). "Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future". Transatlantic Council on Migration. Queen's University. 2.

[15] Musharbash, Yassin (2004). "Muslim Integration: Why Europe Needs a "Leading Culture". *Spiegel Online, International.* Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/muslim-integration-why-europe-needs-a-leading-culture-a-329784.html

[16] BBC News Europe (2010). "Merkel says German multicultural society has failed". Available on the Internet at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451

[17] Miera, Frauke (2007). "Multiculturalism Debates in Germany". European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder. 2.

[18] Hawley, Charles (2004). "Muslim Integration: Germany`s Pseudo Culture War". *Spiegel Online, International.* Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/muslim-integration-germany-s-pseudo-culture-war-a-329248.html

has been generated by SPD member Thilo Sarrazin and his book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* ("Germany abolishes itself") published in the year 2010,[19] where he refers to the "effects of immigration, the shrinking birth-rate in Germany and the growth of a social "underclass"[20] by stating that Germany is being conquered "the same way the Kosovars conquered Kosovo: by using higher birth-rates."[21] He contends that the German identity is being damaged by the Muslim minority, which is less intelligent than the German society in general.[22] In sum, Sarrazin advocates for a more restrictive immigration due to the unwillingness of especially the Muslim minority to integrate into the German community.[23] His decision is clear and final: "immigrants must integrate, or leave the country."[24]

Sarrazin´s views, which have been heavily criticized as representing and reinforcing racist stereotypes against Turks, were also lauded by some as a rare instance of speaking the truth in a debate marked by political correctness.[25]

In response to these kinds of ideas, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, gave a speech in Düsseldorf in 2011, where he famously encouraged Turks living in Germany to first study Turkish and then German[26], which led to an outcry in the German media and among the political elite. Erdogan also expressed his desire that Turkish immigrants living in Germany should undergo a process of integration but emphasized the fact that they should not assimilate because they are not just part of Germany, but also part of Turkey.[27] Erdogan`s words fell on fertile ground in a society where pro-assimilation positions are increasingly gaining ground due to the failure of integration of large parts of the Turkish community living in Germany.

Most recently, Mark Terkessidis introduced the concept of *inter-culture* by focusing on the idea of "diversity" and the notion of the *parapolis*, or city as laboratory of the future. According to this migration expert, diversity should be considered in a positive way and taken as a resource for helping society not just to co-exist but also to live together. In order to achieve a successful inter-culture, *social routine*, institutions and political projects should be transformed with the objective of including everyone living in Germany to the social activities. The starting point to this project should be the *parapolis* that serves as a clear example of the result of interculturality.[28]

From multiculturalism, the so-called *Leitkultur* introduced by the political scientist Bassam Tibi and Mark Terkessidis` interculturality, to the concept of assimilation that is gaining more relevance in the German public and political sphere, Germany`s stance towards integration over the past three decades has not explicitly or clearly adopted either of the proposed models, and has also been marked by the opinions and ideologies of the different political parties of subsequent governments. As a result, current German integration policies involve multiculturalist as well as assimilative elements.

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[19] For more information: Sarrazin, Thilo (2010). *Deutschland shafft sich a: Wie wir unser Land auf Spiel setzen.*

[20] ESI (European Stability Initiative) (2010). "The Great Debate: Germany, Turkey and the Turks. Part I: Intellectuals". 12.

[21] Ibid., 13.

[22] Abadi, Cameron (2013). "Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Euro, Germany's Thilo Sarrazin is Not Sorry". *Bloomberg Businessweek, Global Economics*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-23/anti-immigrant-and-anti-euro-germanys-thilo-sarrazin-is-not-sorry

[23] Switzer, Jane (2011). "Thilo Sarrazin spreads his word on Muslim immigration". *Maclean's*. Available in the Internet at: http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/02/02/thilo-sarrazin-spreads-his-word/

[24] Ibid.

[25] Thilo Sarrazin's ideas have been heavily criticized by minority groups such as Jews, Muslims and the poor. At the same time, he has also been criticized by most German political parties. However, his book has been a bestselling and has gained a lot of relevance within the German society.

[26] Lindsey, Daryl (2011). "The World from Berlin: "Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Wants to Be the Father". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-turkish-prime-minister-erdogan-wants-to-be-the-father-a-748379.html

[27] Gezer, Özler and Reimann, Anna (2011). "Erdogan Urges Turks Not To Assimilate: "You Are Part Of Germany, But Also Part Of Our Great Turkey". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-748070.html

[28] For more information: Terkessidis, Mark (2010). *Interkultur*. Berlin, Edition Shurkamp.

For the purpose of this study, integration is considered successful when the following elements are present: multicultural elements, which will ensure respect of ethnic and religious diversity from mainstream society, and assimilative elements, which will guarantee the peaceful and efficient coexistence of both groups due to the minority's adoption of specific elements such as the official language of the receiving country. The combination of multicultural and assimilative elements, from both the immigrants' and the host society's side, will make integration a successful process that, in this case, will bring equal opportunities for the Turkish minority representatives in the political, cultural and economic dimensions.

3. Equal opportunities through integration

Based on the definition of a "successful" integration offered above, this section will aim to systematically assess the different criteria of the integration process by showing how Turks living in Germany have been dealing with the economic, cultural and political dimensions of integration.

In this context, the concept of "parallel societies", introduced by the German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer in the early 1990s, deserves special attention. The concept denominates self-organized communities of an ethnic or religious minority inside of and largely segregated from the rest of the host society. Parallel societies are constructed in parallel to the mainstream German social order. While Germans live their lives in accordance to German policies, culture and traditions, some minorities live according to the cultural (and at times even political or legal) rules of a separate enclave order. Most notably, the concept of parallel societies has been applied to Muslim neighborhoods in major cities such as Berlin, Stuttgart or Cologne. Often considered both as a cause for and as a consequence of the non-integration of immigrants, parallel societies are of high relevance to the German integration debate as a worst-case scenario for failed integration.

This section is divided into three sub-sections: political, cultural and economic integration. Firstly, the section on the political integration of the Turkish minority will specifically assess the role of citizenship for the integration of ethnic Turks on the one hand, and on degree of political participation, both active and passive, of the Turkish minority on the other. Secondly, the cultural integration of the Turkish minority in Germany will be assessed based on two sub-criteria: religion and language. In this context, clashes between German majority-Christian society and Muslims living are paid special attention.

The third and final part of this section will deal with the economic integration of Turks in the German labor market. Education and employment play a very important role in the economic integration.

These three criteria are complementary with each other and the degree of integration undertaken in each of the sections will determine the level of full integration of Turks residing in Germany as well as the level of equal opportunities. In accordance with the working hypotheses outlined in the introduction, this part of the study will try to demonstrate how Turks living in Germany lack equal opportunities as a consequence of an insufficient political, cultural and economic integration. Therefore, having the same opportunities as German natives involves not just legal issues, such as the holding of citizenship, but also a great effort and a clear willingness from the immigrant`s side to undertake an effective and productive integration process which will allow a better coexistence of both communities.

4. Equal opportunities through political integration

4.1. Political Integration

In this section, the Turkish minority's political participation will be assessed in accordance to the previously mentioned criteria: citizenship, from the reformed Nationality Act onwards, and the influence of the political participation of Turks in German political life.

For the completion of this chapter, this study will be focused on the most significant reforms of the Nationality Act undertaken first in the year 1993 and later by the political party SPD in the year 2000, which opened the doors of citizenship for migrants. The duty of this sub-section will also be to explain the impact of the latter reform on the Turkish population residing in Germany.

Secondly, the study will also be focused on the political participation of the Turks. Naturalization is a requisite that must be completed if the immigrant wants to vote or run for office. This is an important part of the political integration of the migrant because participating in politics, both actively and passively, means having a voice in the political issues concerning the country. This sub-section will demonstrate how the political landscape in Germany can change when it comes to the election of the governing party, coalitions, Turkish members in parliament or the so-called "representation gap."[29]

4.1.1. Citizenship

Holding citizenship of the receiving society is paramount for integration because, in many cases, "it avoids the need for a work permit; entails full protection against expulsion, enables access to public employment, decreases administrative difficulties, and, in the EU context, allows for mobility within the European Union without a visa."[30] These rights will allow migrants to better participate in issues concerning the receiving country that will result in a better coexistence between natives and the new citizens of distinct origins and a more complete integration into the host society.

Around 2.7 million residents of Turkish origin live in Germany currently, of which around 1 million (40%) have German nationality.[31] The next graphic shows the number of Muslim Turks with German citizenship as well as Muslim immigrants from other regions also holding German nationality:

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[29] Aktürk, Sener (2010). "The Turkish minority in German politics: Trends, Diversification of Representation, and Policy Implications". *Insight Turkey*. 71-72.

[30] Faist, Thomas and Gerder, Jürgen (2008). "Dual citizenship in an age of mobility". Transatlantic Council on Migration, Bielefeld University. 9.

[31] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam". 294.

Graphic 2: Number of Muslims Holding German Citizenship by Region of Origin (in thousands)[32]

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009

Generally, citizenship law distinguishes between two fundamental legal principles that have a significant impact on the openness of a society to welcome new arrivals among their citizenry: *ius soli* ("law of the soil") and *ius sanguinis* ("law of the blood or descent"). Under the first criterion, citizenship is granted not only to children of native descent but also to anyone born on national territory, so relatives of immigrants can become citizens. The "law of the soil" principle is characteristic, for example, for long-standing immigration societies in the Americas and Pacific, and has in Europe traditionally found its purest application in France. In Germany and a number of other European countries, by contrast, the other principle of *ius sanguinis* has been predominant, which attaches great importance to the origins of the family when determining eligibility for citizenship. In other words, while the *ius soli* principle defines a country's citizenry predominantly as a political community, the *ius sanguinis* principle defines it as a predominantly ethnic community.

Although contemporary citizenship laws in practically all EU Member States reflect a combination between both principles, the emphasis of citizenship laws on ethnic criteria does not combine well with the continent's identity as a major immigration destination. This applies especially to Germany, where the strong ethnic component of citizenship laws has constituted a significant obstacle to the formal political integration of immigrants through citizenship. It also leads to certain paradoxes, such as the ease with which many ethnic, German-descent immigrants from Eastern European countries (*Aussiedler*[33]) are granted German citizenship for historical reasons, in spite of having very little connection to German society otherwise; this ease of obtaining citizenship contrasts with the at times significant obstacles faced by ethnic Turks who have spent large parts of their lives in Germany.

The German Nationality Act 1913, which determines eligibility for German citizenship, was reformed in 1993. According to the law, criteria to acquire German citizenship from 1993 to the next reform of the law in 2000 were "fifteen years of legal and permanent residency in the Federal Republic, or eight years for foreigners between 16 and 23 years of age."[34] In 2000, the Nationality Act was again reformed by Gerhard Schröder's SPD,

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[32] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam".

[33] These immigrants are descendants of German colonists who moved to settle in the Eastern parts of Europe in earlier centuries. They are also called ethnic German resettlers and they have received the status of refugees.

[34] Özcan, Veysel (2005). "Citizenship". BPB (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung).

increasing the weight of *ius soli* in acquiring citizenship. From January 1st 2000 onwards, children of non-German parents automatically acquire German citizenship if one of the parent had lived legally and permanently in Germany for at least eight years before the child's birth.

An additional policy to facilitate integration was the introduction of Naturalization tests in the year 2008. For the German Federal Government,

> "Naturalization is a key step on the way to successful integration because it gives political immigrants numerous possibilities to participate in society. At the same time, naturalization demonstrates that the immigrant is accepted by German society."[35]

The main purpose of these tests is to make those who want to be naturalized conscious that if they want to be granted the German citizenship, they first must prove a specific level of proficiency in the German language as well as "knowledge of the legal and social system and living conditions in Germany."[36]

Other prerequisites such as fluency in the German language, no criminal records, loyalty to the Constitution and a source of financial subsistence are also mandatory requirements for the acquisition of German citizenship. The new criteria amplified the grounds on which German nationality is granted, adjusting to some extent German citizenship legislation to the realities of a migrant society. The reformed Nationality Act fell short, however, of foreseeing dual citizenship. In the year 1999, a national campaign against the allowance of dual citizenship for second and third generation immigrants, spearheaded by the conservative party CDU, collected more than 5 million signatures from across the country.[37] Defenders of the campaign stressed that those who automatically acquired the nationality when they were born should decide which of the citizenships they wanted to maintain because it was impossible to keep both of them. This was a question of loyalty to Germany and the German Constitution because according to a large section of the German conservative sector, maintaining the passport of your country of origin while holding the German passport will not ensure a full and true allegiance to Germany.[38] The campaign was very successful; hence the legal impossibility of keeping both nationalities was implemented and the age period for deciding about this issue is between 18 and 23 years of age. Moreover if one fails to demonstrate his or her refusal of the non-German nationality directly he or she loses his or her German citizenship by default.

However, there exist three exceptional cases in which German legislation admits dual citizenship: when the legislation of the country of origin does not allow citizens to resign their nationality (as is the case, for example, in Iran or Syria); in the case of the previously mentioned *Aussiedler*, who have a special permission from the German government to maintain their former citizenship;[39] and in the case of citizens of other European Union member states and Switzerland, who are allowed to retain their original citizenship and German citizenship at the same time.

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[35] Federal Ministry of the Interior. "Naturalization test". Available on the Internet at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/MigrationIntegration/Nationality/NaturalizationTest/naturalization_test_node.html

[36] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. "What is the naturalization test?" Available in the Internet at: http://www.bamf.de/EN/Einbuergerung/WasEinbuergerungstest/waseinbuergerungstest-node.html

[37] Ehrkamp, Patricia and Leitner, Helga. "Beyond national citizenship: Turkish immigrants and the (re)construction of German citizenship". Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, 6.

[38] Young, Mark (2011). "A dual citizenship double standard in Germany". *The Local.* Available on the Internet at: http://www.thelocal.de/opinion/20111026-38467.html

[39] Özcan, Veysel (2005). "Citizenship". BPB (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung).

The above-mentioned conditions for the acquisition of citizenship have had an important impact on the integration capacities of the Turkish population living in Germany, the largest non-German minority residing in the country.[40] However, the impossibility of retaining both nationalities puts a serious constraint on Turks in particular, given that the three exceptions for dual citizenship previously exposed do not apply to the Turkish case. Hence, Turkish citizens willing to acquire German citizenship are forced to renounce the former, which many are reluctant to do. The debate on the dual-citizenship is therefore again gaining relevance in the German political sphere. The government formed by the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition rejects the acquisition of the dual-citizenship, although divisions within the governing parties are emerging on this point. While the CDU/CSU, whose members argue that this is a matter of loyalty to the German State,[41] opposes a broadening of the dual citizenship provisions, the FDP increasingly supports the restrictions, in line with great parts of the left-wing opposition. Some conservative voices see opposition efforts to push for more liberal citizenship legislation as attempts to appease the migrant votership in view of the upcoming elections.[42]

As a matter of fact, Turks would be the immigrant group that would most benefit from a liberalization of dual citizenship provisions. Critics affirm that abolishing the option model currently in force (having to choose between two nationalities), which would disappear if dual citizenship was permitted on regular basis, is generating sentiments of discrimination towards the Turkish community residing in Germany. At the same time, the possibility of retaining both nationalities would make naturalization much more attractive to many Turkish immigrants, and hence increase their likeliness of acquiring German citizenship which in turn permits their access to social security, employment, education, and it also creates a sense of belonging. Thus, the allowance of dual citizenship in Germany would probably promote a more effective integration process, as well as an increasing loyalty to Germany, because with a sense of belonging and the rights granted by dual citizenship, migrants could better participate in social activities within the host country without feeling discriminated against or unwanted.

4.1.2. Political Participation

Being naturalized grants a new German citizen the rights not only to vote in the elections, but also to run as a candidate for public political office. This bears a substantial potential for political influence for the Turkish minority in the German society and politics both as a political force and as an important electoral campaign target. The weight of the Turkish vote in Germany, the degree to which Turks are represented in parliament and overall Turkish participation in German politics are valid indicators of the degree of political integration of German citizens of Turkish background.

Previous to the 2000 reform on the German Nationality Act, a very small number of immigrants held German nationality. Therefore, with the aim of giving more migrants the right to vote and to be voted into office, the debates on a possible liberalization of the acquisition of citizenship finally brought a more opened Nationality Act in the year 2000.[43] However, from the approximately 3 million migrants of Turkish origin living in Germany, very few are the ones who own the German citizenship and therefore the right to actively

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[40]   Yentl Solari, Sarah (2008). "German Nationality: An Illustration of Institutionalized Discrimination". Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 34.

[41]   Dempsey, Judy (2013). "A Difficult Choice for Turks in Germany". *The New York Times, Europe*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/europe/16iht-letter16.html?_r=0

[42]   Ibid.

[43]   Groenendijk, Kees (2008). "Local Voting Rigths for Non-Nationals in Europe: What We Know and What We Need to Learn". Transatlantic Council on Migration. University of Nijmegen.. 7.

or passively participate in German politics. As a result, Turks without German nationality "do not display interest in their integration into German politics and society. Instead, they are occupied by homeland political struggles."[44]

Regarding the voting patterns, Turks vote predominantly leftist parties. This characteristic voting behavior stems from the fact that in the 1970, labor unions were the only institutions in which immigrants could become politically active, and because leftist parties were considered to be defending classical immigrant demands more forcefully. However, cultural ethnographer Sener Aktürk speaks of a "representation gap", referring to the paradox that Turkish minority has been represented mostly by centre-left political parties despite their conservative attitudes towards some of the aspects of the German society. This situation can sometimes lead to political controversies, for example when "the conservative social, cultural, and religious views of the Turkish minority are not expressed by their political representatives."[45] However, it must not be forgotten that the social position occupied by the people forming this ethnic group is an immigrant's position. Even if most of the Turks have conservative views towards social, cultural and religious topics, their vote in Germany appears to prioritize solutions to specific immigrant problems, which leftist and social-democratic parties are seen to provide more than other political currents.

The table below shows how many members of the German parliament claim Turkish origins as well as their political tendencies.

Table 2: Number of Deputies of Turkish Origin in the Bundestag, by Party and Legislative Term[46]

Term	Left	Green	SPD	FDP	CDU/CSU	Total
2009-2013	1	2	1	1	--	5
2005-2009	3	1	1	-	--	5
2002-2005	-	2	1	-	--	3
1998-2002	-	2	1	-	--	3
1994-1998	-	1	1	-	--	2

Source: Insight Turkey, 2010

From 1994 to 2009, a clear increase of representatives of Turkish origin can be observed. Strikingly, the table also reveals the marked bias of Turkish representation in leftist and centre-left parties, whereas the conservative parties have not had a single deputy of Turkish origin during that period. Nevertheless, it is important to mention the presence of various CDU members of Turkish origin such as the State Chairman of the North-Rhine Westphalia CDU[47] or in the Duisburg CDU[48]. It must be noted that the real number of Turks living in Germany is considerably higher than the number of German citizens with Turkish origin. On the one hand, the fact that there are five Members of Parliament with Turkish origin appears very small when aspiring

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[44] Tol, Gonul. "A comparative study of the integration of Turks in Germany and the Netherlands". Middle East Institute, Center for Turkish Studies, Washington DC. 10.

[45] Aktürk, Sener (2010). "The Turkish minority in German politics: Trends, Diversification of Representation, and Policy Implications". *Insight Turkey*, 72.

[46] Ibid., 67.

[47] Bülent Arslan.

[48] Mehmet Yildirim.

to represent the approximately 2.5 to 3 million Turks residing in Germany without holding German citizenship, but on the other hand, they could be argued to adequately represent the just over one million German voters of Turkish origin.

The fact that those one million Germans of Turkish origin are well represented in German parliament by those five deputies of Turkish origin, who at the same time disproportionately represent the total Turkish population living in Germany, results in several controversies regarding the concept of the "representation gap" and the (in international comparison) disproportionally low ratio of Turkish parliamentarians compared to Turks living in Germany. To what degree are the Turkish parliamentarians representing the Turkish community and its demands? And conversely, do politicians need to be of Turkish origin to effectively defend immigrant rights? Can one assume that politicians of Turkish origin always represent Turkish interests better than native German politicians? By responding affirmatively to this question one would be directly asserting that one of the main reasons for those German politicians of Turkish origin entering politics is to defend the rights and interests of Turkish immigrants, which would mean that one is directly admitting and accepting the lack of integration of Turks within the German society.

Non-exhaustive political participation from the Turks living in Germany leads to a poor political integration of this minority group into the German society. Taking into account Germany's Nationality Act, naturalization is a requisite for active or passive participation in German politics. As the majority of the Turkish community does not possess the German citizenship, the Turkish presence in German politics, political parties and parliament is reduced. At the same time, one can assume that the existent politicians of Turkish origins do not enter politics with the obligation of intensively representing the German-Turks or Turkish immigrants and their interests, hence the "representation gap" above mentioned exists.

5. Equal opportunities through cultural integration

5.1. Cultural Integration

The degree to which religious differences bear potential conflict between immigrants and their host society and fluency in the German language are key indicators approximate the degree of cultural integration of the Turkish minority in Germany.

Controversial issues frequently ascribed to religious and/or cultural differences include extreme examples of arranged marriages, and conservative social customs which Turkish women are especially obliged by their families to maintain. Rather than being ascribed to actual religious obligations, however, such extreme instances of cultural conflicts are more frequently considered as being based on extremist social conservative attitudes among immigrants, which reach beyond religious or cultural matters. Necla Kelek, a German writer of Turkish origin, relates arranged and forced marriages and the enslavement of Turkish women in her book *Die fremde Braut* ("The strange bride").[49] In March 2011, the German parliament passed a law which makes

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[49]   For more information: Kelek. Necla (2005). *Die fremde Braut. Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Lebens in Deutschland*. Köln, Kiepenheuer und Witsch Verlag.

forced marriages illegal and punishable with up to five year imprisonment. It also grants non-German citizens the legal right to return to the country if they have been taken abroad against their will.[50]

The double lives that especially third-generation Turkish women lead, serve also as example of the willingness that some Turkish families have to impose their daughters the Turkish culture, habits and traditions. As Güner Balci explains in an article in *Der Spiegel Online*:

> Young Muslim women are often forced to lead double lives in Europe. They have sex in public restrooms and stuff mobile phones in their bras to hide their secret existences from strict families. They are often forbidden from visiting gynecologists or receiving sex education. In the worst cases, they undergo hymen reconstruction surgery, have late-term abortions or even commit suicide. [51]

These examples show how the situation of lots of second- and third-generation Turks, especially the situation of Turkish women, tends to jeopardize their integration processes which let us think that differences between first-generation and second- and third-generations are sometimes not so remarkable.

5.1.1. Religion

Around 4 million Muslims reside in Germany from which a 63.2 percent are of Turkish origins.[52] The recognition of Islam as an official state religion is controversially debated in most European Union Member States. Germany gives an official status to Judaism and Christianity, but not to Islam.[53] Thus, the Islamic religion cannot participate in important sectors of the German society such as education. They do not have access to public schools, hospitals, and other welfare institutions. As a consequence of this non-recognition of the Islam as an official state religion, "Islamic organizations' institutionalization is unregulated"[54] by the German government which can cause a feeling of discrimination, which undermines the freedom of religion guaranteed by the German constitution and is unfavorable to the integration of Muslims into the German society.

Unlike the Jewish and Christian faiths, Islam has *per se* no centralized institutional hierarchy (such as the pope), so recognizing Islam as an official religion encounters the problem of having no central institution that is recognized by all Muslims as their superior authority and representative with whom to conduct official business. Some widespread Islamic umbrella organizations have been created to forego this problem (DITIB[55]). These institutions work as registered associations, which imply they must have a democratic structure with a list of all the members working and participating in the institution. They are created in order to defend rights for Muslims and so that they may continue with their traditions and cultural issues in a public way. However, not being regulated the same way Christianity and Judaism are means that unlike other religious representative institutions, Islam does not have a direct say on important social aspects such as education. Due to this reason, the Turkish government participates strongly in the regulation of the lives of

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[50] Johnson, Alan (2011). "Germany Calls Time on Forced Marriages". *World Affairs*. Available on the Internet at: https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CD4QFjAB&url=http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alan-johnson/germany-calls-time-forced-marriages&ei=Nzt5UemxFc6A7Qa34oDwCw&usg=AFQjCNFMjh6VWNBBBSwBSl2wJmJWSDJ3Lg&sig2=L812CUReOPiG4DP4TWbYVA

[51] Balci, Güner (2011). "Forbidden Love: Taboos and Fear among Muslim Girls". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/forbidden-love-taboos-and-fear-among-muslim-girls-a-737683.html

[52] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam".

[53] Tol, Gonul (2008). "Institutionalization of Islam in Germany and the Netherlands: beyond EU jurisdiction". Florida International University, Department of Political Science. 3.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi (the Religious Authority's Turkish Islamic Associations).

Turks living in Germany by providing them with places for worship or religious education by bringing imams from Turkey to Germany.

The DITIB, which provides religious services and attentions to Turkish immigrants residing in Germany, was established in Germany in the year 1985 as a formal representation of the Turkish government for religious matters abroad. It supports the inter-cultural dialogue between the Turkish and the German governments and expresses its political neutrality by claiming it "do[es] not take a political position, and that religion must be kept separate from politics."[56] Working with this clear idea of purpose motivates them to not interfere with the relations between both governments. On the other side of the spectrum, the Islamist organization Milli Görüs,[57] previously named Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilati (AMGT[58]), created in Germany and banned by the Turkish government for "violating Turkey's laic legislation",[59] has established itself in Germany with over 26.500 members and around 2.200 facilities such as mosques and clubs and sports clubs for women and young people.[60] Far from DITIB's neutrality, the German Ministry of the Interior sees Milli Görüs as a more radical organization and as a threat for the German democratic society. It is also accused of wanting to "infiltrate" radical Islamist ideology and lifestyle into the Turkish immigrant community in Germany. The basis of this organization lies in the demands they make of certain rights for Muslims, such as Islamic education in public schools, the possibility of carrying out rituals in which they kill animals or cemeteries just for Muslims.

While the DITIB is to some degree controlled by the German government and understands and supports the Turkish State's secular status as well as the limitations that Islam should have in Europe, Milli Görüs is an independent organization[61] with a more radical view of what the "European Islam" should be.

Contrary to Islamist ideologies from currents such as Milli Görüs that largely try to circumvent integration of the Turkish community in Germany, others have come forward with more accommodating concepts of integration for Muslims in Germany that seek to reconcile freedom of religion with harmonious coexistence under the umbrella of the German constitution. One example is the concept of "European Islam", or "Euro-Islam" by the previously mentioned Bassam Tibi (and others). This concept propagates the integration of Muslims into the European society, culture and values through the development of a specific "European" brand of Islam. By encouraging and supporting inter-religious dialogue and open discussions between Christian and Muslim politicians and students, defenders of "Euro-Islam" argue that conflicts and "cultural clashes" can be prevented. Mutual understanding and respect should form the base to overcome problems and disputes that the presence of Muslims in Western cultures can create. Tibi emphasizes the need for Muslims residing in the European Union to become European citizens by integrating into the mainstream societies and accepting the separation of the state from religion in Europe. The non-acceptance of these principles, he argues, is likely to reinforce the development of parallel societies, and with them, substantial potential for conflict. Another religious scholar, Tariq Ramadan, says that Muslims "need to separate Islamic principles from their cultures of origin and anchor them in the cultural reality of Western Europe."[62] However, Ramadan contends that in order to construct an effective Euro-Islam, Europeans should also start by accepting that Islam is a European religion.

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[56] Yurdakul, Gökçe (2006). "Islam, Conflicts and Immigrant Incorporation in Germany: the cases of DITIB and Milli Görüs". 6th Biennial Conference of ECSA-C (European Community Studies Association-Canada). 7.

[57] National Vision.

[58] European Organization for the National Opinion.

[59] Gonul, Tol (2008). "Institutionalization of Islam in Germany and the Netherlands: Beyond EU Jurisdiction". Florida International University, Department of Political Science. 8.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Although under tight observation of the German Constitutional Protection.

[62] Le Quesne, Nicholas (2000). "Trying to bridge a great divide". *Time Magazine*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,998765,00.html

The leader of the Milli Görüs, Mustafa Yeneroğlu, expressed with the term "European Islam" connections with liberal and secular ideas.[63] Neither the German government nor the Turkish government fully controls this institution, a fact which gives more confidence to many Turkish families that prefer their children to receive Islamic education in Milli Görüs' mosques rather than in the DITIB's mosques, moving away from the secular ideas characterizing Turkey. Problematically, Muslim youth increasingly educated by fundamentalist, self-employed imams, who also work in mosques and schools owned by DITIB, Milli Görüs and other movements such as the Gülen Movement,[64] pose significant challenges to the long-term integration of this generation. Imams serve as community leaders and their labor is to provide guidance to Muslims in their everyday lives, helping them with their problems and teaching them morals offered by the Koran. A yet unsolved structural problem is that very few German public schools teach Islamic theology, leaving this important subject to the control of the Turkish government and other Turkish organizations present in Germany. Providing for religious education was one of the reasons why, for example, DITIB was created by the Turkish government. This institution employs imams coming from Turkey for a four-year stay, and they are considered as civil servants that work for the Turkish government. These imams know very little German, and the content and methods of their teachings are largely beyond the control of the German state. Among those imams some have been denominated "the Preachers of Hate,"[65] who are regarded as preaching radical and fundamentalist ideas. Critics affirm that these imams pursue a systematic strategy of indoctrination and recruitment among the Turkish-German immigrant youth to spread fundamentalist, intolerant visions of Islam and the Koran by taking advantage of the kind of identity problems that many migrant youth have. Rauf Ceylan affirms that

> "[Imams are] street-workers, and of course they also hook up with mosque associations, where they give talks on topics that interest younger generations - education problems, youth crime. Once they establish contact, they foster it, and eventually their real agenda surfaces."[66]

As a result, and taking into account that "Germany is afraid of a clash of cultures within its own borders,"[67] the issue of religious education for the Muslim immigrant community has been subject to intense debate among German policy-makers. While the German government has started to develop domestic capacities for Islamic education, such efforts have not yet reached a level able to solve the above described risks and challenges.

The emblematic case of the Turkish Islamic leader, Metin Kaplan, also known as the "Caliph of Cologne," as he called himself, can be taken as a clear example of the previously mentioned "Preachers of the Hate," due to Kaplan's fundamentalist and extremist discourses. He was considered a preacher of fundamentalist Islam and leader of the Turkish community in Germany. He and his family arrived to Germany in the year 1983 looking for political asylum after being expelled from Turkey. They established themselves in the city of Cologne where his father, Cemaledin Kaplan, created an association of Islamic centers and clubs. Germany did not know the reality that this association created by Cemaledin was in fact a hotbed of extremist Islam. After the death of Cameledin Kaplan, his son, Metin Kaplan, occupied his position of leader of the Turkish community and the Islamic association, and soon recognized himself as the "Caliph of the Muslims" or the "emir of the faithful," thereby instrumentalising Islam to raise his own profile. According to the German secret

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[63] Yükleyen, Ahmet (2009). "Compatibility of "Islam" and "Europe": Turkey's EU accession". *Insight Turkey*. 128.

[64] The Gülen Movement is a transnational religious, social and political movement run by the Turkish imam Fetullah Gülen. It owns more than 1000 schools around 130 different countries, as well as think-tanks, radio and TV stations and universities.

[65] Cziesche, Dominik; Schmid, Barbara and Holger Stark (2004). "Muslim Integration: Fighting the Preachers of Hate". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/muslim-integration-fighting-the-preachers-of-hate-a-329735.html

[66] Brand, Andrea and Weinzierl, Alfred (2010). "Interview with Expert on Islam in Europe: "The Role of Imam is different in Germany". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-expert-on-islam-in-europe-the-role-of-imam-is-different-in-germany-a-686713.html

[67] Cziesche, Dominik; Schmid, Barbara and Holger Stark (2004). "Muslim Integration: Fighting the Preachers of Hate". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/muslim-integration-fighting-the-preachers-of-hate-a-329735.html

service, Kaplan's mission was to convince German Muslims that the world should be dominated by Islam and that it was all Muslims' duty to participate in a holy war in order to overthrow Turkey's secular regime and replace it with an Islamist regime based on the Koran.[68] With his extremist ideologies, Kaplan was considered a threat for the German constitutional and democratic order, and after his involvement in the killing of the emir Halil Ibrahim Sofu, who once questioned Kaplan's authority, he was captured and extradited to Turkey in 2004 where he was accused of terrorism and subjected to life imprisonment.

Increasing fundamentalism among young Muslim immigrants is a serious problem today. Third-generation Muslims (approximately 15 to 25 years) are extremists' primary recruitment targets. Living between two different cultures and never fully accepted by either German or Turkish society, these young people especially suffer from the above-mentioned hybrid identities, which fundamentalist head-hunters may easily take advantage of.

In response to such challenges, in 2010 the German Council of Science and Humanities made the proposal to create Islamic theology as a new subject in German public universities, with the aim of fostering better integration of Muslims in Germany, based in "the idea of cultivating a distinctly German form of Islam that is rooted in German institutions or at least mosque leaders with a native knowledge of the German language and the communities they serve."[69] With this kind of control over what is being done in the various Islamic organizations in Germany, the government seeks to prevent integration problems. While Germany does not recognize Islam as an official religion, it has permitted the existence of Islamic associations as well as the import of Turkish imams to serve as leaders of the different Islamic communities due to the small number of schools teaching Islamic theology. Everything has been controlled within the German constitutional framework. However, the controversial issue of the construction of minarets and the broadly debated issue of whether wearing the veil is a matter of freedom of religion are matters that sometimes escape the German constitutional frame. In these examples, balancing migrants' constitutional rights to freedom of religion and worship, and other democratic principles of the German Basic Law,[70] remain matters of controversial public and legal debate.

The prohibition of the construction of minarets in Switzerland, decided by referendum in 2009, has been criticized across Europe, but at the same time hailed by right-wing and far-right parties. It provides evidence of the fear present across Europe of a possible "Islamization,"[71] especially after the September 11th attacks and other Islamist terrorist attacks and due to the high numbers and increasingly visible presence of Muslims living in the European Union. A study conducted by the Stresemann Foundation and the Citizen Times shows the increasing trends of islamization[72] among Turks living in Germany. The following graphic displays changing attitudes of German Turks advocating for a stronger role of Islam in German society:

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[68] Comas, José (2004). "El Califa de Colonia se escurre de la Justicia alemana". *El País Archivo*. Available on the Internet at: http://elpais.com/diario/2004/06/03/internacional/1086213615_850215.html

[69] Angelos, James (2010). "Islam for the Diaspora: Importing Germany's Imams". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islam-for-the-diaspora-importing-germany-s-imams-a-681948.html

[70] Basic Law is the name of the German Constitution.

[71] In this case, Islamization refers to the perceived imposition of Islam in a society with a different social and political background.

[72] In this case, Islamization refers to the tendency towards a more radical view of the Islam.

Graphic 3: Changing Religious Attitudes of Turks Living in Germany (in percent)[73]

Source: Citizen Times, 2012

Similar concerns about this matter in German society were expressed by CDU politician Wolfgang Bosbach in the aftermath of the 2009 Swiss referendum, stating that the vote held in Switzerland was a consequence of a fear of Islamization that also existed in Germany.[74] Soon after the results of the Swiss referendum, German nationalists and far-right parties started supporting anti-minarets and anti-mosque movements[75] with the objective of using "a new European Union law to hold a minaret referendum across the 27 member bloc."[76] However, most observers agreed that the prohibition of minarets in Switzerland does not respond to the basic right of the freedom of religion as stipulated in constitutions across Europe, including the German one. At the same time, it was argued, limiting freedom of worship in such a way is irreconcilable with the tolerance that constitutes one of the main basic values of the European Union. The conservative *Die Welt* stated that "the referendum shows how deep the fear of Islam runs in Europe and that the issue isn't being taken seriously enough by the political elite –and not just Switzerland–. But it doesn't provide a solution to Europe's pressing integration problems."[77]

Another topic linked to religion which is controversially discussed in Germany –and in other European societies– is the degree to which the wearing of full body covers and headscarves is permitted in public spaces. The graphic below shows the high percentage of Turkish girls and women wearing headscarves in comparison to other girls and women from other regions:

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[73]   Strüning, Felix (2012). "Turks in Germany 2012. Study on German-Turkish life and values". *Citizen Times*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.citizentimes.eu/2012/08/23/turks-in-germany-2012/

[74]   Crossland, David (2009). "The World from Berlin: "Germany Would Also Have Voted To Ban Minarets". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-world-from-berlin-germany-would-also-have-voted-to-ban-minarets-a-664231.html

[75]   The most famous anti-mosque movement was the one carried out in Cologne after the planned construction of the new mosque in Cologne's district of Ehrenfeld. After the public pressure, architects had to reduce the size of this mosque.

[76]   *Spiegel Online, International* (2009). "Mosque Madness: German Group Hopes for EU Referendum on Minarets". Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/mosque-madness-german-group-hopes-for-eu-referendum-on-minarets-a-667158.html

[77]   Crossland, David (2009). "The World from Berlin: "Germany Would Also Have Voted To Ban Minarets". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-world-from-berlin-germany-would-also-have-voted-to-ban-minarets-a-664231.html

Graphic 4: Muslim Girls and Women Wearing Headscarves by Region of Origin[78]

Region	Yes	No
Southeast Europe	4,5	95,5
Turkey	31,4	68,6
Central Asia/CIS	4,2	95,8
Iran	2,2	97,8
South/Southeast Asia	28,1	71,9
Middle East	29,5	70,5
North Africa	34,9	65,1
other parts of Africa	22,2	77,8
total	27,6	72,4

■ Yes ■ No

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009

German law bans the wearing of religious symbols such as the Islamic headscarves and full body covers in public institutions, such as schools or the public sector, and many European countries with great numbers of Muslim residing inside their territories hold up similar bans. It is controversial, however, to what degree wearing the various types of veils are mandatory in Islam, and hence banning them is a violation of freedom of religion. At the same time, it is discussed to what extent the wearing of religious symbols by public administration employees violates the freedom of religion of those citizens whom these employees are attending. Defenders of the ban argue that allowing such religious symbols in public spaces would violate the "social order and the state's obligation to remain, neutral when it comes to religious issues."[79] Many well-known public figures of Turkish origin have also spoken up in favor of the ban, such as FDP member Serkan Tören, who stated that Germans "can't allow woman to work in a city office who has no personality because she is completely veiled."[80]

The aforementioned controversies related to religion and religious practices demonstrate the problems and conflicts the integration of predominantly Muslim immigrants implies for German society. They offer evidence that in order for these minorities to integrate into German society and avoid conflicts, a great effort will be necessary on both sides that seeks to grant immigrants the greatest freedom of worship possible while at the same time respecting the norms and traditions of the host society, including balanced legislation that does not reinforce prejudices or discrimination.

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[78] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam".

[79] Reimann, Anna (2011). "Veiled Debate Arrives in Germany: State Prohibits Burqas at Work for Public Employees". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/veiled-debate-arrives-in-germany-state-prohibits-burqas-at-work-for-public-employees-a-743340.html

[80] Reimann, Anna (2011). "Veiled Debate Arrives in Germany: State Prohibits Burqas at Work for Public Employees". *Spiegel Online, International*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/veiled-debate-arrives-in-germany-state-prohibits-burqas-at-work-for-public-employees-a-743340.html

5.1.2. Language

Another important element of the cultural integration is fluent proficiency in the language of the host society. Given the importance of German language fluency for integration into the labor market, the German language skills among the second- and third- generation Turks deserves special attention. Most first generation Turks residing in Germany live with the reality of hardly speak the language of the country in which they are employed and received. This generation of immigrants, being born in Germany, retains strong ties to their Turkish homeland. Many of these now retired former guest-workers still live in the aforementioned parallel societies surrounded by Turkish shops, supermarkets, tea-shops and newsagents, in short, in an environment which makes learning the local language largely unnecessary. By contrast, for their children and grandchildren, second- and third- generation Turkish migrants in Germany, speaking the German language plays an important role in their lives. They have been born in Germany and their lives are grounded in Germany. They attend school, university and enter the labor market in Germany; and the full command of German language is a precondition for their communication and integration into the mainstream community.

Although in 2011 the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasized the fact that Turks residing in Germany should first learn Turkish and then German, the German government insists on the importance of learning the local language in order to improve immigrants' opportunities within the German community. As the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, expressed in a public speech she gave in the opening of the international technology exposition in Hannover in the year 2011, "the integration of Turkish-origin migrants in Germany has a very special meaning for us. I will talk to Turkey's prime minister over what progress has been made and which problems remain to be solved. To me, the focus here is to learn the German language."[81]

While second- and third-generation migrants usually speak German at a native level, this is not always the case when they grow up in the above-mentioned parallel societies, where, embedded in a largely Turkish community, they can get by without a full command of German. This reality poses the risk of a total Turkish segregation from the German mainstream community, with potentially far-reaching socio-economic and security implications. As explained above, the acquisition of citizenship is an important – if only formal – step for a migrant towards integration, which must be complemented by deeper levels of both formal and informal cultural, economic and political integration. Since 2005 the German Federal Government has made the attendance of specific integration courses mandatory. These courses, consisting of 600 hours of language instruction and a 60 hour orientation course dealing with issues of Germany's history, culture, and legal system.[82] A minimum command of the German language has been established as one among the preconditions for the acquisition of German citizenship under the above mentioned "naturalization tests."

Both religion and language play very important roles within the cultural integration of Turks residing in Germany. The non-recognition of Islam, its non-centralized institutional hierarchy, and the interference of the Turkish government bring tremendous difficulties for the German government to control all the irregularities existing within the German society. Likewise, the German language has become so important that even language courses have been implemented as a pre-requisite to acquire citizenship. Second- and third-generation Turks who speak German fluently would probably have more chances for success not only in the labor market, but also in many sectors of German society.

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[81] Euronews (2011). "Merkel insists migrants must learn German". Available on the Internet at: http://www.euronews.com/2011/03/01/merkel-insists-migrants-must-learn-german/

[82] Federal Ministry of the Interior. "Integration Courses". Available on the Internet at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/MigrationIntegration/Integration/IntegrationCourses/Integration_courses_node.html

6. Equal opportunities through economic integration

6.1. Economic integration

The economic integration of migrants into the receiving society is a precondition for their ability to subsist and their socio-economic welfare. Key elements conditioning such opportunities of economic integration are education and employment possibilities.

6.1.1. Education

As discussed above, a full command of the German language greatly facilitates migrants' entry into the labor market. In turn, a lack of language skills largely bars young migrants from finding qualified employment. Beyond the specific language requirement, more broadly, a good educational base greatly improves migrants' chances on the labor market.

The German education system consists of different tracks each of them containing different specificities and objectives. *Hauptschule*,[83] *Realschule*,[84] *Gymnasium*[85] and *Gesamtschule*[86] are the four secondary schooling tracks to which German children are sent after having passed the fourth grade in primary school, or *Grundschule*.[87] Pupils' performance during the four years of primary school determines which secondary school they will attend, with top-markers attending the *Gymnasium* that leads up to the baccalaureate ("*Abitur*"), a precondition for attending university. At the other end of the spectrum, the *Hauptschule*, typically leading up to low-skilled and low-income professions, is the outcome with the least prestige, and is over-proportionally attended by children with immigrant background. When finalizing this educational track, the children are entitled to attend a *Berufsfachschule*,[88] where they have access to practical vocational training, with the aim of working, for example, in the public service at a basic or secretarial level.[89] The *Realschule* comprises six educational courses and at the end, after passing a final exam, students are granted with a certificate. Another possibility is to attend the previously mentioned *Gymnasium* which is the highest educational level one can reach. Going to the *Gymnasium* is the only way students have to later attending university after completing eight or nine years and passing the *Abitur*. The last educational track is the *Gesamtschule* which "combines all three forms of schooling under one roof, allowing students to move from track to track as warranted."[90] The teacher will be the one making recommendations about which school each student should go depending, of course, on their performance during the four years of *Grundschule*. However, the final decision on where to send their child for secondary education lies with the parents. The two graphics

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[83] Equivalent to the American junior high school or middle school, education.
[84] Secondary school without the possibility of going to university.
[85] Secondary grammar school.
[86] Comprehensive school.
[87] Germany's elementary school.
[88] Full-time vocational school.
[89] Maas, Jennifer Marie (2012). "The German Education System: An Impediment to Integration of Turkish Youths into Society. A modest proposal". Kent State University Honors College. 87.
[90] J. Ross, Catherine (2009). "Perennial Outsiders: The Educational Experience of Turkish Youth in Germany". *American University International Law Review*, Volume 24, Issue 5, Article 4. 693.

below show the number of native students and foreign Germans students attending the different educational tracks in 2011:

Graphic 5: Ethnic German Pupils in German Secondary Schools[91]

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2011

Graphic 6: Ethnically Non-German Pupils in German Secondary Schools[92]

Source: Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2011

Both graphs show the differences between the placement of natively German students and foreign pupils, with the former reaching a much higher proportion of attendance of the more prestigious school, segments, while the latter are mostly placed in the least prestigious school, the *Hauptschule*. This disparity is especially significant given that the *Hauptschule*, apart from being the most basic secondary educational track within the German educational system, almost corresponds to a social stigma, being "generally viewed as a dumping ground for children who have learning disabilities, social disorders, are foreign, and especially those children who possess minimal German language skills." The place of birth also plays a significant role: a 2007 study by

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[91]   Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland.

[92]   Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

[93]   Maas, Jennifer Marie (2012). "The German Education System: An Impediment to Integration of Turkish Youths into Society. A modest proposal". Kent State University Honors College. 103.

Roxane Silberman, Richard Alba, and Irène Fournier shows how those children of Turkish origins born in Germany are less likely to be placed in lower educational tracks than those Turkish children arriving to Germany at the age of six.[94]

Most of the second generation Turks hold a German school certificate, at least a *Hauptschule* certificate, which allows them to attend vocational practical training. Özdemir's[95] survey in 2004 reveals that three-fifth of Turks from second generation finished their studies at a *Hauptschule*, now working in unqualified positions; one-fifth at *Realschule* are now working in skilled positions; and less than one-fifth at who attend *Gymnasium* are now occupying high-rank positions.[96]

It is important to mention that the over-proportional placement of foreigners in the lowest-ranking secondary schools is not arbitrary, but reflects their inferior performance in primary schools compared to natively German children.[97] In fact, studies show that among students from the same socio-economic background, those of Turkish origin will be more likely sent to the *Hauptschule* than the German students.[98] Nevertheless, parents make the final decision on where to send their children, hence families' characteristics and aspirations such as their socio-economic background including the job, income and education level of the parents, their skills in the German language, their social networks or their future perspectives play a very important role likely to affect their children's assignment to one school or the other. For example, parents planning to return to Turkey might pay less attention to their children's performance at school when the latter's integration in the Turkish labor market requires skills different from those required by the German system. There are also other distinctions regarding the origins of the parents and the place of birth of these children. Evidence has shown that children of Turkish origin with at least one German parent perform better at school than those with both father and mother of Turkish origin[99] –probably due to the former's superior German language skills. It is also easier for these families to communicate with the teacher on possible performance deficits. Moreover, the German father or mother will be able to help the child with his or her homework–. Other structural reasons for the comparatively low performance of Turkish students include the fact that "they start school relatively late, spend fewer hours in school, receive no structural support outside of school, and then are assigned to stratified tracks just four years after beginning their education, with no time to catch up."[100]

It must be noted, however, that the structural reasons for the lack of equal opportunities for Turkish immigrant children in primary and subsequent schooling segments commented in this section can sometimes be complemented with prejudices and discriminatory treatment from the teacher and/or the school towards foreign children. Given that the German education system pre-selects students according to performance from fourth grade onwards, most Turkish students are at a very early childhood stage barred *de facto* from attending university or similar forms of higher education, which significantly reduces their labor market opportunities. Enhancing equal opportunities in the educational sector by putting a special stress on language

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[94] J. Ross, Catherine (2009). "Perennial Outsiders: The Educational Experience of Turkish Youth in Germany". *American University International Law Review*, Volume 24, Issue 5, Article 4. 693.

[95] Cem Özdemir is a German politician of Turkish origins, co-chairman of the German political party The Greens, member of the German parliament between 1994 and 2002 and euro-parliamentarian from 2004 and 2009.

[96] Brünig, Bianca (2012). "Labor market integration of first and second generation Turkish migrants compared. A German case study". University of Twente, School of Management and Governance.22.

[97] M. Crul and H. Vermeulen quoted in: Crul, Maurice (2007). "Pathways to success for the children of immigrants". Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam. 2.

[98] J. Ross, Catherine (2009). "Perennial Outsiders: The Educational Experience of Turkish Youth in Germany". *American University International Law Review*, Volume 24, Issue 5, Article 4. 693.

[99] Becker, Birgit (2010). "Equal chances by the third generation? Cognitive and language skills of second and third generation children of Turkish origin in Germany". University of Mannheim, Mannheim Center for European Social Research, Germany. EQUALSOC Conference, Amsterdam. 1.

[100] J. Ross, Catherine (2009). "Perennial Outsiders: The Educational Experience of Turkish Youth in Germany". *American University International Law Review*, Volume 24, Issue 5, Article 4. 696.

skills and by targeted policies to improve the performance of children from immigrant backgrounds will therefore be key to these children's subsequent chances and choices on the labor market.

6.1.2. Employment

The level and quality of education is a decisive factor determining chances on the labor market and of reaching higher income levels. This part of the study will assess the situation of Turks within the German labor market in both quantitative (access) and qualitative (which kind of jobs and positions they occupy) dimensions.

As according to Bianca Brünig, not just education, but language skills, social contacts, identification, and citizenship[101] also play a very decisive role when entering the labor market. Therefore, the type of educational level obtained (*Hauptschule, Realschule* or *Gymnasium*), the German language proficiency, having German friends and contacts, the feeling of being identified with Germany, and having or lacking German nationality are likely to be decisive factors determining the chances of Turkish immigrants on the German job market.

Statistics show that Turkish migrants' integration into the German labor market is underproportionally low in both quantitative and qualitative terms. However, studies vary in their assessment. According to Sami Alarbaa, "very few Turks in Germany have a regular job; about 20%. The other 80% live on the so-called Hartz IV (state social benefits). 70% of their children have no GCSE;[102] they left school before they finished their basic education."[103] By contrast, a study conducted by the Green Party politician Cem Özdemir found that in 2000 over 80% of the Turkish younger generation migrants living in Germany was able to enter the labor market.[104] The following graphic shows the employment status of Turks (Muslims and non-Muslims) which at the same time demonstrates that the unemployment-rate is quite low in comparison to those employed:

Graphic 7: Employment Status of Turks Living in Germany (in percent)[105]

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009

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[101] These are the determinants of labor market integration according to Bianca Brünig in her thesis. Brünig, Bianca (2012). "Labor market integration of first and second generation Turkish migrants compared. A German case study". University of Twente, School of Management and Governance. 17-19.

[102] General Certificate of Secondary Education.

[103] Alarbaa, Sami (2013). "Turks in Germany are a Time Bomb". *Family Security Matters*. Available on the Internet at: http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/turks-in-germany-are-a-time-bomb

[104] Cem Özdemir quoted in: Brünig, Bianca (2012). "Labor market integration of first and second generation Turkish migrants compared. A German case study". University of Twente, School of Management and Governance. 20.

[105] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam".

In terms of the job segments in which Turks are represented, a 2005 study by Jansen and Polat[106] displays how the typical jobs occupied by the majority of second-generation Turks residing in Germany are those related to the production sector and especially to the automobile industry. They also claim that a minority of this second generation works in the commercial sector in communication- and insurance-related jobs. Finally, they expose that second-generation Turkish women are usually connected with job positions in the service sector, as well as the commercial departments and social services. The following graphic depicts this occupational standing of Turks (Muslims and non-Muslims) in the German labor market:

Graphic 8: Occupational Standing of Turks (in percent)[107]

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009

The number of blue-collar workers among Muslim Turks is quite high in comparison to those non-Muslim Turkish immigrants who mostly occupy job positions as white-collar workers, civil servants, or self-employed. This could clearly be connected to the fact that, as already mentioned, a high percentage of the Turkish population living in Germany does not hold a high-track school certificate, which limits their opportunities entrance in the German job market occupying high job positions. However, both Muslim and non-Muslim Turks combine to form the Turkish community that resides in Germany; hence, despite the high percentage of Muslim blue-collar Turks, the total number of Turks working as white-collar workers, civil servants, and self-employed workers is higher than the total number of blue-collar Turks. In past decades the number of blue-collar Turks significantly outweighed all other Turks indicating that the job positions occupying by Turks in Germany gradually improved.

Thus, the work life of the Turks living in Germany reveals a clear lack of equal opportunities in correlation with their ethnic and immigration background. This negative correlation perpetuates the lack of equal opportunities first revealed in primary and early secondary education, as shown above. Most of them are laborers and occupy low-income positions in accordance with their lack of well-developed educational background. According to one expert, "the chance of being appointed to a senior professional position is four times greater for a German than for a Turkish migrant"[108] because holding just a *Hauptschule* certificate mostly means that one's chances to enter the labor market successfully will be limited. As a result, job-seekers with Turkish immigration backgrounds enter a vicious circle of economic and social degradation from which it is very difficult to escape.

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[106] Jansen and Polat quoted in: Brünig, Bianca (2012). "Labor market integration of first and second generation Turkish migrants compared. A German case study". University of Twente, School of Management and Governance. 21.

[107] Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009). "Muslim Life in Germany. A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam".

[108] Tröndle, Pamela (2009). "Turkish Migrants in Germany: Completely Integrated?" *Goethe Institüt.* Available on the Internet at: http://www.goethe.de/ges/soz/wsc/en4265929.htm

Conclusions

This study has sought to assess the degree of integration of the Turkish minority in Germany in its political, cultural and economic dimensions. In order to do so, the concept of integration was defined, taking into account the debates carried out in Germany regarding this issue. Given the manifold challenges Germany is facing in this area, and the great degree of controversy involved in discussing how to deal with minorities, German integration policies do not prescribe a specific solution for how to achieve integration. As the above assessment has shown, Germany has not been very successful, to date, in integrating in particular its Muslim immigrant communities. This widely recognized reality has more recently led large sections of the German political elite and society at large to advocate the inclusion of stronger assimilative elements into official integration policies.

However, difficulties do not only stem from negligence in policy- and decision-making. Between 2.5 and 3 million Turks currently reside in Germany, and the cultural and religious diversity that differentiates this group from the German mainstream society makes controversies almost inevitable. As has been explained throughout the study, Turks' equal opportunities are reduced due to deficits in their political, cultural and economic integration. The language and integration courses they have to undertake have limited their access to the German citizenship and the impossibility of maintaining two nationalities obliges them to decide which of the nationalities they want to keep. As most of them still do not have the German citizenship, they cannot participate, neither actively nor passively, in German politics which will probably bring more difficulties for them since there is not going to be a relevant Turkish presence in Parliament with the clear aim of defending their rights and interests.

According to cultural integration, this study has demonstrated the cultural integration deficits on the Turkish side. The institutionalization of Islam has been successful in the case of the DITIB but clearly unsuccessful in the case of the Milli Görüs and other Islamic movements. Controversies have emerged in the German society concerning the construction of minarets, the wearing of headscarves and arranged marriages. The existence of radical and fundamentalist ideologies within the Turkish youth has made integration a more difficult process to be undertaken by second- and third-generation Turks.

Language is another important element to effectively completing the cultural integration, to which the German government gives a lot of relevance. Language courses have been implemented as part of the German integration policies for immigrants accessing citizenship. However, the number of Turks speaking a proficient German is still not enough to be considered a full integration, and their improvement is hindered if they reside within the so-called parallel societies.

Finally, in accordance to the economic integration, Turks lack equal opportunities in the labor market due to their low level of their school certificates which have caused them to not acquire enough requisites to occupy high positions.

The findings exposed throughout this dissertation have provided clear evidence of the lack of equal opportunities the Turkish community has in Germany. However, as already mentioned, this lack comes as a result of Turkish immigrants' deficits in political, cultural, and economic integration. Nevertheless, Germany's difficulties to define and create a concise integration policy, as well as German political parties' contrasting positions towards this issue, have made integration even a more difficult process to be undertaken nearly

entirely by Turks. Improvements should be made in order to achieve a better and a more effective coexistence between both communities. German policy-makers should make greater efforts to reach a consensus on adopting balanced integration policies that take into account the interests of German society and minority groups alike. If Germany facilitates immigrants' access to some social aspects, such as the previously mentioned dual citizenship, migrants would probably respond adequately by adopting the most relevant assimilative elements of Germany, such as the language. However, once the German government liberalizes the access to those main aspects, it would then be migrants' duty to maintain those facilities granted and successfully participate in the German society by undertaking an effective integration process. For this reason, the integration of Turks in Germany relies equally heavily on the personal integration efforts of the Turks as on the integration policies and efforts made by the German government. Thus, both sides must rejuvenate their efforts toward integration if an adequate balance between multiculturalism and assimilation is ever to be achieved.

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
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Resumen: Bajo la hipótesis de que el déficit en la integración política, cultural y económica reduce la probabilidad de igualdad de oportunidades para los ciudadanos de origen turco frente a la población nativa alemana, el propósito de este documento es el de evaluar y analizar el estado de integración de la minoría turca en Alemania.

Abstract: This study assesses the state of integration of the Turkish minority in Germany, under the working hypothesis that deficits in political, cultural and economic integration reduces the likeliness of equal opportunities for citizens with Turkish immigration backgrounds vis-à-vis the native German population.